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YAKASAI BASHIR ALIYU

**The Role of Tribal Relations in the System of Public Administration in
Nigeria**

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Research Supervisor: Abzhapparova Aigul
Abdulmutallipovna, PhD

Foreign Supervisor: Prof. Erhan Dogan
Marmara University
Istanbul, Turkey

Republic of Kazakhstan

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

1. ACF	Arewa Consultative Forum
2. AG	Action Group
3. APC	All Progressives Congress
4. CAN	Christian Association of Nigeria
5. ERGP	Economic Recovery and Growth Plan
6. EUG	Egba United Government
7. FCC	Federal Character Commission
8. FCT	Federal Capital Territory
9. FCP	Federal Character Principle
10. ICPC	Independent Corrupt Practices Commission
11. INEC	Independent National Electoral commission
12. ISWAP	Islamic State West Africa Province
13. IPOB	Indigenous People of Biafra
14. LGA	Local Government Area
15. LP	Labour Party
16. MASSOB	Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
17. MDAs	Ministries, Departments, and Agencies
18. NDDC	Niger Delta Development Commission
19. NEDC	North-East Development Commission
20. NEF	Northern Elders Forum
21. NIMC	National Identity Management System
22. NCNC	National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
23. NNPC	Nigerian National Petroleum Company
24. NNPP	New Nigeria Peoples Party
25. NTA	Nigerian Television Authority
26. NPC	Northern People's Congress
27. NPN	National Party of Nigeria
28. NYSC	National Youth Service Corps
29. OPC	Oduduwa People's Congress
30. PDP	People's Democratic Party
31. PRC	Provisional Ruling Council
32. SMC	Supreme Military Council
33. SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria, a nation characterized by its rich cultural diversity and ethnic plurality, comprises over 250 ethnic groups, with three major tribes the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo dominating the political landscape. This dissertation explores the pervasive role of tribal relations in Nigeria's public administration system, critically examining how tribal affiliations shape governance, policymaking, public service delivery, and national integration. The study analyzes the intersection of tribalism and public administration in Nigeria, investigating its historical roots, contemporary manifestations, and potential implications for effective governance.

Relevance of Study

Tribalism, while often viewed as a cultural marker, has profound implications for Nigeria's political and administrative systems. Since the colonial era, when British policies leveraged ethnic divisions for administrative convenience, tribalism has been embedded into the fabric of Nigeria's governance structures. Despite the country's formal commitment to national unity and federalism, tribal relations continue to influence the distribution of resources, political appointments, and the functioning of public institutions.

This dissertation is motivated by the need to understand how Nigeria's tribal relations contribute to the challenges of public sector inefficiency, corruption, and uneven development. It interrogates the extent to which tribal allegiances conflict with the principles of meritocracy and inclusiveness, raising critical questions about the sustainability of such a system in a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria.

Objectives of the Research

The primary aim of this study is to critically assess the role of tribal relations in shaping the functioning and outcomes of Nigeria's public administration. **Objectives of the study are:**

1. Examine the historical evolution of tribalism in Nigeria's governance structures, particularly during the colonial and post-colonial periods.
2. Analyze the influence of tribal relations on recruitment, promotions, and decision-making processes as well as resources distribution within Nigeria's public sector.
3. Investigate how tribalism affects the distribution of public resources, including education, healthcare, and infrastructure.
4. Explore the implications of tribalism for national integration, peace building, and political stability in Nigeria.
5. Propose strategies for mitigating the negative impacts of tribal relations on public administration to enhance governance and development outcomes.

Object and Subject of the Study:

The Object of the study is: Public Administration System of Nigeria

The Subject of the study is: Role of Tribal Relation

The Variables and Feature in the whole study should consist of:

Tribe: Here means the Nigerian smaller Tribes and Ethnic Groups (Hence Nigeria has both)

Public Administration here means: National Government, Human Resources, Tribal Institutions or Institutions that relate to tribal composition, The state Parliament. Federal and State and Local Government. Federal Character, Public and Policy Institutions Political Parties and Public Service Delivery.

Tribal Relations here means: Tribal Relations regarding, Economic, Resource Distribution, perception of fairness, Inter-tribal institutions and policies, Colonial History through tribal relation, Tribal Representation in Policy Decision-Making, Perception of Fairness and Equity, Socio-economic Impacts of Tribal Relations, Case studies of specific Nigerian election to highlight variations in tribal influence. **Institutional Framework and Anti-Discrimination Policies:** Study of existing policies aimed at reducing tribal bias. **Inter-Tribal Relations and Conflict Management.** Analysis of inter-tribal conflicts and their impact on public administration.

Method and Methodology

This dissertation employs a **mixed-methods approach**, integrating both qualitative and quantitative research techniques to provide a comprehensive analysis of the role of tribal relations in Nigerian public administration. The study draws from primary and secondary sources, including government documents, policy reports, existing literature, and published materials on Nigerian public administration and tribalism. This multi-source approach ensures a well-rounded understanding of how tribal affiliations influence governance, policy implementation, and bureaucratic efficiency.

A **case study method** is adopted to provide an in-depth examination of the interaction between tribal dynamics and public administration within Nigeria. The case study approach allows for a detailed analysis of specific instances of tribal influence in governmental institutions, shedding light on patterns of favoritism, nepotism, and administrative inefficiencies that may arise due to ethnic affiliations. Case studies of selected the Nigeria's 2023 presidential election (see page 44-45), findings illustrate broader trends affecting governance in Nigeria, especially in relation to tribal affiliation.

Furthermore, ethnographic methods were incorporated through direct observation to capture the lived experiences of individuals within Nigeria's tribal relation. Specifically, by participating in the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) in Nigeria 2023 (see appendix E, page 142). By immersing in the multi tribal environment and observing interactions among civil servants and civilians from different ethnic backgrounds, the study provides nuanced insights into how tribal affiliations shape administrative decisions, workplace dynamics, and inter-group relations. Ethnographic data enriches qualitative analysis by uncovering informal structures, cultural practices, and implicit biases that may not be readily apparent in official records.

To complement the qualitative study part, a survey was conducted among Nigerian citizens representing both major and minor tribes. The survey quantitatively assesses public perceptions of tribalism in Nigeria's public administration, its effects on a plural society, and its implications for public service efficiency and fairness (see appendix F, page 137-159). By analyzing statistical trends and correlating them with qualitative findings, the study ensures a general holistic evaluation of how ethnic diversity impacts governance outcomes.

Through this combined methodological framework incorporating case study analysis, ethnographic observation, and quantitative survey research this dissertation seeks to offer a comprehensive and evidence-based understanding of how tribal affiliations influence Nigeria's public administration and governance structures.

Theoretical, Conceptual and Empirical Framework

The theoretical, conceptual, and empirical foundation of this dissertation is grounded in a comprehensive synthesis of classical and contemporary scholarship on ethnicity, governance, and public administration in plural societies, with particular emphasis on the Nigerian context. Nigeria, as a highly heterogeneous state comprising over 250 ethnic groups [28], represents a prototypical case of a plural society in which ethnic identities remain deeply embedded within political and administrative processes. The theoretical grounding of this study begins with the recognition that post-colonial African states, including Nigeria, are characterized by structural dualities and competing loyalties that shape governance and institutional outcomes.

Central to this understanding is the seminal contribution of Ekeh [1], whose theory of the "Two Publics" provides a foundational explanation for the persistence of ethnic influence in public administration. Ekeh [1] argues that African societies operate within two distinct but coexisting public spheres: the primordial public, which is rooted in ethnic, kinship, and communal identities and is governed by strong moral obligations, and the civic public, which represents the formal state and is often perceived as amoral, distant, and lacking legitimacy. This dual moral structure produces a situation in which individuals prioritize obligations to their ethnic groups while simultaneously exploiting state institutions for personal or collective gain, thereby undermining bureaucratic neutrality and institutional effectiveness [1;57].

The implications of this duality for public administration in Nigeria are profound. Empirical observations within Nigerian governance structures demonstrate that recruitment, promotion, and resource allocation are frequently influenced by ethnic considerations rather than meritocratic principles, reflecting the dominance of the primordial public over the civic public [5]. This dynamic is further reinforced by colonial legacies, particularly the British policy of indirect

rule, which institutionalized ethnic divisions and entrenched identity-based governance structures that persist in the post-independence era. The colonial construction of Nigeria as an artificial state composed of diverse and often competing ethnic groups created conditions in which ethnic loyalty became a primary mechanism for political mobilization and access to state resources [41]. As such, the persistence of tribal relations in Nigeria's public administration cannot be understood without reference to these historical and structural foundations.

Complementing Ekeh's theoretical framework is Joseph's [9;315] concept of prebendalism, which provides a political-economic explanation for the operation of ethnic patronage within the Nigerian state. Joseph [9] conceptualizes prebendalism as a system in which public offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated and distributed by officeholders to benefit their ethnic constituencies. In this system, political actors perceive their positions not as instruments of public service but as opportunities for personal enrichment and the advancement of group interests. This perspective explains the prevalence of patronage, nepotism, and corruption within Nigeria's public administration, as well as the persistent linkage between ethnicity and access to state resources [315]. Empirical studies have consistently demonstrated that prebendal practices shape administrative behavior in Nigeria, particularly in the allocation of government positions, contracts, and development projects, thereby reinforcing ethnic inequalities and undermining institutional efficiency [9;225;315]. The relevance of prebendalism to this study lies in its ability to explain why formal institutional reforms aimed at promoting meritocracy often fail, as they conflict with deeply entrenched expectations of ethnic redistribution and political patronage.

While Ekeh and Joseph provide critical insights into the structural and behavioral dimensions of ethnicity in governance, Lijphart's [12;13] theory of consociational democracy offers an institutional framework for managing ethnic diversity in deeply divided societies. Lijphart [12] argues that stability in plural societies can be achieved through power-sharing arrangements that ensure the inclusion of all major groups in governance. These arrangements typically include grand coalitions, proportional representation, mutual veto rights, and segmental autonomy [13]. In the Nigerian context, elements of consociationalism are evident in the federal system of government, the creation of states to accommodate ethnic diversity, and the Federal Character Principle, which mandates equitable representation of ethnic groups in public institutions [56]. These mechanisms are designed to mitigate ethnic conflict, promote inclusivity, and enhance the legitimacy of the state. However, the application of consociational principles in Nigeria has produced mixed outcomes. While they have contributed to relative political stability and reduced the risk of domination by any single ethnic group,

they have also institutionalized ethnic identity as a central organizing principle of governance, thereby reinforcing the very divisions they seek to manage [12;13].

The complexity of ethnic relations in African governance is further illuminated by the work of Chabal and Daloz [11], who challenge conventional notions of state failure by arguing that what appears as disorder in African politics may, in fact, be a deliberate and functional system of governance. According to Chabal and Daloz [11], political elites often instrumentalize informal networks, including ethnic and kinship ties, to maintain power and control resources. In this perspective, the persistence of ethnic politics and administrative inefficiencies is not merely a consequence of weak institutions but a reflection of strategic choices by political actors who benefit from the existing system [225]. This interpretation is particularly relevant to Nigeria, where ethnic networks serve as both sources of legitimacy and mechanisms of resource distribution, thereby sustaining the political order despite apparent inefficiencies.

In addition to these core theoretical perspectives, this study draws on broader scholarship on ethnicity, nationalism, and nation-building in Nigeria. Igwara [312] provides a critical analysis of the role of ethnicity in shaping political identity and state legitimacy in post-civil war Nigeria, arguing that efforts at nation-building have been constrained by the enduring salience of ethnic affiliations. Igwara's work is particularly significant in highlighting the tension between national integration and ethnic pluralism, a tension that is central to the functioning of Nigeria's public administration [312]. Although Igwara [312] does not focus specifically on administrative structures, her analysis underscores the broader socio-political context within which public administration operates, thereby complementing the theoretical perspectives employed in this study.

Conceptually, this dissertation develops an integrated framework that links tribal relations to key outcomes in public administration, particularly trust in governance. The conceptual model is built on the premise that ethnic dynamics influence both the processes and outcomes of public administration through multiple pathways [313]. Specifically, the study operationalizes tribal relations through four key dimensions: recruitment fairness, influence of tribal affiliation, federal character impact, and service delivery efficiency. Recruitment fairness captures the extent to which administrative appointments are perceived as merit-based, while the influence of tribal affiliation reflects the degree to which ethnicity shapes decision-making processes within public institutions [306]. The federal character impact represents the perceived effectiveness of institutional mechanisms designed to ensure inclusivity and equitable representation, and service delivery efficiency measures the performance of public institutions in meeting citizens' needs [56]. These variables are hypothesized to influence trust in public administration, which serves as the central dependent variable in the study.

The conceptual relationships proposed in this framework are grounded in the theoretical perspectives discussed above. Relevant to Ekeh's work [1], the study posits that strong ethnic loyalties undermine trust in state institutions by reinforcing the primacy of the primordial public over the civic public. From the perspective of prebendalism, the influence of tribal affiliation is expected to negatively affect trust by fostering perceptions of corruption and inequality [9]. Conversely, consistent with consociational theory, the federal character principle is expected to have a positive impact on trust by enhancing perceptions of fairness and inclusivity [13]. However, the relationship between service delivery efficiency and trust is expected to be more complex, as existing literature suggests that in multi-ethnic societies, perceptions of fairness may be more important than actual performance in shaping citizens' attitudes toward government [306].

Empirically, the relationship between ethnicity and governance in Nigeria has been extensively documented in the literature. Studies by Ayoade [5] and Joseph [9] provide evidence of the pervasive influence of ethnic considerations in political and administrative processes, while more recent analyses highlight the continued relevance of these dynamics in contemporary governance. The findings of this dissertation build on and extend this body of literature by providing new empirical evidence based on a mixed-methods approach that combines survey data, ethnographic observation, and case study analysis. The empirical results indicate that tribal relations continue to play a significant role in shaping public administration outcomes in Nigeria [306], particularly in terms of trust and perceptions of fairness. Notably, the study finds that the federal character principle emerges as a statistically significant positive predictor of trust in public administration, suggesting that institutional mechanisms aimed at promoting inclusivity can enhance legitimacy even in the presence of broader governance challenges.

This finding contributes to the existing literature by challenging the dominant emphasis on performance-based explanations of public trust. While traditional theories of public administration often prioritize efficiency and service delivery as key determinants of trust, the results of this study suggest that in multi-ethnic contexts such as Nigeria, perceived fairness and inclusivity may be more important [313]. This aligns with the broader theoretical insights of consociationalism and supports the argument that legitimacy in plural societies is fundamentally linked to the equitable distribution of power and resources [314]. At the same time, the persistence of prebendal practices and the influence of the primordial public highlight the limitations of institutional reforms that do not address the underlying socio-cultural dynamics of ethnicity.

Concisely, the integration of Ekeh's theory of the Two Publics, Joseph's concept of prebendalism, Lijphart's model of consociational democracy, and the broader literature on inter-ethnic relations and nation-building provides a

comprehensive framework for analyzing the role of tribal relations in Nigeria's public administration [1;12;13]. The empirical findings of the study offer new insights into the mechanisms through which these dynamics influence trust and administrative outcomes.

Key Findings

The findings of this dissertation provide strong empirical and analytical evidence that tribal relations remain a central and structuring force within Nigeria's public administration system, shaping both institutional processes and governance outcomes. Drawing from the mixed-methods approach adopted in this study; including survey data, ethnographic observations, and the case study of the 2023 presidential election, the results demonstrate that ethnic and tribal affiliations continue to exert significant influence over recruitment practices, political behavior, resource distribution, and public trust in governance. These findings reinforce earlier theoretical claims that ethnicity is not merely a social identity in Nigeria but a functional mechanism embedded within the state structure itself [1; 12].

With specific reference to the 2023 presidential election analyzed in [see chapter 2], the study reveals that electoral behavior in Nigeria remains deeply ethnicized, with voting patterns largely aligning along tribal and regional lines. The major candidates, representing different geopolitical and ethnic constituencies mobilized support primarily through identity-based appeals rather than policy-driven campaigns. The emergence of voting blocs across the North, South-West, and South-East illustrates the persistence of ethnic political alignment, where voters prioritize shared identity over ideological or programmatic considerations. This finding is consistent with existing scholarship on ethnic voting in Nigeria, which highlights the role of identity politics in shaping electoral outcomes [5;12]. The case study further demonstrates that the perceived legitimacy of election results is often filtered through ethnic lenses, with post-election reactions reflecting regional and tribal sentiments rather than a unified national perspective.

Moreover, the 2023 election provides empirical support for the relevance of consociational dynamics in Nigeria's political system. The informal practice of power rotation between the North and South, as well as the strategic balancing of ethnic representation in political party structures, reflects an attempt to maintain stability in a highly divided society [13]. However, the findings indicate that while such arrangements may reduce overt conflict, they do not eliminate underlying tensions. Instead, they institutionalize ethnic considerations as a prerequisite for political participation, thereby reinforcing identity-based governance rather than transcending it. The continued marginalization of certain groups, particularly the absence of a South-East presidency since 1999, further underscores the limitations

of existing power-sharing mechanisms and raises critical questions about the inclusivity of Nigeria's democratic system.

Beyond the electoral context, the findings on the role of tribal relations in public administration provide deeper insight into how these dynamics operate within state institutions [see chapter 3]. The survey results indicate that a fair percentage of the respondents perceive recruitment and promotion within the public service as influenced by tribal affiliation rather than merit. This perception aligns with the theoretical expectations of prebendalism, where public offices are treated as avenues for distributing benefits to one's ethnic group [12].

At the same time, the findings reveal a more nuanced relationship between tribal relations and governance outcomes, particularly in relation to public trust. While the influence of tribal affiliation is generally associated with negative perceptions of fairness and efficiency, the study finds that the Federal Character Principle despite its criticisms, plays a significant role in enhancing trust in public administration. Statistical analysis shows that the Federal Character Impact is the only variable with a significant positive effect on trust ($p \approx 0.046$), suggesting that citizens value inclusive representation even when it may come at the expense of meritocratic efficiency. This finding is particularly important, as it challenges conventional assumptions in public administration theory that prioritize performance and service delivery as the primary drivers of trust. Instead, the results indicate that in a multi-ethnic context such as Nigeria, perceived fairness and equitable representation are more critical determinants of legitimacy [13].

Furthermore, the findings highlight the dual nature of tribal relations as both a source of constraint and a mechanism of cohesion. On one hand, tribalism contributes to inefficiencies, corruption, and administrative fragmentation by promoting nepotism and undermining merit-based practices. This is evident in the persistence of patronage networks and the uneven distribution of public resources across regions. On the other hand, tribal affiliations provide individuals with a sense of identity, belonging, and informal support within a complex and often unreliable institutional environment. This multifaceted nature reflects Ekeh's concept of the two publics, where loyalty to the primordial public coexists with participation in the civic public, creating tensions but also sustaining social order [1].

The study also finds that institutional frameworks designed to manage ethnic diversity, such as federalism, state creation, and unity institutions have had mixed success. While these mechanisms have contributed to reducing large-scale conflict and ensuring a degree of representation for minority groups, they have also led to the proliferation of identity-based competition and political fragmentation. The creation of states, for instance, has enabled greater local autonomy but has simultaneously intensified demands for further subdivision and resource control. Similarly, unity institutions such as the NYSC promote inter-

ethnic interaction but are often limited in their ability to overcome deeply rooted prejudices and structural inequalities.

In addition, the findings reveal that public perceptions of governance are strongly influenced by the interaction between tribal relations and service delivery. Although service delivery efficiency is positively associated with trust, its impact is less significant compared to that of perceived fairness and representation. This suggests that citizens may tolerate inefficiencies in governance as long as they feel adequately represented within the system. Conversely, even effective service delivery may not translate into trust if it is perceived as benefiting only certain ethnic groups. This insight underscores the importance of balancing performance with inclusivity in policy design and implementation.

Overall, the findings of this dissertation confirm that tribal relations are not peripheral but central to the functioning of Nigeria's public administration system. They shape not only formal structures and policies but also informal practices, perceptions, and outcomes. The persistence of ethnic influence across both political and administrative domains highlights the need for a more nuanced understanding of governance in multi-ethnic societies, one that recognizes the interplay between identity, institutions, and legitimacy.

Implications for Public Policy and Governance

The dissertation highlights the need for reforms aimed at reducing the influence of tribalism in Nigeria's public administration system. This includes the promotion of merit-based recruitment and promotion processes, as well as the enforcement of policies aimed at fostering national unity, such as the Federal Character Principle. However, the study cautions that such reforms must be implemented with sensitivity to the complexities of Nigeria's ethnic landscape, as blanket policies may inadvertently exacerbate tribal tensions if not carefully managed.

Tribalism remains a double-edged sword in Nigeria's public administration system on one hand, it reflects the country's rich cultural diversity; on the other, it hinders the development of a meritocratic and efficient governance structure. The findings of this dissertation underscore the urgency of addressing the structural and cultural factors that perpetuate tribalism in Nigeria's public sector. By doing so, the country can move toward a more inclusive and effective public administration system, capable of meeting the needs of all its citizens, irrespective of tribal affiliation.

Contribution of the study to the field of knowledge

This study contributes to the growing body of literature on governance in multi-ethnic societies and offers practical policy recommendations for Nigeria's ongoing quest for national unity and administrative efficiency. Ultimately, it calls for a balanced approach that respects cultural identities while promoting the ideals of fairness, meritocracy, and national integration in Nigeria's public administration.

Study Hypotheses

This dissertation posits that tribal relations significantly influence the structure, processes, and outcomes of public administration in Nigeria. Specifically, it hypothesizes that:

H1: Recruitment fairness positively influences trust in public administration.

H2: Influence of tribal affiliation negatively affects trust in public administration.

H3: Federal character impact positively influences trust in public administration.

H4: Service delivery efficiency positively influences trust in public administration.

The research aims to test these hypotheses through qualitative and quantitative analysis, evaluating how tribalism interacts with public administration systems and identifying potential pathways for reform as the general expected outcome of the study.

Assumptions and Summary of Results and Findings:

As the findings of this study, derived from the 2023 presidential election case study [see chapter 2] and the quantitative survey analysis [see chapter 3], provide clear numerical and statistical evidence supporting the central assumptions of this research on the role of tribal relations in Nigeria's public administration system.

From the 2023 presidential election, the results show that Bola Ahmed Tinubu won the election with 8,794,726 votes, followed by Atiku Abubakar with 6,984,520 votes, and Peter Obi with 6,101,533 votes. The distribution of these votes reflects strong ethnic and regional alignment: Tinubu dominated in the South-West (Yoruba base), Atiku in the North (Hausa-Fulani base), while Obi secured overwhelming support in the South-East (Igbo base). This numerical pattern confirms that electoral success in Nigeria is strongly tied to ethnic population strength and regional loyalty rather than purely national appeal, thereby validating the assumption that tribal identity remains a primary determinant of political outcomes. The implication is that political power is effectively negotiated through ethnic blocs, reinforcing the embedded role of tribal relations in governance structures.

From the quantitative survey [see Appendix G], the dataset shows a balanced ethnic representation including Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo, and minority groups, ensuring cross-regional validity of findings. The descriptive statistics indicate that a clear majority of respondents (well above 50%) agreed that tribal affiliation influences recruitment and promotion in public administration, confirming the structural presence of ethnic bias in administrative processes. This directly supports H2 (Influence of tribal affiliation negatively affects trust), which is further validated by the regression analysis showing a negative coefficient for tribal influence on trust, indicating that as ethnic interference increases, trust in public institutions decreases.

Regarding H1 (Recruitment fairness positively influences trust), the findings show that although respondents generally perceive recruitment fairness as important, the statistical results indicate that its effect is not statistically significant in the regression model. This means that while fairness matters normatively, it does not independently drive trust when ethnic dynamics are present, suggesting that fairness is overshadowed by broader perceptions of group inclusion.

The most important quantitative result emerges from H3 (Federal Character Impact positively influences trust). The regression results in Appendix G show that Federal Character Impact is the only statistically significant predictor of trust at ($p \approx 0.046$). This indicates that respondents strongly associate ethnic representation and inclusivity with legitimacy, even when efficiency is compromised. In practical terms, this means that citizens are more likely to trust a government that reflects their ethnic identity than one that performs efficiently but appears exclusionary.

For H4 (Service delivery efficiency positively influences trust), the results show a positive but statistically insignificant relationship. Although respondents acknowledge that better service delivery improves satisfaction, the regression findings demonstrate that efficiency alone does not significantly predict trust in the presence of ethnic considerations. This reinforces the conclusion that performance is secondary to representation in Nigeria's governance context.

Generally, the combined quantitative evidence from the election and survey results leads to a clear assumption: tribal relations are structurally embedded and statistically significant in shaping both political outcomes and administrative trust in Nigeria. The election results demonstrate that political power is distributed along ethnic lines, while the survey findings confirm that public administration operates within the same logic of ethnic influence.

The most critical implication of these findings is that legitimacy in Nigeria's public administration is driven more by perceived ethnic inclusion (Federal Character) than by meritocracy or service efficiency. This confirms the study's central argument that tribal relations are not merely a social factor but a core institutional mechanism shaping governance outcomes. Therefore, any reform aimed at improving Nigeria's public administration must balance merit-based efficiency with equitable ethnic representation, as removing one in favor of the other may undermine either trust or performance within the system

Other primary assumption synthesized from the study are:

1. **Ethnic Diversity and Political Fragmentation:** Nigeria's multi-ethnic composition has historically contributed to political fragmentation and competition, necessitating the application of consociationalism to manage ethnic tensions effectively [12].

2. **Federalism as a Conflict Management Tool:** The federal structure of Nigeria, including state creation and the Federal Character Principle, is assumed to be a deliberate mechanism for reducing ethnic friction and promoting national integration by ensuring equitable representation of diverse ethnic groups.
3. **Prebendalism and Elite Dominance:** The political system is heavily influenced by prebendalism, which fosters an elitist and hierarchical structure where political positions are often seen as opportunities for personal and group enrichment rather than public service [9].
4. **Consociationalism as an Applied Theory:** The principles of consociational democracy such as power-sharing, proportional representation, and mutual vetoes are assumed to be essential in sustaining Nigeria's heterogeneous public administration and ensuring a balance of power among ethnic groups.
5. **State Creation as a Means of Ethnic Balance:** The continuous creation of states in Nigeria is assumed to be an effective strategy for mitigating ethnic dominance, ensuring political inclusion, and addressing historical grievances of marginalized groups.
6. **The Role of Federal Character Commission (FCC):** The FCC is assumed to be a critical institutional framework designed to prevent ethnic monopolization of government positions and ensure fair distribution of resources.
7. **Weak Institutional Structures and Corruption:** It is assumed that despite formal frameworks like federalism and consociationalism, weak institutions and corruption undermine equitable governance and prevent the effective implementation of inclusive policies.

The study concludes that while federalism, state creation, and the Federal Character principle have provided a structural framework for ethnic inclusion in Nigeria's public administration, they have not fully eliminated elite dominance, corruption, and ethnic rivalry. A more robust implementation of these frameworks, alongside political and electoral reforms, is necessary to foster a truly inclusive and merit-based governmental system.

The Research Novelties of the Study

This study introduces several novel contributions to the field of political science and public administration or Ethnic study specifically in Nigeria. The study is the first of its type that exclusively study the intersection of Nigerian tribes and their relation in public administration. Although Igwara studies something slightly similar to this [312], her study was on ethnicity and nation building. The thesis creates some novelties as follow:

1. First, it presents a uniquely balanced, pan-ethnic, and multi-state data set that enables comparative cross-regional analysis of ethnic relations and administrative trust. By employing a purposive and stratified sample of 600 valid responses drawn from six states representing Nigeria's three major geo-political zones; Kano and Kaduna in the North, Lagos and Oyo in the West and Enugu and

Port Harcourt in the East. The study ensures the inclusion of the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo and minority ethnic groups. This methodological approach goes beyond the conventional single region focus of earlier works by some scholars, thereby offering a more representative and generalizable understanding of how ethnic affiliation influences public administration and governance in a multi-ethnic federation.

2. The research distinguishes itself by adopting a triangulated design that combines historical-institutional analysis, a contemporary political case study, quantitative surveys, and ethnographic field observations. The integration of the 2023 presidential election case study with a national survey and direct participant observation through the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) program provides a rare combination of breadth and depth. This hybrid design bridges the gap between macro-level institutional structures and micro-level human experiences, creating a comprehensive empirical narrative that illuminates both systemic and behavioral dimensions of ethnic influence in governance.

3. The study develops and laid an original analytical model of trust in public administration, anchored on four key governance levers: Recruitment Fairness, Influence of Tribal Affiliation, Federal Character Impact, and Service Delivery Efficiency. Through rigorous statistical testing, the research demonstrates that among these four levers, only Federal Character Impact emerges as a statistically significant positive predictor of public trust ($p \approx 0.046$). This finding contributes a new empirical hierarchy of determinants of administrative trust in Nigeria, showing that procedural inclusivity and perceived fairness in representation are more decisive than performance-based efficiency in shaping citizens' confidence in government institutions.

4. Another excellent novelty lies in the study's methodological rigor and transparency. The research employs advanced diagnostic tools such as Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) analysis to confirm the absence of multicollinearity, residual normality testing to verify model validity, and Harman's single-factor test to rule out common-method bias. Furthermore, the study highlights the collective contribution of the predictors by demonstrating that removing non-significant variables reduces the model's explanatory power (R^2). This meticulous attention to diagnostic integrity enhances the reliability and credibility of the study findings, an aspect rarely achieved in previous similar studies conducted in developing contexts.

5. The theoretical framework of the study represents a distinctive synthesis of multiple perspectives of Consociationalism, Prebendalism, Ekeh's theory of the Two Publics, and Institutional Theory to a unified analytic model, such theoretical construction is novel. This construction provides a deeper explanation

of why symbols of fairness and inclusion (such as the Federal Character Principle) can generate higher trust even when performance indicators remain weak. The integration of these theoretical traditions offers a holistic interpretation of Nigeria's administrative dynamics, bridging normative, structural as well as behavioral dimensions of governance.

6. In addition, the study provides a contemporary governance insight that challenges traditional performance-based theories of public trust previously utilized. The finding that perceived fairness in representation significantly outweighs service delivery efficiency underscores the sociopolitical reality of multi-ethnic societies, where legitimacy often depends more on the fairness of inclusion than on technical performance. This revelation contributes not only to Nigerian scholarship but also to the broader discourse on governance and trust in divided societies like Nigeria, offering policy makers a refined understanding of the conditions necessary for building sustainable and united administrative legitimacy.

Main Provisions for the Thesis Defense

The decision to submit this dissertation for defense lies in several concrete and substantiated provisions that demonstrate its scholarly fitness and academic maturity.

1. The study possesses a clearly articulated problem definition, coherent research objectives, and precisely formulated hypotheses that are empirically testable. Each research objective directly corresponds to a measurable variable, and the hypotheses are explicitly stated and validated through statistical evidence. The internal coherence highlights the study's logical structure and scientific fairness.

2. The methodological design of the research is both comprehensive and transparent. By combining qualitative and quantitative approaches, the author employed a multi-stage sampling method and utilizing standardized Likert-scale instruments (as seen from the Appendix D pg147) the study ensures replicability and methodological validity. The detailed description of sampling, data collection, and analysis procedures, which were supported by SPSS based regression models provides a solid foundation for validity.

3. In the third provision; the thesis yields original empirical findings that are directly relevant to public policy and administrative reform. The statistically significant relationship between Federal Character Impact and public trust reveals a previously under-explored mechanism through which inclusivity affects governance legitimacy. This outcome reinforces the theoretical claims of the

dissertation and positions the study as a practical contribution to Nigeria's ongoing discourse on representation, meritocracy and nation-building.

4. The thesis laid both thematic breadth and analytical depth by traversing historical, institutional, political, and social dimensions of Nigeria's administrative evolution. From colonial administrative legacies to the 2023 presidential election (modern), and from federal restructuring to inter-ethnic interactions within unity institutions in Nigeria, the research shows a command of interdisciplinary knowledge.

5. The inclusion of comprehensive appendices at the end of the dissertation which encompasses the full survey instrument, detailed respondent data, and methodological tables tried transparency and completeness. As the appendices materials allow for independent verification of the study's findings and reinforce the credibility of the analytical procedures in the dissertation research. The appendices demonstrate that the research process was systematic, ethical and verifiable.

6. Finally, the scholarly merit of this work has already been externally validated through peer-reviewed publications. Portions of the dissertation have been published in reputable journals that include two SCOPUS-indexed (Q1-Q2). So, this achievement shows both the originality and the academic value of the research, confirming its readiness for public defense and contribution to global field of knowledge.

Approbation of the Dissertation study result:

The main provisions of the study are published in nine articles in total, two of them in journals indexed on SCOPUS database (both Q1) with 88 and 91 percentiles respectively. Four of the articles in journals recommended by the Committee for Quality Assurance in the Science and Higher Education Ministry of Kazakhstan and others as report in local and international conferences. The articles are as follows: 1. Role of Tribal Relations in the Public Administration System of Nigeria. 2. Ethnic Politics Towards the Influence of Voter's Behavior: A Case Study of Nigeria's 2023 Presidential Election. 3. Nigeria's System of Government and Administration from the Post-Colonial Era to Date. 4. Inter-Ethnic Relation in a Multi-Ethnic Society. 5. The Concept of Pluralistic Society: An Overview of Nigerian Tribes. 6. The Impact of Tribes in the System of State Governance in Nigeria. 7. Unity or Division: The Impact of Modern Media in Promoting Peace or Developing Conflict. 8. Introduction of ICT to Reshape Public Institutions in Rural Areas.

The study is structured in the following format:

Chapter one presents an overview of the Nigerian public administration system and its historical relationship with tribal structures, providing the

theoretical and contextual foundation of the study. The second chapter examines the Nigerian system of public administration through a detailed case study of the 2023 presidential election, highlighting the practical manifestation of tribal relations in political processes. The third chapter focuses on the core subject of the research, analyzing the role of tribal relations within the public administration system of Nigeria, supported by empirical data and field observations. The final chapter presents the methodology and the results of the research, including statistical analysis, interpretation of findings, and hypothesis testing. The concluding section provides a comprehensive summary of the study, alongside policy recommendations and the full list of references.

The dissertation is further supported by a range of supplementary materials, including **15 figures, 8 tables, 7 appendices, and 316 references**, which enhance the transparency, validity, and reproducibility of the research. The appendices play a critical role in documenting the research process and providing additional empirical evidence. Specifically, they include the survey instrument used for data collection, detailed respondent data and statistical outputs, ethnographic observation records from the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), and other supporting materials relevant to the study.

Given that this research involves human participants through survey data collection and ethnographic observation, strict ethical standards were observed throughout the research process. The study received formal approval from the Legal and Ethical Committee (LEC), ensuring compliance with established research ethics concerning participant consent, confidentiality, and data protection. The ethical approval was granted under **LEC Number IRB – A1657 dated 27th May 2025**. The official approval document is included in **Appendix C**, providing verification of the study's adherence to ethical research standards.

1 NIGERIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM AND TRIBAL HISTORY

1.1 Theoretical Study of Nigerian Tribes and Public Administration

The destiny of Nigeria happened to be a mosaic of different colors in terms of ethnic origin, which was due to its colonial history. The public administration system in Nigeria is deeply influenced by the country's complex socio-cultural landscape, in which tribal and ethnic affiliations play a significant role. Nigeria, often described as the Giant of Africa, is home to more than 250 ethnic groups, with the three largest being the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo and a mixture of other smaller tribes termed as the minority. Each of these groups has unique cultural, historical, and socio-political characteristics, which collectively shape the dynamics of governance and public service delivery [1]. In Nigeria, "tribe" and "ethnic group" are often used interchangeably, though they hold nuanced distinctions. Both terms relate to Nigeria's rich social diversity. The term "tribe" historically emphasizes cultural identity and traditional social organization, whereas "ethnic group" includes broader markers such as shared ancestry, language, and political affiliation [2].

In the Nigerian context, these terms overlap due to the strong association between cultural heritage and political identity, which shapes social interactions and influences public administration. The intertwining of these terms reflects the depth of Nigeria's ethnic diversity, where social affiliations profoundly influence political and administrative frameworks. The interplay of these tribal relations within Nigeria's public administration system reflects the multifaceted identity of the nation and has considerable implications for governance effectiveness, equity, and national development. The tribal dynamics of Nigeria can be traced to its colonial history, which consolidated diverse ethnic groups under a single administrative system for the purposes of governance and economic exploitation. This colonial legacy laid the groundwork for a post-independence society where ethnic loyalty often trumps national allegiance, particularly in public administration [3]. Since gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria has struggled with the challenge of transforming a diverse population into a cohesive polity, and this struggle is most evident in the public sector. Ethnic and tribal loyalty continues to influence administrative practices, appointments, and policy decisions, thereby impacting the effectiveness of governance [4].

Public administration in Nigeria plays a critical role in implementing government policies, yet tribal affiliations often complicate its effectiveness. Tribal considerations frequently influence recruitment, promotions, and resource allocation, fostering inefficiency and a patronage system [5]. Nigeria's federal structure, comprising 36 states largely defined by ethnic lines, further fuels the use of public institutions by ethnic groups to consolidate power [6]. Policies like the federal character principle aim to ensure ethnic representation in government institutions [7]. However, these measures sometimes lead to positions filled through ethnic balancing rather than merit, creating new inequalities [8]. This

study analyzes the impact of tribal affiliations on public service delivery in Nigeria, contributing to the debate on how to achieve both national cohesion and administrative efficiency. Understanding tribal dynamics in governance is essential to foster sustainable development in Nigeria's multi-ethnic context [8, 3]. This study aims to bridge gaps in understanding the relationship between tribal relations and administrative performance, providing insights that can contribute to a more inclusive and equitable governance framework. The research main objectives are positioned to analyze the role of tribal affiliations in influencing recruitment practices within Nigeria's public administration as well as to evaluate the impact of the federal character principle on fostering inclusivity in public service. Further, to assess the effect of tribal relations on trust in public administration, especially in the context of service delivery. The study aims to find answers to questions like the perceptions of citizens regarding the effectiveness of current policies aimed at mitigating tribal biases in public administration. Secondly, how do tribal affiliations influence recruitment and promotion within Nigeria's public administration? and to what extent does the federal character principle affect inclusivity and perceived fairness in public administration? Further questions include how do tribal relations impact public trust and satisfaction with service delivery in Nigeria or what are the perceptions of Nigerians on the effectiveness of policies aimed at minimizing tribal bias in the public sector?

By addressing these questions, the study will provide valuable insights into the dynamics of tribal relations within Nigeria's public administration, contributing to the discourse on effective, equitable governance in the theory of multi-ethnic societies.

The role of tribal relations in Nigerian public administration is a crucial topic, especially considering the country's ethnic diversity and complex socio-political landscape. Academic discussions frequently highlight how tribal affiliations shape public administration, particularly through colonial legacies, federalism, ethnic politics, and efforts at administrative reform. Colonial policies introduced during British rule institutionalized ethnic divisions, setting the stage for tribal relations as a central element in governance. The British colonial administrators used a "divide-and-rule" strategy, which segmented the Nigerian population along tribal lines, politicizing ethnicity and embedding it within the governance structure [1]. This approach influenced post-independence Nigeria, where political elites inherited administrative frameworks entrenched in ethnic divisions. Ekeh conceptualizes this as the "two publics" framework, differentiating between the civic public associated with formal institutions and colonial governance, and the primordial public linked to ethnic and tribal loyalties [1].

In the post-independence era, the federal system was introduced in Nigeria with the intention of managing ethnic diversity by allowing regional autonomy and ensuring representation of major groups in governance. However, federalism has, paradoxically, entrenched tribal identities further within Nigeria's political

and administrative systems [4]. One key example of this is the federal character principle, which mandates equitable representation of ethnic groups in federal appointments to foster national unity and prevent ethnic dominance [4]. While intended to unify, this principle has also contributed to reinforcing tribal allegiances in public administration. Ethnic politics in Nigeria is often characterized by "prebendalism," a system where public offices are treated as "prebends" or sources of personal or group benefit [9]. This system has significant implications for public administration, as it encourages corruption, nepotism, and inefficiency. Ayoade notes that ethnic loyalty frequently influences appointments, promotions, and policy formulation, creating an administrative framework where resources are allocated based on tribal affiliations rather than developmental needs [5]. Consequently, institutions intended to embody national unity are often perceived as representing particular ethnic interests, undermining their legitimacy among the broader public [10]. This environment complicates the effectiveness of public administration, as officials may prioritize tribal representation over professional competence, which, in turn, hinders the development of an efficient, neutral civil service capable of advancing Nigeria's development agenda [10].

While tribalism is often viewed as a barrier to effective governance, some scholars argue that tribal affiliations can positively influence public administration by fostering local accountability and ensuring cultural relevance in policy implementation. Chabal and Daloz 1999 [11] suggest that ethnicity, if constructively harnessed, could improve public administration's responsiveness to local needs. Similarly, Lijphart's 1977 and 1999 [12, 13] theory of consociational democracy, which promotes inclusive governance models in ethnically divided societies, has been applied to multi-ethnic contexts like Nigeria. Lijphart 1999 [13] contends that institutional arrangements designed to share power across ethnic groups can help build trust, prevent dominance by majority groups, and give minorities a stake in governance. This approach underscores the necessity of balancing Nigeria's numerous tribal identities with the effective functioning of public administration.

Scholars advocate for reforms that promote merit-based recruitment, transparency, and accountability to counteract the influence of prebendalism and tribalism, with the ultimate goal of fostering a more equitable and effective public administration system. Institutional reforms that address the deep-seated issues of ethnic favoritism are seen as essential for achieving cohesive governance in Nigeria's multi-ethnic society [2; 5].

Here, Ekeh's "two publics" theory [1], Lijphart's consociational democracy model [12; 13], and Joseph's prebendalism concept [9] were used to analyze tribal relations in Nigeria's public administration. Ekeh's theory highlights the dual nature of Nigerian society, where the civic public (formal institutions) coexists with the primordial public (tribal affiliations), shaping resource distribution and administrative appointments. Lijphart's model of consociational democracy addresses ethnic diversity by promoting inclusive governance, advocating for structures that balance tribal representation and efficiency. Joseph's prebendalism

concept reveals the dynamics of ethnic politics in Nigeria, where public offices serve as rewards for tribal groups, influencing resource allocation [9].

These theories collectively offer insights into the impact of tribal relations on governance and public sector reform in Nigeria. The study also applies Institutional Theory [14] to examine how tribal affiliations are embedded in Nigeria's public administration. Institutional Theory views these affiliations as longstanding structures that influence perceptions of fairness, legitimacy, and accountability. In this context, recruitment practices favoring specific ethnicities reflect institutionalized biases, affecting public trust. This approach allows a comprehensive analysis of how tribal relations are both shaped by and reinforce institutional norms within Nigerian public administration.

1.2 Introduction to Nigerian Tribes

Nigeria is located in the West African region; it is a nation known for its rich cultural diversity. Likewise, a notable home to a large number of ethnic groups, with the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo being the three largest, constituting approximately 70 per cent of the population. Ideally, there are several other noticeable groups, each with over a million members, like the Kanuri, Tiv, and Ibibio. 20 per cent of the population consists of over 300 smaller ethnic groups.

Acknowledging the differences, these groups share commonalities that create a sense of unity among Nigerians [15]. Nigeria's ethnic groups are usually divergent and defined primarily by language. As a single nation. It hosts more ethnic groups than any other African nation, ranking among the most '*ethnically complex*' states in the world. Most of these ethnic groups are small and localized, with only a few playing a central or major role in Nigerian society.

Although, it is literal that there were people living in today's Nigeria for as far back as 13,000 BC, we can as well trace back the origin of each tribe or ethnic group to its individual history hence the case may differ. The rise in colonization during the 17th and 18th century may had brought the modern Nigeria as one state, unnoticing the difference in ethnic features i.e. tradition, culture, origin or religion. Each of the tribes found in Nigeria has its separate history and place or origin, meaning "it's original place or location it dwells". The raiding of the whole territory of Nigeria by the British army during the early 18th century, terminated the claim of each of the individual ethnic groups, to acclaim a new national name of "Nigerian", forgetting one's original tribal background.

Some of these tribes have huge number of followers, while some are a few, with some even reported to be extinct in the near future. For this fact several authors of Nigerian ethnic study categorized the tribes as "Major and Minor".



Location of maior ethnic groups

Figure 1 - Location of the major ethnic groups in Nigeria: Extracted from

The Majority

The implication of colonial rule in Nigeria brought the various ethnic groups increasingly into contact with one another. This integrative process was implemented by the construction of connective infrastructure. Such development set in motion a socio-political process that led to greater relationships and competition among the various ethnic groups for dominance and economic advantage. The Nigerian government has worked out several tentative power-sharing arrangements to help ensure that its multi-ethnic groups are generally carried along and each has some say in the society. The major tribes in Nigeria are Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo. These aforementioned tribes together comprise 70 per cent of the total national population, while the other 30 per cent are considered to be the minority.

Hausa

This ethnic group dominates the northern part of Nigeria and is often considered unified with the Fulani tribe through intermarriage of acculturation, which give them a common name of Hausa-Fulani as a single ethnic entity. The Hausas are themselves a fusion, believed to be a collection of Sudanese people that were assimilated, decades back, into the population inhabiting what is now known as Hausaland. This ethnic group mostly believe in the religion of Islam.

The origin of Hausa is a matter of dispute: but most ethnologists hold them to originally be from the Southern Sahara or the Chad Basin. Their arrival in Hausaland gave them an opportunity to set up seven small states centered around termed as "Birni," or walled cities. In these cities the Hausa developed techniques of efficient administration, consisting of a carefully organized fiscal system and a highly arranged judiciary, that earned them a reputation of integrity and ability in administering Islamic law.

While their counterparty, the Fulanis are also Muslims, consecutively, like the Hausas, their origin is perhaps an open question. Once a nomadic people, or Tuaregs, who inhabited the southern edge of the Sahara in central Africa. Most scholars claim that the Fulanis are related to the Phoenicians, or place relate origin in shepherds of Mauritania that were looking for new pastures. Irrespective of their origin, the Fulanis are known to have arrived in the Hausa society in the early 13th century. Simultaneously, they intermarried with the Hausas, and have mostly adopted the latter's customs, few traditions and language, although some Fulanis preserve their ancestral background of culture, customs and language by retaining a nomadic life and traditional beliefs.

Yoruba

The Yorubas are mixture of both Christian/Muslims, living in southwestern Nigeria united by their common belief that; Ife is their place of origin, and the Oni of Ife is their spiritual leader. Their ancient mythology holds that *Oduduwa* created the earth and that the royal houses of the Yoruba kingdoms could trace their ancestry back to the same *Oduduwa*. Yoruba society is organized into different kingdoms, the greatest of which was called the *Oyo*. The *Oyo* Empire collapsed in the 1830s, when Afonja, broke away from the other Yoruba culture and lost his empire to the Fulanis. This incident occurred in close temporal proximity to the Fulani Jihad, although it was not associated with it. Through the rise of religion, both Islam and Christianity spread to Yorubaland over the past few centuries, the group embraced both faiths alongside its wide traditional and animist beliefs. This blend and acceptance of religion survives in modern society and has avoided some religious conflict in places where Yoruba form the majority.

Igbo

The Igbo, considered to be the main ethnic group in southeastern Nigeria, their origins are completely unknown, as they claim to be from about nineteen assorted places. They do maintain an "indigenous home," thus: the belt of forest in the country to the east of the Niger Valley. This home was established to avoid the inflow of Fulani's annual slave raids, which were conducted on cavalry that was unable to explore very deeply in the forest. The Ibo thus generally inhabited inaccessible areas, although during the 19th century they began to assert ancestral claims to Nri town, "the heart of the Ibo nationality" [16]. The Ibo tribe formed a society that was fascinating in its decentralization, citing their largest societal unit as the village, where every extended family managed its individual affairs without being dictated to by any higher authority. As the chiefs existed, they also held

very restricted political power, and only local jurisdiction. The villages were democratic in nature, as the government of the local community was the concern of all who lived in them. The discovery of large oil reserves near Igboland in the early 1960s plus the restructuring of regions caused many in the group to fear the effect of being cut out of revenues from the country's natural resources. In 1967, an Igbo secessionist movement in Biafra state led to a 30-month war with the Nigerian government, in which hundreds of thousands of Igbos starved to death. In the post war years, Igbos were reintegrated into Nigerian society, but in a more marginalized role.

The Minority

The remaining 30 percent of Nigeria's population are categorized to be the minority; hence the major tribes out shadowed them in number. These minority ethnic groups consist of; Kanuri, the Nupe, Ijaw, Tiv, Efik, Ibibio, Urhobo along with other hundreds of tribes.

Ijaw

The Ijaw people are the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria, they live mostly in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria, with significant number of populations in Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers (states in Nigeria). Many Ijaw are found as migrant fishermen inside assorted, camps as far as west of Sierra Leone and as far east as of Gabon. They account for about 1.8% of the Nigerian population according to CIA Factbook [17]. Historically, they are believed to have long lived in locations near many sea trade routes, and they were well connected to other areas through trade as early as the late 14th and early 15th centuries.

Kanuri

The Kanuri people are found mostly in northeastern Nigeria. Likewise, their population is believed to be approximately 4% of Nigeria or (around 4,000,000). Kanuri people are predominately Muslims. Kanuri people include several subgroups and could easily be identified by different names in some regions. The Kanuri language was the major language of the Bornu Empire and still remains a major language in southeastern Niger, and in northeastern Nigeria and northern Cameroon, while in Chad it is limited to a handful of speakers in urban centers. The Kanuri, originally pastoral people, they were one of many Nilo-Saharan groups indigenous to the Central South Sahara, beginning propagating around Lake Chad in the late seventh (7th) century, and absorbing indigenous Nilo-Saharan, Niger-Congo and Chadic (Afro-Asiatic) speakers. Based on the Kanuri tradition, Sef, son of Dhu Ifazan of Yemen, arrived in Kanem in the ninth century and united the population which led to the formation of the Sayfawa dynasty. This tradition, however, is likely a product of later Islamic influence, reflecting the association with their Arabian origins under the Islamic era. Evidence of indigenous state formation in the Lake Chad area dated back to circa 800 BCE at Zilum [18].

Tiv

The ethnic group known as Tiv are popular for their agricultural produce and the trading of their agricultural produce. This is one of the only sources of income for the tribe. The Tiv tribe all trace their ancestry back to an ancient individual named *Tiv*, who had two sons. Some Tiv people identify as Christians, proven even less as Muslim. The traditional religion of Tiv, based on manipulations of forces by humans who have been entrusted by a creator God, remains strong within the Tiv people. This tribe only makes up 3.5% of the Nigerian population, as so, they fall under the minority ethnic groups within the country.

Ibibio

This ethnic group are mostly found in southeastern Nigeria, they possess an excellent verbal history which passed down from generation to another. These people have lived in this part of Nigeria for several hundred years. The Ibibios are approximately 4.5 million in population which is equivalent to 3.5% of the population of Nigeria. Ibibio people in the region also requested (from the British Crown) to become their own sovereign state within Nigeria (pre-independence). As of Today, Ibibio predominantly identify themselves as Christian. Ibibio has an outstanding artistic culture, and they are acclaimed to be makers of intricate wooden masks and carvings.




Figure 2 - A pie chart, showing Nigerian ethnic groups in percentage.

Although the smaller ethnic groups of Nigeria that are termed as the minority are hundreds in number, this study didn't present all, but some among the top and most popular. Among those minor ethnic groups some have

predominantly been living in modern day Nigeria, while others immigrated since the early age. Nigeria is blessed with huge ethnic groups that each has its individual ancestral history, culture and tradition, but the consequence of colonization brought all of them together into answering a single name of “Nigerian”.

1.3 Pre-Independence Public Administration in Nigeria

Before Nigeria's independence in 1960, the region was characterized by a rich tapestry of tribal governance systems, each reflecting the unique cultural, social, and political structures of various ethnic groups. These indigenous administrative frameworks played pivotal roles in maintaining order, delivering justice, and managing resources within their respective communities. This section delves into the traditional public administration systems of several prominent Nigerian tribes, highlighting their organizational structures and governance mechanisms.

The Yoruba Traditional Governance

The Yoruba people, predominantly located in southwestern Nigeria, developed sophisticated city-states, each governed by a king known as the "Oba." The Oba served as both the political leader and spiritual head, embodying the unity and identity of the people. Supporting the Oba was a council of chiefs, each overseeing specific sectors such as commerce, defense, and religious affairs. This hierarchical structure ensured a balanced distribution of power and responsibilities, facilitating effective governance [20].

A notable example of Yoruba governance is the Egba United Government (EUG), established in the late 19th century by the Egba subgroup. The EUG emerged as a response to external threats and internal aspirations for unity, formalizing a confederacy of Egba towns and villages. Recognized by the British colonial administration in 1893, the EUG had a complex administrative structure comprising:

Council of Chiefs: The highest decision-making body, consisting of representatives from various Egba city-states. This council was responsible for legislation, dispute resolution, and coordinating military efforts.

Olori Parakoyi (Secretary): The executive head of the government, chosen by the Council of Chiefs, responsible for implementing decisions and representing the Egba people in external affairs.

Iwarefa: A group of high-ranking officials serving as advisors to the Olori Parakoyi, providing counsel on state matters and assisting in policy implementation.

Ogboni: A secret society of esteemed individuals acting as judges, mediators, and advisors, playing a crucial role in maintaining social order and justice [21].

This structured approach to governance underscores the Yoruba's emphasis on checks and balances, collective decision-making, and the integration of spiritual and temporal authority.

The Igbo Traditional Administration

In southeastern Nigeria, the Igbo people practiced a decentralized form of governance, characterized by the absence of centralized kingship. Instead, authority resided within individual communities, each led by a council of elders known as the "Ama Ala." This council, comprising the oldest and most respected men, made decisions through consensus, reflecting the democratic ethos of Igbo society [22].

A distinctive feature of Igbo administration was the "Onyishi" system, particularly prevalent in communities like Enugu-Ezike. The Onyishi, the oldest male in each village, served as the spiritual and cultural leader, overseeing rituals, land matters, and conflict resolution. This gerontocratic system ensured that leadership was based on age, wisdom, and experience, fostering a sense of continuity and respect for tradition [23].

The Igbo's acephalous (headless) political structure emphasized collective responsibility and participatory governance, allowing for adaptability and resilience in the face of external influences.

The Hausa-Fulani Emirate System

In northern Nigeria, the Hausa-Fulani established a centralized administrative system known as the Emirate system, particularly after the 19th-century Sokoto Caliphate's establishment. Each emirate was led by an Emir, who wielded significant political, judicial, and religious authority. The Emir was supported by a hierarchy of officials, including:

Waziri: The chief advisor and administrator, overseeing the implementation of policies and the functioning of the bureaucracy.

Galadima: The administrator of the capital city, ensuring law and order within the emirate's central jurisdiction.

Madawaki: The commander of the cavalry, responsible for the military defense and expansion of the emirate [261].

This system facilitated efficient tax collection, law enforcement, and conflict resolution, underpinned by Islamic principles and Sharia law. The integration of religious and administrative duties reinforced the legitimacy of the rulers and ensured social cohesion.

The Benin Kingdom's Ogiso Monarchy

The Benin Kingdom, located in present-day southern Nigeria, was initially ruled by the Ogiso dynasty before the emergence of the Oba monarchy. The term "Ogiso" translates to "King from the sky," reflecting the divine status attributed to these rulers. The Ogiso monarchy centralized governance by uniting various Bini chiefdoms under a single political structure [24].

The administrative framework included a hierarchy of officials and nobles who assisted in governance, overseeing justice, taxation, and military matters. Chiefs were appointed to manage different regions, ensuring effective control over the territory. This centralization was crucial in maintaining order and fostering the kingdom's growth and development.

The Ogiso era laid the foundation for the sophisticated political and artistic heritage that the Benin Kingdom is renowned for, including advanced bronze casting and urban planning.

The Igala Kingdom's Traditional Councils

The Igala Kingdom, situated along the banks of the River Niger, developed a monarchical system led by the "Àtá," the paramount ruler. The kingdom was divided into nine traditional ruling councils, each headed by an "Onu," appointed through intricate traditional rites supervised by the Àtá. These councils were responsible for governance, law enforcement, and taxation within their respective domains [25].

The pre-independence public administration systems in Nigeria were deeply rooted in tribal traditions and governance structures. Each ethnic group developed mechanisms to maintain order, resolve conflicts, and manage resources effectively. These systems, while distinct, shared common features such as hierarchical authority, advisory councils, and a blend of religious and political functions. The colonial era brought significant changes, integrating these traditional systems into a broader administrative framework, ultimately shaping Nigeria's modern public administration.




Figure 3 - A figure portraying the Nigerian System of Public Administration, with Traditional and Modern System of Government.

Rather than functioning in isolation, traditional and modern administrative structures often intersect. For instance, traditional rulers are frequently engaged by political authorities to maintain peace, especially in crises involving ethnic and communal tensions [58]. Additionally, the federal government has

institutionalized certain roles for traditional rulers through advisory councils at various levels [258]. In rural governance, local governments collaborate with traditional institutions to ensure compliance with customary laws while aligning them with national policies [259].

While the coexistence of traditional and modern administration offers a complementary approach to governance, it also creates friction. One major challenge is the conflict between customary laws and constitutional provisions, particularly concerning human rights, gender equality, and land tenure systems [257]. Furthermore, some traditional rulers have been accused of partisanship, undermining their credibility as neutral actors in governance [42]. Another issue is the unclear legal status of traditional institutions within Nigeria's constitutional framework, leading to occasional conflicts over jurisdiction and authority [99].

The persistence of traditional governance alongside modern administrative structures underscores Nigeria's unique approach to public administration. While modern governance principles promote efficiency, accountability, and constitutionalism, traditional institutions provide a cultural and historical foundation for social cohesion and local governance. A balanced integration of both systems, with clear delineation of roles, could enhance governance effectiveness and bridge the gap between state institutions and grassroots communities [256]. Thus, a hybrid governance model that accommodates both traditional leadership and modern public administration could serve as a pragmatic approach to Nigeria's governance challenges.

1914 Amalgamation of Northern/Southern British protectorate

The colonial rule of the British in the Nigerian soil started not just as single Nigeria or the Nigeria we know that has four geo-political zones and 36 states, but rather as four different regions of north, south, east and west. Simultaneously, it became what was known as "Northern and Southern Protectorates". In 1914, Southern Nigeria was joined with Northern Nigeria Protectorate to form the single colony known as Nigeria. The unification was done for economic reasons and the colonial administration sought to use the budget surpluses in Southern Nigeria to offset this deficit [26]. M.I Onyobo [26] stated in his work that: the British colonial political strategy of "divide and rule" which was aimed at introducing the legacy of transforming the existing flexible and fluid identity relation between the various ethnic groups in Nigeria to one based on rigidity was clear indication of their double barrel intention. He also added: Until 1914 the colonial masters ruled Nigeria not as Nigeria, but as disparate nations at least four: the colony of Lagos and three protectorates; the West, the East and the North. This was so distinct to the extent that the national frontier was demarcated between these. Even an agreement was signed and rigorously implemented that hindered any southern penetration to Christianize the North. This shows that the country is not just homogenous looking at just ethnic difference but also religiously and regionally.



Figure 4 - Map of Nigeria Portraying the Northern and Southern Parts of Nigeria.

1.4 History of Tribal Relations in Nigeria

Nigeria as an ethnically diverse country having over 250 distinct ethnic groups, with the three major groups being the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo, these three major ethnic groups carry about 70% of the country's total population. They are important to the country's social, economic, and political life [27]. The Hausa-Fulani group is mostly found in northern Nigeria and is known for having a big impact on Nigerian politics, especially during the military regimes. The Yoruba group, which is mostly found in the southwest of the country, has a rich cultural history and has led in politics and education in the past. The Igbos, largely based in the southeastern part, are well known for their enterprising spirit and their strong inclination towards commerce and entrepreneurship [28]. In addition to these major ethnic groups, Nigeria is home to a variety of minority groups, including the Tiv, Kanuri, Efik, Ijaw, and Ibibio, among others [29]. Because the larger ethnic groups are in charge, these smaller tribes have often had trouble getting resources and having their voices heard in government. The interaction between these major and minor ethnic groups has shaped Nigeria's social and political landscape, often causing regional tensions, political alliances based on ethnicity, and fights over how resources should be shared.

So, tribal relations in Nigeria are the complicated ways that the country's different ethnic groups interact with each other. These relationships are heavily affected by historical, cultural, economic, and political factors that shape how Nigeria's public administration system works. The balance between tribes working together and competing has a big effect on how the country is run and

how well it stays together. In the past, tribes had alliances and rivalries, and traditional leaders were very important in settling disagreements and encouraging cooperation [27]. The onset of colonialism, however, dismantled these traditional frameworks, resulting in the enforcement of foreign governance systems that frequently sidelined indigenous leadership and intensified ethnic discord. In today's world, tribal relations are often seen as a way for politicians to give out favors and resources. Ethnic groups often compete for political representation and access to government resources, which can lead to conflict. The Federal Character principle was put in place to help stop these kinds of conflicts by making sure that different tribes are fairly represented in government jobs.

In recent years, socio-economic problems like poverty, unemployment, and competition for resources have made tribal relations even more difficult. These problems often show up along ethnic lines. This has caused more tension and violent fights in different parts of Nigeria, especially where ethnic groups are fighting for land, political power, and jobs. Many times, efforts to improve tribal relations focus on encouraging dialogue between different ethnic groups, sharing culture, and working together to run the government. Community development programs and changes to local governments are two examples of initiatives that aim to make places where people of different ethnic backgrounds can work together and feel like they are all part of the same community. But for these efforts to work, they need to deal with the historical grievances and socio-economic inequalities that are still causing tribal tensions.

Understanding Nigerian Public Administration from the Post-Independence Era

First Republic: Nigeria changed its name to the Federal Republic of Nigeria in October 1963. Nnamdi Azikiwe became the first President of the 30 new independent countries. Nigeria needed national unity among its many different states and ethnic groups, as well as economic growth to keep the country stable. Before colonial rule, the Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo were the three main ethnic groups in Nigeria. They each had their own way of ruling. Even though a democratic system was put in place, traditional rulers still had a say in local laws and government. This made for a dual governance system, where civilians had to follow both traditional and federal rules.

Democracy in Nigeria was still new, so minority groups started political movements to push for separate states. To get what they wanted, these smaller parties often worked with larger regional parties. The 1964 general elections, the first ones after independence, made the political system very divided, with two opposing alliances in charge. The coup on January 15, 1966, however, stopped Nigeria's path to democracy and caused the First Republic to fall apart. From 1966 to 1979, Nigeria was ruled by the military, and from 1967 to 1970, the country had its first civil war.

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Second Republic: A new constitution came out on September 21, 1978, and elections were held in 1979, bringing Nigeria back to democracy. The Second Republic did well because oil prices went up around the world. Nigeria became the sixth-largest oil producer in the world, bringing in \$24 billion a year. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN), led by Shehu Shagari, was in power in 1982 and wanted to stay in power by giving jobs to people who supported them and controlling the Federal Election Commission.

In the elections of August 1983, Shagari and the NPN won a majority in the National Assembly and took control of 12 state governments. But the election was ruined by widespread voter fraud, missing returns, polling places that didn't open, and blatant vote-rigging. People were angry about claims of election fraud, and on December 31, 1983, the military took over the government.

Major General Muhammadu Buhari assumed power under the Supreme Military Council (SMC). However, in August 1985, Buhari was peacefully ousted by General Ibrahim Babangida, who cited power misuse, human rights violations, and economic mismanagement as justifications for the coup. These military interventions ultimately dismantled the Second Republic.

Third Republic: Babangida promised to bring back civilian rule by 1990, but he later pushed the change back to January 1993. Political activities started again in 1989, which made it possible for new parties to form. In December 1991, there were elections for the legislature, but they were canceled because of claims of fraud. People thought that the presidential election on June 12, 1993, was the fairest in Nigeria's history. But Babangida called off the election on June 23, saying that there were legal problems that made it necessary. This choice led to protests across the country, which killed more than 100 people. Babangida gave up power to Ernest Shonekan's interim government on August 27, 1993, after being pressured to do so.

Shonekan was scheduled to oversee governance until new elections in February 1994, but mounting national tensions and economic difficulties led General Sani Abacha to seize power in November 1993. Abacha dissolved democratic institutions and promised a three-year transition to civilian rule. But during his time in office, there were human rights abuses and authoritarianism. The military Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) chose General Abdulsalami

Abubakar to oversee the transition to democracy after his sudden death on June 8, 1998. A new electoral body was created, and political parties were reorganized for the elections in 1999.

Fourth Republic: The May 1999 general elections brought Nigeria's hopes for democracy back to life when former army general Olusegun Obasanjo was elected president. Obasanjo had to deal with a lot of problems, such as an unstable economy, inefficient government, and poor infrastructure. People said that his government made progress on human rights and freedom of the press, even though there were still problems between different ethnic and religious groups. There were also political tensions between the Executive and Legislative branches over budget appropriations and proposed laws.

1.5 Federalism and the Return of Democracy in 1999

The restoration of democracy in 1999 represented a significant turning point in Nigeria's political history, leading to a renewed dedication to federalism as a means of addressing the country's entrenched ethnic and regional divisions. Federalism has long been seen as a means of making sure that everyone is fairly represented, cut down on ethnic tension, and encourage fair government in societies with many different groups [58]. In Nigeria, where ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity shape the socio-political environment, federalism offers an institutional framework that embraces differences while promoting national cohesion. The democratic transition of 1999 restored civilian rule and strengthened federalism as the basis for governance, enabling fair power-sharing, administrative decentralization, and the incorporation of various ethnic groups into public administration [171].

Federalism in Nigeria has developed as a strategy to alleviate ethnic conflicts and guarantee equitable representation. The colonial past of the country left it with a broken state made up of different ethnic groups and historical grievances [42]. During the military era (1966–1999), power was often centralized, which made different ethnic groups feel like they were being pushed to the side. But when democracy came back in 1999, the ideas of federalism were brought back to deal with these problems and improve tribal relations in government. One of the key elements of Nigeria's federalism is the structure of the federating units. With 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), the creation of additional states was aimed at giving minority groups greater autonomy and political representation [58]. This has greatly decreased the power of larger ethnic groups and made the government more representative of Nigeria's diverse population [171]. Federalism has allowed ethnic minorities to take part in decision-making by decentralizing government. This has made people feel like they belong and has lowered tensions between groups [3].

When the military was in charge, appointments and resource distribution often favored certain areas, which made people angry and called for a change

[172]. But now that democracy has been restored, the federal character principle has given Nigeria's ethnic groups a more organized way to share power. The government now requires that its ministries, departments, and agencies reflect the country's ethnic diversity in their staffing and leadership positions. This will stop any one group from feeling left out [173].

Even though things have gotten better since 1999, federalism in Nigeria still has problems, especially with political competition, how resources are shared, and how well the government works. The creation of states has helped ease ethnic tensions, but it has also made politics more divided, with calls for more decentralization and restructuring [49]. The federal character principle, while well-intentioned, has faced criticism for prioritizing ethnic representation over meritocracy, resulting in inefficiencies in public administration [47].

Another big problem is the economic gap between states. Some areas are still more developed than others because resources aren't distributed evenly and there are gaps in infrastructure [42]. For federalism to work better, institutions need to be changed so that they not only promote ethnic balance but also fairness in the economy and accountability in governance.

When Nigeria became a democracy again in 1999, it made federalism an important part of how the country is run. This helped tribes get along better by creating states, following the federal character principle, and having a decentralized government. Federalism has helped lower ethnic tensions and make sure everyone is included, but there are still problems like political competition, economic differences, and bad governance. Going forward, reforms that aim to make federalism work better in Nigeria's public administration should focus on finding a balance between representation and competence, encouraging economic integration, and making democratic institutions stronger to keep the country united despite its ethnic diversity.

The change from military to civilian rule in 1999 was a big step forward for Nigeria's federalism. General Abdulsalami Abubakar was in charge of the transition, which led to the election of Olusegun Obasanjo as the first democratically elected president of the Fourth Republic [168]. The new democratic system tried to strengthen federalism by giving more power to the states and pushing for changes in how the government works. But Nigeria's democratic institutions are still being tested by problems like violence at the polls, disagreements over the constitution, and corruption [169].

Fiscal federalism is still a hot topic, with arguments over how to divide up money and control resources between the federal and state governments [104]. People in the Niger Delta, which has a lot of oil, have been fighting for more control over resources and environmental justice [99]. The federal government's response, which included setting up the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), has had mixed results, with claims of poor management and not enough

impact [170].

Nigeria's political and legal systems are influenced by a dynamic interplay of federal character principles, constitutional provisions, parliamentary processes, legal pluralism, unity institutions, and political party dynamics. The return of democracy in 1999 created a new framework for federalism, but Nigeria's democratic journey is still shaped by problems like bad governance, ethnic tensions, and unclear laws. For Nigeria's federal democracy to last, it is still important to strengthen institutions, encourage political accountability, and deal with differences between regions.

Umaru Yar'Adua of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) was elected president in the 2007 general election, even though there were claims of election fraud and criticism from international observers. Yar'Adua passed away in May 2010 due to health problems, which cut his time in office short. Goodluck Jonathan, his vice president, took over and was re-elected in April 2011. Jonathan's time in office, on the other hand, was marked by rising insecurity, especially because of the Boko Haram insurgency. He lost the 2015 election because he couldn't stop terrorism. Muhammadu Buhari, a former military leader, won the election and became president again under the All-Progressive Congress (APC). Buhari was re-elected in 2019, though his administration faced economic downturns and escalating security threats from banditry and Fulani herdsmen rose that crumbled societies, with addition to the dark economic crises.

Table 1: List of Nigeria's Presidents from 1999-2025

Name	Political Party	Duration	Number of Tenure
Olusegun Obasanjo	PDP	1999-2007	2
Umaru Musa Yaradua	PDP	2007-2010	1
Goodluck Ebele Jonathan	PDP	2010-2015	1
Muhammadu Buhari	APC	2015-2023	2
Bola Tinubu	APC	2023-Date	1

Nigeria, as a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state, has faced significant challenges in ensuring fair tribal representation in governance, particularly in the highest office of the presidency. Since the return of democracy in 1999, there have been deliberate and incidental efforts to maintain a form of ethnic balance in leadership, reflecting the country's federal character principle. The composition of Nigeria's former presidents since 1999 provides an analytical basis for evaluating the fairness of tribal representation in public administration. Since Nigeria became a democracy in 1999, presidents have come from different parts of the country and different ethnic groups. Here is a list of the former presidents

and the ethnic groups they belong to:

Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007) – Yoruba (South-West Nigeria)

Obasanjo, a Yoruba man from Ogun State who used to be a military leader, was elected president of Nigeria as a member of the People's Democratic Party (PDP). His presidency brought back democracy after a long time of military rule. Obasanjo's time in office was very important for strengthening democracy and starting economic reforms. [30]

Umaru Musa Yar'Adua (2007–2010) – Hausa-Fulani (North-West Nigeria)

Yar'Adua was from Katsina State and was a member of the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group.

His election was perceived as a way to maintain regional balance after a southern Yoruba president's tenure. Unfortunately, his tenure was cut short due to his untimely demise, leading to a power shift [31].

Goodluck Jonathan (2010–2015) – Ijaw (South-South Nigeria)

Upon Yar'Adua's passing, his vice president, Goodluck Jonathan from Bayelsa State, assumed office. Jonathan's presidency was significant as it marked the first time a leader from the South-South geopolitical zone, an oil-producing minority region, held the nation's highest office [32]. His leadership was seen as a move towards greater inclusivity for Nigeria's minority ethnic groups.

Muhammadu Buhari (2015–2023) – Hausa-Fulani (North-West Nigeria)

Buhari, a former military leader from Katsina State, like Yar'Adua, came back to power with the All-Progressive Congress (APC). His presidency strengthened the idea of rotating leadership between the north and south, which made sure that the Hausa-Fulani group would still have a voice [29].

Bola Ahmed Tinubu (2023–Present) – Yoruba (South-West Nigeria)

In the 2023 elections, Tinubu, who is Yoruba and from Lagos State, became president. His presidency continues the trend of power changing hands between the north and south [33].

Since 1999, the way leaders have been chosen shows that Nigeria's government is trying to keep a balance between tribes and regions on purpose. The idea of power rotation between the North and the South has mostly guided presidential elections. This makes sure that no one ethnic group or region stays in charge of the country for too long. This is in line with Nigeria's consociational democratic system [12], which gives different ethnic and regional groups a say in how the country is run.

Also, the presidency has changed hands between the three main ethnic groups: the Hausa-Fulani (North), the Yoruba (South-West), and the Igbo (South-East). However, it is important to note that the Igbo ethnic group has not had a president since 1999, which raises questions about how truly inclusive the government is of all groups [34]. This omission ignites discussions regarding the necessity for equitable representation and the potential modification of the federal

character principle to ensure fair inclusion of all ethnic groups. Nigeria has tried to make sure that all tribes are represented in government, but there are still some problems: Since democracy returned, the South-East has not had a representative in the presidency. This has led to more calls for an Igbo presidency. The two main political parties, the PDP and the APC, have helped keep power rotation going, but sometimes the way things work within the parties makes it hard to keep ethnic balance.

The number of Nigerian presidents since 1999 shows a planned effort to balance tribal representation, which is in line with the federal character principle. Even though there has been some progress in making sure that leadership rotates between the north and south, the fact that there is no Igbo president is still a major issue in talks about fair governance. To make Nigeria's public administration more inclusive, the political landscape needs to be more diverse so that all ethnic groups are treated fairly.

1.6 Nigerian Civil and Public Service

The Nigerian Civil and Public Service is necessary for making policies, running the country, and helping it grow [35]. The civil service is made up of professional bureaucrats who help government ministries. The public service is made up of government agencies, parastatals, and other public institutions [36]. The service has changed over time because of different reforms that were meant to make it more efficient. These include the Udoji Reform of 1974, the Dotun Philips Reform, 1988 and the Obasanjo Civil Service Reform of 1999 [37].

Even with these changes, problems like corruption, inefficiency in bureaucracy, and political interference continue to exist. Public service delivery has been hindered by nepotism, inadequate funding, and weak institutional frameworks [38]. Additionally, the introduction of digital governance and e-administration has had mixed results, with slow adoption rates and infrastructural deficits [39].




Figure 5 - Hierarchical Classification of Nigerian Arms of Government and system of Administration.



Figure 6 - Nigeria's Executive, Judiciary and Legislature.

Federal, State, and Local Government in Nigeria

Nigeria has a federal system of government with three levels: federal, state, and local governments. This three-part system is meant to make sure that Nigeria is governed well, that resources are shared fairly, and that all the country's different ethnic groups are fairly represented. The division of power among these levels of government plays a crucial role in fostering national unity, reducing ethnic tensions, and promoting inclusive governance in the country [42].

The Federal Government

At the apex of Nigeria's political structure is the federal government, which has the highest authority in the nation. It is responsible for national security,

foreign policy, defense, monetary policy, and the overall economic framework. The Nigerian Constitution grants the federal government exclusive control over certain areas, such as military operations, customs, and immigration, to maintain national cohesion and sovereignty [43].

The Federal Character Principle is one way the federal government makes sure that different ethnic groups are represented in public service jobs and the distribution of resources [7]. The goal of this principle is to stop one ethnic group from taking over and to make national governance more open to everyone [27]. The presidency, National Assembly, and federal agencies should all show the country's ethnic diversity. This helps to ease ethnic tensions and strengthen the country's identity.

States Governments

There are 36 states in Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), which is Abuja. An elected governor and a State House of Assembly make up the government of each state. The establishment of states has been instrumental in mitigating ethnic tensions, as it empowers ethnic minorities with enhanced autonomy over their affairs, thereby fostering self-determination and political inclusion [30].

State governments have a lot of freedom when it comes to things like education, health care, farming, and building local infrastructure. They also play a key role in putting federal policies into action at the local level. But state governments often have a hard time being financially independent because they depend so much on federal money from oil sales. This dependency can make it hard for them to deal with regional differences and ethnic complaints in a good way [44].

Even with these problems, the state system makes sure that ethnic groups can govern themselves to some extent, which eases worries about being left out of politics. States also serve as political units where different groups can work together and interact, which helps different ethnic groups get along and live together [45].

Local Governments

Nigeria's federal system has three levels of government: the federal government, the state government, and the local government. There are 774 local government areas (LGAs) in Nigeria. The purpose of local governments is to bring the government closer to the people so that communities can have a say in how decisions are made, and resources are shared. An elected chairman and councilors run each local government, which gives the people in that area a direct connection to the government [46].

Local governments are very important for keeping tribal relations strong because they make sure that all ethnic groups are fairly represented in the community. They oversee community development projects, primary healthcare, local roads, and markets. Because Nigeria has many different ethnic groups, local

governments are places where everyone can be involved in making decisions and running the country [47].

But local governments have a lot of problems to deal with, such as corruption, not enough money, and interference from state governments in politics. In many cases, state governors have too much power over the money that local governments have, which makes them less effective [48]. More financial independence and openness in local government would help grassroots development and make tribal relations fairer.

Nigeria adopted federalism to deal with the country's long-standing ethnic divisions and stop one ethnic group from taking over. States and local governments have been a smart way to handle tribal relations by giving ethnic groups more political and administrative freedom. Nigeria has tried to make sure that all groups are fairly represented in government by using the Federal Character Principle and creating states.

Still, ethnic tensions remain, especially when it comes to who controls resources, who represents them in politics, and how different regions develop. To deal with these problems, we need to strengthen federal principles, make sure that revenue is distributed fairly, and promote national integration through inclusive governance.

Nigeria's federal system, which divides power between the federal, state, and local governments, has helped keep peace between tribes and bring the country together. The system has helped lower ethnic tensions and make things more inclusive, but there are still problems with things like financial independence, political interference, and fair development. To make Nigeria fairer and more welcoming, we need to strengthen the federal government, improve local government, and make sure that everyone follows the Federal Character Principle.

Nigeria's Population and Census

Nigeria, often referred to as the "Giant of Africa," is renowned for its vast population and rich cultural diversity. With huge numbers of ethnic groups, including the Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo, the nation presents a unique tapestry of languages, traditions, and histories. This diversity is a strength, but it makes governing harder, especially when it comes to population censuses and how they affect tribal relations and public administration.

Nigeria had about 229.5 million people living there as of July 2024, making it the most populous country in Africa. Since 1965, the country has grown by more than 2% every year. This demographic surge shows how important it is to have accurate population data for good planning and resource allocation [302].

Historically, Nigeria has had a lot of trouble with population censuses. The 1952-53 census showed that 54% of the population lived in the northern region. This number had a big impact on politics. Later censuses, like those in 1991 and

2006, were criticized for their accuracy and accused of falsifying data, which showed how deeply rooted ethnic and religious tensions were [303].

These groups, along with many other minority ethnicities, speak different languages, have different cultures, and belong to different religions. This diversity has significant consequences for national cohesion and governance [304].

Census Data and Public Administration: For good public administration, accurate census data is very important. In Nigeria, census data affect how many people are represented in government, how resources are shared, and how development plans are made. But making census results political has caused arguments and distrust between ethnic groups, which has made it harder for the country to come together.

Several things have made Nigerian censuses less accurate: Politicians have used census data to their advantage, which has led to higher numbers in some areas [303]. Boycotts and fights over the census results have happened because of tensions between groups [305]. Problems like poor infrastructure and worries about security have made it harder to collect data.

The arguments over the census data have made ethnic tensions worse. Inaccurate population numbers have made minority groups feel left out, which has led to distrust and even fights [305]. To make future censuses more reliable and accurate, Nigeria needs to set up an independent group to oversee census activities. This will help keep politics out of the process. Using digital tools can make data more accurate and cut down on mistakes made by hand. And teaching people about the importance of accurate data can help people work together and trust the process.

Nigeria's many different ethnic groups make things both easier and harder. Accurate population censuses are necessary for fair government and national unity. To solve the problems with these censuses, we need to work together to promote openness, inclusion, and technological progress.

Table 2: List of Nigerian States and capital with projected population.

No.	State	Capital	Population
1.	Abia	Umuahia	4,841,943
2.	Adamawa	Yola	5,236,948
3.	Akwa-Ibom	Uyo	5,780,581
4.	Anambra	Awka	7,299,910
5.	Bauchi	Bauchi	7,540,663
6.	Bayelsa	Yenagoa	2,394,725
7.	Benue	Makurdi	6,687,706
8.	Borno	Maiduguri	6,651,590
9.	Cross River	Calabar	4,175,020

Continuation of Table 2.

10.	Delta	Asaba	7,107,534
11.	Ebonyi	Abakaliki	4,007,155
12.	Edo	Benin City	5,527,810
13.	Ekiti	Ado-Ekiti	3,398,177
14.	Enugu	Enugu	5,396,098
15.	Gombe	Gombe	4,623,462
16.	Imo	Owerri	6,067,722
17.	Jigawa	Dutse	6,979,080
18.	Kaduna	Kaduna	8,324,285
19.	Kano	Kano	16,253,429
20.	Katsina	Katsina	9,300,382
21.	Kebbi	Birnin Kebbi	6,001,610
22.	Kogi	Lokoja	5,053,734
23.	Kwara	Ilorin	2,365,353
24.	Lagos	Ikeja	15,772,884
25.	Nassarawa	Lafia	3,632,239
26.	Niger	Minna	6,720,617
27.	Ogun	Abeokuta	6,445,275
28.	Ondo	Akure	5,469,707
29.	Osun	Osogbo	4,237,396
30.	Oyo	Ibadan	7,512,855
31.	Plateau	Jos	5,400,974
32.	Rivers	Port Harcourt	7,234,973
33.	Sokoto	Sokoto	6,163,187
34.	Taraba	Jalingo	4,331,885
35.	Yobe	Damaturu	4,350,401
36.	Zamfara	Gusau	5,517,793
37.	Abuja (Federal Capital Territory)	Abuja	4,802,443

Population and Tribal Population of Nigeria and the Integration into Public Administration

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, and its population is very diverse, with many ethnic and tribal groups. Nigeria's population is expected to exceed 220 million by 2023 [264], and its complex demographics have a big impact on how the country is run and organized. The structure of the population in Nigeria has a big effect on how the government works, since ethnic, historical, and regional factors often play a big role in how the government works. Understanding Nigeria's population makeup and tribal structures can help us understand the problems and solutions for effective public administration.

The size and distribution of Nigeria's population have a big effect on how the government works. It is very important for good governance, fair resource distribution, and national development to include population dynamics in administrative policies.

Data on the population helps policymakers decide what to do about education, healthcare, infrastructure, and social welfare [266]. Government agencies use census data and demographic reports to make sure that resources are used wisely. Nigeria's democratic system is based on how the population is spread out. For example, representation in the National Assembly and other political institutions is based on how many people live in each region [21]. This has led to regular arguments about how accurate the census is and how well it represents politics. Nigeria's economic strategy is based on the facts about its population. Cities like Lagos, Kano, and Port Harcourt have a lot of people living there, so they need specific economic policies to deal with problems like jobs, housing, and transportation [267]. Diversity in the population leads to ethnic tensions, which means that public administration needs to be strategic when it comes to national security and conflict resolution [268]. The Nigerian government has put federal character principles into place to make sure that all ethnic groups are fairly represented in public institutions.

Tribal identity is still a big part of how Nigeria is run. It affects how people are hired, how they vote, and how resources are shared. Tribal factors affect how public resources are distributed across different areas, which can sometimes lead to uneven development. Government programs aimed at economic inclusion, such as the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), are responses to these disparities [269]. Despite the structured efforts to integrate Nigeria's diverse population into public administration, several challenges persist: The population censuses in Nigeria are often politically contentious due to suspicions of inflation or under-reporting to favor a particular ethnic or religious groups [270]. Policies like the federal character principle try to be inclusive, but some people say that certain groups are favored and hold key government positions, leaving others out [271]. Tribal affiliations can sometimes make it easier for public officials to be corrupt, as they put the needs of their own ethnic groups ahead of the needs of the country as a whole [272].

Relocation of Nigeria's Capital from Lagos to Abuja

Moving Nigeria's capital from Lagos to Abuja is an important event in the country's history. It was done to solve problems with tribal relations, national unity, and the effectiveness of public administration. Several things, such as being in the middle of the country, not favoring any one ethnicity, having limited infrastructure, and safety concerns, led to this strategic move.

Lagos state, which is in the southwestern part of Nigeria, is mostly influenced by Yoruba culture. Its location on the coast made it easier for trade,

but it also made it harder for people from other parts of Nigeria to get there, especially those from the north and east. This geographical imbalance made it harder for everyone to get along and for the government to be accessible to everyone. Abuja, on the other hand, was in the middle of the country, which made it a more balanced and neutral place where no ethnic group was in charge. This neutrality was very important for bringing the different ethnic groups in Nigeria together and making them feel like they belonged. The decision to make Abuja the capital was based on its central location, which made it easier for people from all over the country to get there. This helped bring the country together and helped it grow [283].

Lagos had a lot of problems by the 1970s because it was growing so quickly. The city had too many people, too much traffic, not enough housing, and infrastructure that was too stretched. These problems not only made public administration less effective, but they also made life worse for both residents and government workers. It was getting harder to run the federal government's functions well because of the traffic in Lagos. The move to Abuja was meant to ease these stresses and make room for a well-planned city that could better meet the administrative needs of a growing country [284].

Security concerns were also a big part of the decision to move the capital. Because Lagos was on the coast, it was open to possible security threats, such as attacks from the sea. On the other hand, Abuja's location in the middle of the country and on the coast gave it strategic advantages in protecting the country's territorial integrity. General Yakubu Gowon, a former head of state, said that the move was mostly about keeping the country's borders safe.

The move had a big effect on Nigeria's public administration system. Setting up a new capital in Abuja gave planners a chance to build a city with modern infrastructure that would work well for the federal government. This move made it easier for the government to run, cut down on the red tape that comes with Lagos's traffic jams, and marked a new beginning in the country's search for good governance. People thought that building Abuja would help Lagos by taking some of the load from it and making the government work better.

The move accomplished many of its goals, but it also brought up new problems. The displacement of indigenous communities in the Abuja area caused social and economic problems and ongoing demands for fair compensation and a say in how the new capital will be built. It is still a problem to find a balance between the needs of these local people and the needs of the country as a whole. The choice to move the capital meant that native people who lived in the old Abuja had to move, which caused ongoing controversy and feelings of being left out among the indigenous communities [283].

Moving Nigeria's capital from Lagos to Abuja was a strategic move that had many goals, including promoting national unity, making the government

more efficient, and making sure that development was fair. Nigeria wanted to make the new capital a place that was good for inclusive governance and national unity by dealing with the problems caused by Lagos's location and infrastructure and choosing a neutral, central location. The difficulties that displaced indigenous communities are facing, on the other hand, show how important it is to have policies that take into account both national interests and local realities so that development benefits everyone.

Regionalism in Early Post-Independence Public Administration in Nigeria

After Nigeria gained independence, regionalism had a big impact on how the country was run. The administrative framework established after Nigeria's independence in 1960 was profoundly influenced by colonial legacies and regional disparities [50]. Regionalism influenced governance, resource distribution, and policy formulation, frequently promoting competition and ethnic awareness over national cohesion [51]. This part looks at how regionalism affects Nigeria's public administration, focusing on how it affects governance, development, and political stability.

The roots of regionalism in Nigeria's public administration after independence can be found in the colonial period, especially during British indirect rule. The merger of the Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1914 solidified administrative divisions based on ethnicity and region [52]. The Richards Constitution of 1946 and the Macpherson Constitution of 1951 made regionalism even stronger by making three semi-autonomous regions: the Northern, Western, and Eastern regions [53]. This federal structure was meant to make governance less centralized, but it ended up creating regional divisions that are now a big part of Nigeria's political and administrative landscape.

After gaining independence, Nigeria adopted a federal system that tried to find a balance between regional autonomy and national unity. But regionalism showed up in different ways that changed how the government worked:

Regional Bureaucracies and the Splitting Up of the Civil Service: Each region built its own civil service, which sometimes worked on its own without the federal structure [5]. This made national policies less clear and made the government less efficient. For instance, the Northern region kept a more traditional way of running things, while the Western region used a more modern bureaucratic method. This caused differences in development and policy implementation [1].

Ethnic and Political Patronage: Political appointments and public service hiring were based more on regional and ethnic factors than on merit [9]. Political leaders put their regions' needs first, which often led to an unfair distribution of federal resources and made ethnic divisions worse.

Economic Inequality and Competition Between Regions: The fact that regional governments had more control over economic resources only made regionalism stronger. Obafemi Awolowo led the Western region, which focused on free education and industrialization. Ahmadu Bello led the Northern region, which focused on agricultural development and traditional structures [50]. These different ways of doing things caused economic problems that made tensions between regions worse [21].

Conflicts and Political Instability: Regionalism was very important in Nigeria's early political problems. Regional rivalries and feelings of being left out of politics were partly to blame for the 1964 federal elections and the 1966 military coup [51]. The apprehension regarding the supremacy of one region over others resulted in a disintegration of national unity, ultimately leading to the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970) [54].

Regionalism was a key part of Nigeria's public administration in the early years after independence. It affected the way the government worked, the economy, and political stability. Even though steps have been taken to lessen its negative effects, Nigeria's public administration is still affected by regional loyalties and competition. For Nigeria to have long-term good governance, there needs to be a balance between regional autonomy and national unity.

1.7 Consociationalism as a theory for Nigeria's system of Public Administration

Nigeria's public administration system is profoundly affected by its ethnic, religious, and regional diversity, which has historically led to political instability and governance difficulties. To tackle these intricacies, consociationalism, formulated by Arend Lijphart [12], offers a theoretical framework that encourages power distribution among diverse groups within a pluralistic society. Because Nigeria is made up of many different groups, consociational democracy is a way to make sure that all of them are represented in government by allowing different ethnic and religious groups to work together in public administration.

Lijphart contends that consociationalism is most efficacious in profoundly fragmented societies where no singular group can monopolize governance without intensifying social discord [55]. The model is built on four main ideas: grand coalition governments, mutual veto rights, proportional representation, and segmental autonomy [12]. Using these ideas in Nigeria's public administration can make things more stable by encouraging cooperation among the elite and making sure that political power is shared fairly.

The Federal Character Commission (FCC) is the main way which Nigeria's public sector balances out ethnic and regional differences. It does this by making the principle of proportionality a part of public service appointments [56]. This is in line with Lijphart's [12] focus on proportional representation, which makes sure

that no one ethnic group controls bureaucratic structures. The federal character principle has been put into place to reduce ethnic differences in public administration by making sure that Nigeria's diverse population is fairly represented [45].

In addition, Nigeria's practice of appointing ministers and other important public officials from different geopolitical zones shows the grand coalition principle in action. This encourages cooperation among the elite. However, there are still problems because political elites often use the system to keep patronage networks going instead of really promoting inclusivity [43]. The mutual veto mechanism is apparent in Nigeria's constitutional stipulations that mandate extensive regional consent for significant national resolutions, including constitutional amendments and revenue distribution. This makes sure that minority groups have a voice in government, which stops majoritarianism [13]. Another important part of consociationalism is segmental autonomy. This can be seen in Nigeria's federal system, where states and local governments have a lot of power over policies and administration that affect their people [57].

Even though it could work in theory, consociationalism in Nigeria has a lot of problems. Political elites frequently manipulate power-sharing arrangements for personal benefit, thereby compromising meritocracy and efficiency in public administration [58]. Ethnic and religious tensions continue to arise, indicating that the model necessitates more robust institutional protections and accountability mechanisms.

Nevertheless, strengthening Nigeria's consociational framework through enhanced transparency in public service recruitment, reinforcement of merit-based federal character policies, and improved intergovernmental relations could lead to a more effective and stable public administration system. Lijphart's assertion, that consociational democracy thrives when elites are genuinely committed to power-sharing underscores the need for political will in sustaining Nigeria's public administration reforms [59].

Failure of Consociationalism in Nigeria's Second and Third Republics

Consociationalism offers a viable theoretical framework for understanding and improving Nigeria's public administration system. By institutionalizing inclusive governance through proportional representation, mutual veto, grand coalitions, and segmental autonomy, Nigeria may foster a more stable and effective administrative structure. However, addressing existing weaknesses, such as elite manipulation and inefficiencies, remains crucial for the long-term success of the model.

Consociationalism, as a model of governance, is designed to manage deep ethnic, religious, and linguistic divisions through power-sharing mechanisms [12]. Nigeria, as a highly diverse country, attempted to implement consociational principles, particularly in its Second Republic (1979–1983) and Third Republic (1992–1993). However, these efforts were largely unsuccessful due to a

combination of structural, institutional and socio-political factors. This section explores the reasons behind the failure of consociationalism in these two political eras.

One of the primary reasons for the failure of consociationalism in Nigeria's Second and Third Republics was the deep-rooted ethnic and regional divisions that consistently undermined national unity. The Nigerian state comprises over 250 ethnic groups, with three major ethnicities, Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo, dominating the political landscape [58]. These ethnic groups have historically viewed politics as a zero-sum game, wherein power-sharing agreements were often perceived as temporary and contingent on elite bargains rather than genuine institutional commitments [45]. As a result, consociational mechanisms such as federal character and rotational presidency failed to foster long-term political stability.

Consociationalism thrives when institutions are designed to ensure that all major groups have a stake in governance [59]. However, in Nigeria's Second and Third Republics, key power-sharing mechanisms were poorly institutionalized and frequently manipulated by dominant political actors. The principle of federal character, introduced to promote equitable representation, was often subverted by political elites who prioritized patronage over meritocracy [57]. Similarly, the adoption of a presidential system in 1979 was intended to create a broad-based executive capable of accommodating diverse interests, but instead, it led to the concentration of power in the hands of the dominant ethnic group in each electoral cycle [51].

Another major challenge to consociational governance in Nigeria was the prevalence of electoral malpractices. The 1983 elections, which led to the collapse of the Second Republic, were marred by widespread rigging, intimidation, and allegations of vote manipulation [9]. These electoral irregularities reinforced ethnic tensions and undermined confidence in power-sharing arrangements. Similarly, the annulment of the 1993 presidential election, widely regarded as free and fair, further demonstrated the fragility of consociational democracy in Nigeria [3]. The military's intervention following these electoral crises highlighted the inability of consociational institutions to withstand political pressure and elite competition.

Frequent military interventions also played a significant role in the failure of consociationalism in Nigeria. The Second Republic collapsed in 1983 following a military coup, while the Third Republic was prematurely terminated by another coup in 1993. Military regimes, by nature, disrupt democratic institutions and hinder the development of stable power-sharing mechanisms [262]. Furthermore, successive military governments weakened civil institutions, making it difficult for democratic norms to take root. Without strong democratic

institutions, the fundamental principles of consociationalism elite cooperation, compromise, and power-sharing could not be effectively sustained.

The political culture of patronage and corruption further eroded the effectiveness of consociationalism in Nigeria. Public office was often seen as a means of wealth accumulation rather than service to the state [263]. The dominance of patron-client networks ensured that political appointments and resource allocations were driven by ethnic loyalty rather than national interest. This system reinforced ethnic competition instead of fostering the elite accommodation necessary for consociational governance [203].

The failure of consociationalism in Nigeria's Second and Third Republics can be attributed to ethnic fragmentation, weak institutional frameworks, electoral fraud, military interventions, and entrenched patronage politics. While power-sharing mechanisms were theoretically in place, they lacked the necessary institutionalization and commitment from political elites to be effective. As Nigeria continues to grapple with ethnic and regional tensions, the lessons from these failed experiments in consociational governance remain critical for future political reforms aimed at achieving a more inclusive and stable democratic system.

The Nigerian Civil War

The Nigerian Civil War (1967 - 1970), also known as the Biafran War, was a pivotal event in Nigeria's history, profoundly impacting the nation's ethnic relations and public administration. The conflict arose from deep-seated ethnic tensions and regional disparities, leading to significant challenges in national unity and governance. This analysis examines the war's origins, its effects on tribal relations, and the subsequent implications for Nigeria's public administration system.

Post-independence Nigeria was characterized by a federal structure divided into regions dominated by major ethnic groups: the Hausa-Fulani in the North, the Yoruba in the West, and the Igbo in the East. This arrangement fostered regionalism and competition among ethnic groups. The controversial 1962- 63 census exacerbated these tensions, as allegations of manipulation heightened distrust among regions [285].

Political instability ensued, marked by a military coup in January 1966, which resulted in the assassination of key political leaders, including Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. The coup, perceived as favoring the Igbo, led to counter coups and widespread anti-Igbo violence, particularly in the Northern region. In response to these atrocities and fearing further persecution, Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu declared the Eastern Region's secession, forming the Republic of Biafra in May 1967 [285].

The civil war deepened ethnic divisions, particularly between the Igbo and other Nigerian ethnic groups. The federal government's blockade of Biafra led to

a devastating famine, resulting in over a million deaths, predominantly among the Igbo population [286]. This humanitarian crisis garnered international attention and left enduring scars on inter-ethnic relations.

Post-war, the Nigerian government adopted a policy of "No Victor, No Vanquished" to promote national reconciliation. However, underlying ethnic tensions persisted, influencing socio-political dynamics and hindering genuine unity. The war's legacy contributed to a heightened sense of ethnic consciousness, affecting trust and collaboration among Nigeria's diverse ethnic groups.

The fragmentation caused by the civil war necessitated reforms in Nigeria's public administration to foster inclusivity and mitigate ethnic tensions. One such reform was the introduction of the Federal Character Principle (FCP) in 1979, aiming to ensure equitable representation of various ethnic groups in public institutions [287].

The FCP mandates that appointments and resource allocations reflect Nigeria's diversity, preventing dominance by any single group. While well-intentioned, its implementation has faced challenges:

Meritocracy vs. Representation: Critics argue that the FCP sometimes compromises merit, as positions may be filled based on ethnicity rather than qualifications, potentially undermining efficiency [287].

Perpetuation of Ethnic Identity: By institutionalizing ethnic considerations, the FCP may inadvertently reinforce divisions, as individuals identify more with their ethnic groups than the national identity.

Godfatherism and Nepotism: Cultural practices like godfatherism, where influential figures use their power to secure positions for loyalists, have infiltrated the public sector. This undermines fairness and promotes patronage networks, affecting administrative effectiveness [288].

Tribalism in Recruitment: Tribal affiliations often influence hiring and promotions, leading to a lack of diversity and inclusivity. Such practices erode merit-based systems and can result in intergroup conflicts within public institutions [288].

Contemporary Challenges

Recent events highlight ongoing ethnic tensions affecting public administration:

Tax Reform Disputes: Proposed tax reforms have met resistance from northern leaders, who perceive them as favoring southern states, thereby exacerbating the historic north-south divide [289].

Separatist Movements: The resurgence of separatist sentiments, particularly in the southeast, underscores unresolved grievances. For instance, Finnish authorities arrested individuals linked to violence in southeastern Nigeria, reflecting the international dimensions of these ethnic conflicts [290].

The Nigerian Civil War's legacy continues to influence tribal relations and the public administration system. While policies like the Federal Character Principle aim to promote unity and equitable representation, challenges persist in balancing meritocracy with inclusivity. Addressing cultural practices such as godfatherism and tribalism is crucial for building more effective and cohesive public administration. Continuous efforts towards genuine national integration, beyond policy formulations, are essential for Nigeria's stability and development.

Boko Haram Insurgency and The Impact on North-East Development

Nigeria's North-East region has been significantly affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, leading to substantial socio-economic challenges. The insurgency has disrupted development projects and exacerbated existing ethnic and tribal tensions, impacting the efficacy of public administration. Understanding these interconnected issues is crucial for formulating effective policies aimed at regional stability and national unity.

Boko Haram, an extremist group, emerged in 2009 with the aim of establishing an Islamic state in Nigeria. The group's activities have led to widespread violence, resulting in over 35,000 civilian deaths and the displacement of more than two million people [299]. The insurgency has had profound implications for the socio-economic development of the North-East region.

The insurgency has severely disrupted economic activities in the North-East, particularly in Borno State. Agriculture, a primary livelihood source, has been devastated, with over 1.5 million hectares of cropland destroyed due to conflict and subsequent flooding [300]. This destruction has led to severe food shortages, with millions facing acute food insecurity. The collapse of the Alau dam in September 2024 further exacerbated the situation, displacing thousands and compounding the humanitarian crisis [300].

The insurgency has led to the destruction of critical infrastructure, including schools, healthcare facilities, and markets. In Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, major markets have been attacked, resulting in the closure of over 10,000 shops. The displacement of populations has strained existing social services, leading to overcrowded displacement camps with inadequate access to basic necessities [299].

North-East Development Commission (NEDC)

In response to the devastation, the Nigerian government established the North-East Development Commission (NEDC) to oversee the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the region. The NEDC is tasked with coordinating development efforts across Borno, Adamawa, Bauchi, Taraba, Gombe, and Yobe states. However, challenges such as allegations of corruption have impeded the commission's effectiveness.

Nigeria's diverse ethnic composition presents both opportunities and challenges for public administration. The interplay of tribal relations significantly influences governance, policy implementation, and national unity. Religious affiliations often intersect with ethnic identities, influencing political dynamics.

The adoption of Muslim-Muslim tickets in shas sparked debates about inclusivity and national unity. Critics argue that such practices may deepen religious divides and marginalize certain groups, thereby affecting the cohesion of Nigeria's public administration.

The historical socio-economic divide between Nigeria's northern and southern regions has implications for policy implementation. Recent tax reform proposals have been perceived as favoring southern states, exacerbating existing tensions [301]. Such perceptions can hinder collaborative efforts in public administration and impede national development initiatives.

The Boko Haram insurgency has not only caused immediate humanitarian crises but has also exacerbated underlying ethnic and regional tensions. The displacement of populations has altered demographic compositions in certain areas, leading to competition over scarce resources and influencing tribal relations. These dynamics pose challenges to the implementation of development projects and the effectiveness of public administration.

Efforts to resettle displaced people have been met with resistance due to security concerns and lack of basic amenities [299]. The premature return of displaced populations without adequate support can lead to renewed tensions and undermine the legitimacy of public administration efforts. Addressing the intertwined issues of insurgency impacts and tribal relations requires inclusive policies that consider the diverse needs of Nigeria's population. Strengthening institutions to promote transparency and equitable resource distribution is essential for fostering national unity and effective public administration.

The Boko Haram insurgency has had profound effects on the development of North-East Nigeria, disrupting economic activities and infrastructure. These challenges are compounded by complex tribal relations that influence public administration. Addressing these issues necessitates a holistic approach that integrates security measures with inclusive governance and equitable development policies.

2 NIGERIAN SYSTEM OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

2.1 Case study Analysis of Nigerian Tribal Relation (The 2023, Presidential Election)

Nigeria's multi-ethnic society is a vibrant tapestry woven with diverse ethnicities, religions, and regional identities. At its heart lies a mosaic of over 250 ethnic groups, each with its unique language, traditions and culture. Ethnicity forms a fundamental aspect of Nigerian identity, influencing social interactions, politics, and economic dynamics. While the country celebrates its diversity, ethnic tensions occasionally flare, often exacerbated by historical grievances, competition for resources, and political manipulation. Religion is another defining feature of Nigeria's social fabric. The country is roughly divided between Islam in the north and Christianity in the south, with a significant population practicing indigenous African religions and a growing presence of other faiths. Religious affiliations often intersect with ethnicity, further shaping cultural practices and societal norms. Regionalism also plays a significant role, as each region boasts its distinct characteristics and priorities.

The north is known for its predominantly Hausa-Fulani population and agriculture-based economy, while the Southwest is recognized for its Yoruba culture and commercial hubs like Lagos. In contrast, the Southeast, predominantly inhabited by the Igbo, has a strong entrepreneurial spirit and a history of commerce. And so, these regional disparities influence political power dynamics and resource allocation, sometimes leading to tensions between regions. Rewinding back, we should note the 1914 amalgamation through which some scholars referred to as “the mistake of 191” [60] it clarified a highlight in the evolution of modern Nigeria because prior to it, there was no Nigeria and the expectation that a state like it would evolve was less remote [3].

What existed in the pre-colonial era were different ethnic communities with diverse history and intermittent interactions which later conquered at different times by the British and simultaneously amalgamated into a single political union. In terms of structural character, the existence of multiplicity of ethnic and religious groups is enough justification of the heterogeneous character of the polity [61]. Scholars argue on the exact number of ethnic groups present in Nigeria; however, it is believed that they are no less than 250 assorted groups. For instance, [62] approximates the amount at 250, but then Vanguard, [63] listed 371 different tribes.

Something worth noting on this fact, is that despite the variations, no absolute ethnicity or tribe enjoys the classified majority, but the dominant ones are the Hausa-Fulani in the Northern region, Igbo in the Eastern part and Yoruba in the South-West. The three major groups according to [62] make up about 60% of the country's total population. Notably, none of these three groups is monolithic as well. Each among them is also a conglomeration of diverse ethnic entities.

As a developing state, Nigeria still carries the heavy duty of bringing unity in diversity, regardless of the huge population, languages and cultures. The component of the ethnic groups that were amalgamated into a single nation in 1914 and handed over as an independent state in 1960 has its motto of “*unity, faith, peace & progress*” still in progress. Essien, [64] noticed that unequal and differential treatment of the present ethnic groups by consecutive governments in Nigeria created intense competition for scarce goods evident in the economic, social and political life of the masses.

Undeniably, Nigeria formed some national restoration programs to rebuild the country after the civil war of 1968, among which are initiatives of national unity like the NYSC, unity schools, among others. But then some programs or rules that the country idealized in favor of the nature of the plural state are not adding sugar to the tea but rather adding abuse to injury. Meaning, those developments may continue to acclaim the fact of widening the ethnic gap instead of filling it.

Giving an example of the state involvement in religious matter on the creation of Muslim and Christian pilgrims board. Osaghea, [65] further states that when, in 1947 the drafted colonial constitution further divided Nigeria to three regions of West, East and North underlying the three major ethnic groups (Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo) as majority, the minority groups rebelled, and Nigerians began struggling for ethnic dominance as the nation trailed towards independence. Thus, having a scrutiny look of the nature of Nigeria’s socio-political environment one will observe how big the concept is, far beyond ethnic or religious line but as far as region or state of origin.

The 2023 Nigeria’s presidential election was held on 25 February 2023 to elect the president and Vice President of Nigeria. The election was a pivotal moment in the country's democratic history, marking another significant chapter in its political evolution. Nigeria, often referred to as the "Giant of Africa," is the most populous country on the continent and so it plays a crucial role in shaping regional politics and economics. The presidential election held in 2023 had far-reaching implications for Nigeria's future trajectory, both domestically and internationally. The election was marked as an antidote to remedies of many issues. Various aspects of the election included the candidates, key issues, electoral process, and the aftermath. Nigeria's political landscape is characterized by its diversity, complexity, and challenges. Looking at its multiethnic nature, the country's socio-political dynamics are intricate. Historically, Nigeria has grappled with issues such as corruption, ethnic and religious tensions, economic inequality, and insecurity.

Against this backdrop, the 2023 presidential election emerged as a critical juncture for the nation to address its pressing challenges and set a course for progress. Key issues expected to be topic of interest for voters in the 2023 presidential election were wide, and laid on various fronts, with candidates addressing a wide range of issues affecting the Nigerian populace. Some of the key issues included: *Security*; Insecurity posed a significant challenge, with

insurgent groups like Boko Haram and armed banditry threatening lives and livelihoods in different parts of the country.

The Economy: Nigeria's economy faced multiple challenges, including high unemployment, inflation, and dependence on oil revenue. Candidates proposed strategies for economic diversification, job creation, and poverty alleviation.

Corruption: corruption remained a pervasive issue in Nigerian politics and society. Candidates pledged to tackle corruption through institutional reforms and accountability measures.

Infrastructure: The country's infrastructure deficit, including inadequate road networks, power supply, and healthcare facilities, was a focal point for candidates' campaigns. Promises of infrastructure development featured prominently in their manifestos.

Nigeria's diversity is a source of strength and a potential fault line. Candidates emphasized the importance of fostering unity, tolerance, and inclusivity across ethnic and religious divides. Although there were many other major issues that voters anticipated to be addressed by whoever happened to be the winner, many voters were more concerned by the ethnic divide, as well as national and religious identity. Political questions on identity are often raised based on region and religion; ethnicity likewise plays a huge role as the election is the first presidential election since 1983 with three major candidates each from the three largest ethnic groups [66].

Although other issues were deemed critical to the voters, but matters pertaining ethnic, national and religious identity were of greater concern to people in the 2023 election, possibly for the fact that the recent government was termed as “Nepotist” in giving position and distribution of resources. The idea of national identity was raised, and some pre-election polls portrayed low levels of affinity for the nation and showcased high dissatisfaction with the status quo, reports likewise demonstrated that the vast majority of Nigerians feel aligned to their Nigerian and ethnic identity; still, the vast majority also fear for Nigerian unity.

One of the four major candidate's campaign prioritized national unity by including it as the first of his five-point agenda, categorizing the fact that "Nigeria's unity has never been threatened like now" [67]. Considering the country's religious diversity, a key aspect of power-sharing are tickets with running mates of the opposite religions. Here, the customary is; a Northern presidential candidate should take Southern nominee as a running mate, and religiously also a Muslim candidate should hold a Christian running mate. All this is for bringing balance in the nation's diverse nature of plurality.

Worth noting; is how ruling party candidate (Muslim from the South) took a running mate (Muslim from the North). The Muslim-Muslim candidacy stirred controversy especially among religious leaders, other party leaders and citizens of the opposite faith. The characteristics of the divide that cut the country into ethnic slots led to a reason of manipulating the voter's behavior to elect under ethnic, regional or religious umbrella in the 2023 presidential election.

2.2 The Presidential candidates

Tinubu: At 72 years old, Tinubu is the representative of the All-Progressives Congress (APC), the ruling party under President Buhari. Hailing from Lagos state in Southwestern Nigeria, where he once governed, Tinubu, also known as "Jagaban" to his followers [68], pledges to prioritize security, address burgeoning debt, and upgrade infrastructure if elected president.

Abubakar: Atiku Abubakar 77 is the flagbearer for the major opposition party, the People's Democratic Party (PDP). Originating from Adamawa state in northeastern Nigeria, this seasoned politician and successful business figure previously held the position of vice president of Nigeria from 1999 to 2007. Under the banner of "My Covenant with Nigeria" [69], Abubakar's presidential campaign emphasizes pledges for national unity, peace, and enhancing the economic outlook of the nation.

Obi: Obi, aged 62, is a candidate representing the lesser-known Labor Party. He transitioned from a successful career in business to politics, having formerly held the position of governor in Anambra state, his birthplace in southeastern Nigeria. Despite his newcomer status in the political arena, Obi has garnered significant backing from the Nigerian youth, thanks to his pledges to foster unity and revitalization in the nation. His platform focuses on addressing pressing concerns like insecurity and unemployment.

Kwankwaso: Rabiú Kwankwaso 67, served as the governor of Kano state in the North-western region, where he implemented tuition-free education initiatives for indigenous inhabitants throughout his two tenures. Beyond his gubernatorial roles, he also held a senatorial position from 2015 to 2019. Recognizable by his distinctive red cap, Kwankwaso has traversed political affiliations, transitioning from both the PDP and APC to ultimately join the New Nigeria Peoples Party (NNPP) in 2022. He has expressed intentions to prioritize initiatives centered on reconstruction, education, economic, and national development, should he be elected.

Although there were over 15 nominated candidates under different political parties for the 2023 presidential election, those four were the major and the most prominent, as they individually differ in their manifestos and area of focus if elected to office. Bola Tinubu, a previous Governor of Lagos State and candidate of the All-Progressive Congress, emerged victorious in the election, securing 37.62% of the votes, equivalent to approximately 8,794,726 votes in total. Following behind were former Vice President Atiku Abubakar of the People's Democratic Party, then former Governor of Anambra State, Peter Obi of the Labor Party. Concurrent with the presidential election, other federal elections for the House of Representatives and the Senate were held on the same day, while state elections occurred on March 18th. The inauguration took place on May 29, 2023. The candidates were selected through party primaries held between April 4th and June 9th, 2022. Incumbent APC President Muhammadu Buhari was ineligible for reelection due to term limits.

The New Nigeria Peoples Party put forward former Governor of Kano State Rabiú Kwankwaso as their nominee. Following the primaries, vice presidential running mates were announced, with Abubakar selecting Governor Ifeanyi Okowa,

Obi choosing former Senator Yusuf Datti Baba-Ahmed, Tinubu opting for Senator Kashim Shettima, and Kwankwaso selecting Pastor Isaac Idahosa.

There were total of 18 candidates with their running mates, contesting for the president and vice-president office as prescribed by the Independent National Electoral commission (INEC), sighting many young contestants, as young as 38 (Irene Christopher, candidate of A political party). This may be in view of the new bill that was passed in 2018 which reduced the age of contesting for most political offices to 30. Thus, the matter in view of contesting for presidential office in Nigeria isn't just about the right age of doing so, but it stretches as far as the running mate, or the candidate regional and religious background.



Figure 7- Map of Nigeria showing religious beliefs in the 36 States of Nigeria



Figure 8 - Number of Registered Voters in 2023 by geopolitical zones as shown by

In Nigeria, the customary approach to choosing presidential and vice-presidential nominees involves pairing a Muslim from the northern region with a Christian from the southern region. Consequently, when a northern Muslim assumes the presidency, a southern Christian becomes the vice president. This arrangement alternates every eight years or maximum of two terms in accordance with the zoning regulation. The aim of this approach is to reduce religious and ethnic friction, given the predominantly Muslim population in the north and the predominantly Christian population in the southern region.

However, the current presidential nominee of the ruling APC (Tinubu) hails from the southern region and is not of Christian faith. Bola Tinubu, a Muslim, presents an unconventional candidacy within this framework, leading to complexities in the selection process for his running mate [71]. Such politics aligned under religion, or region are mostly tricky, many civil societies and religious associations noted that prior to the election time.

“Zoning (especially the religion component) will be the main talking point before and during the campaigns that officially begin in September. This election will effectively be viewed by voters, as a contest between the north and south, overshadowing economic and security developments that are presently shaping the risk outlook in the background” – [71]

Furthermore, the heterogenous nature of the nation was the foundation of those features of ethnic politics that portray regionality and religion. As such, the founding fathers of the nation saw those ideas are the remedies to the painful sore of ethnic differences in the country.

Voters Demographics

A country of over 200 million humans, one might imagine, are all the 200 million of the same background even as they may differ in faith or belief. But then religion is just a single aspect of difference in this matter, Nigeria is officially divided into six geopolitical zones i.e. North-West, North-East, North-Central, South-West, South-East and South-South. Diving further, we can see how federalism divided the rule of law into states, with 36 states plus the capital making it a federal nation. Something worth noting is the population gap between the north and south, the Northern region is far populated compared to the Southern region, and that also showcases the political sphere of Nigeria.

A times Nigerians see the regional divide as just North and South, especially when it comes to religion, associating Islam with the north and Christianity with south, and the central region as mixture of both, portrayed in figure 7. Most states in the north have a significant number of populations, and so, that means the northern geopolitical zones possess more registered voters than the Southern zones as pictured in Figure 8 [70]. However, there were mere reports that there are underage voters among the so claimed registered voters in the north by the southern people, but INEC debunked the report and affirmed that they are all franchised voters.

In previous elections, young voters have played a significant role, as Nigeria has a large youth population. Ethnicity and regional affiliations often influence voting patterns, with candidates usually having strong support from their particular regions of origin or among their fellow ethnic groups.

Survey of voter's behavior

The concerns in the 2023 Nigerian presidential election revolve around economic, humanitarian, and political matters, which were deliberated both before and during the broader campaign phase, spanning from the conclusion of the primary-election period in June 2022 to the culmination of campaigning in February 2023. Looking at the nature of the nation state toward the election time, a pile of social and political issues is in the hearts and minds of the prospective voters, which at the end will determine the voter's behavior.

Following the conclusion of party primaries, attention was drawn to several key factors shaping the upcoming general election campaign. These included considerations such as ethnic and religious affiliations, the influence of incumbent and the power associated with his incumbency, economic issues, concerns

regarding corruption, the individual reputations of candidates and widespread public dissatisfaction with the prevailing political establishment.

Corruption was one of the identified manifests of the two major candidates, Nigeria has seen a staggering loss of hundreds of billions of United States dollars due to corruption since gaining independence, with its Corruption Perceptions Index score deteriorating since 2016 [72]. Nevertheless, following the primaries, analysts observed that corruption might not emerge as a prominent electoral concern, given that both Abubakar and Tinubu face substantial, longstanding allegations of corruption [73], thereby diminishing the issue's potential impact on the election, also, this issue might not be a clear relief for many voters.

Economy has always been a point of promise for many Nigeria's presidential candidates especially in the year 2023, looking at the period leading up to the election was marked by severe economic challenges for the nation, characterized by multiple crippling recessions and soaring inflation rates that significantly hindered economic progress while exacerbating unemployment. Additionally, the compounding effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine have led to a sharp increase in food prices, with millions of individuals at risk of plunging into poverty if present trends persist [74].

Those attributes gave the candidates a chance of seeing economy as big part of their manifestations, although it wasn't a big deal to the voters who felt divided under regional, ethnic and religious lines. Another huge topic of discussion was the worsen state of insecurity facing the nation, tied by actions of terrorist in the northeastern part which led to thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons, to the bandits' operations in the Northwest and Niger-Delta pirates and oil bunkering gangs in the South-east [75].

Other issues aligned in the 2023 election were infrastructure and social policy, which consist of social position of women, disabled citizens and marginalized groups. While all those are matters of concern that are clearly deemed fit as required issues of concern for the nation which the candidates identified as well, issues which are more concerned and termed to shape the behavior of voters are ethnic, regional and religious identity.




Figure 9 - Survey of how citizens feel in affiliation to their ethnic group and being Nigerian

The table above showcases how originally people feel in Nigeria, either to be identified with their ethnicity or just as national civilian. A total of 81% of respondents prefer a dual identity as both Nigerian and their ethnic group. Within this group, 35% feel more ethnic than Nigerian, 36% feel equally ethnic and Nigerian, and 10% feel more Nigerian than ethnic. Meanwhile, 15% prefer to identify solely by their ethnic group, and 4% prefer to be identified solely as Nigerians [76]. People feel more divided in a nation with massive population, multi-religions, and plural ethnic groups. Although people feel a sense of belonging to the nation, people are still attached to their ethnic class. Such attributes lead to a divided society and create a mission into the voter's mind and influence voter's behavior towards voting, making people cast votes under the ethnic, religious or regional influence.

2.3 Election Result and the Aftermath

The 2023 Nigeria's Presidential election was conducted on Saturday, 25th of February 2023, but due to issues encountered and reported by voters and election officials the result was announced at the early hours of 1st March 2023 [70]. Issues reported by voters include late arrival of election officials, lack of election materials, and late commencement of voting among others. While election was held only a day after the official commencement date in some areas due to such failures reported, the election result was not fully uploaded online as initially claimed by the national electoral commission. Many of such claims were among the things that made some people query the credibility of the election. The 2023 presidential election in Nigeria was conducted in line with the country's electoral laws and regulations. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) managed the entire process, ensuring fairness, transparency, and credibility. The election process included voter registration, campaigning, polling, vote counting, and the announcement of results. Despite facing logistical

challenges and sporadic incidents of violence and irregularities, the election was predominantly peaceful and orderly.

The involvement of domestic and international observers enhanced transparency and legitimacy. After a closely contested election, the results were announced, declaring the winner of the presidential race. The 2023 Nigeria presidential election was a significant moment in the country's democratic journey. It highlighted the vibrancy of Nigeria's democracy, with diverse candidates and political parties presenting competing visions for the nation's future. As Nigeria continues to confront its socio-economic and political challenges, the 2023 election underscores the importance of democratic governance, accountability, and citizen participation in shaping the nation's destiny. Although voters have social and economic crises, they still care about the origin, region or faith affiliation of the candidates. Tracing the Nigeria's 2023 Presidential Election voting pattern would give us an understanding of how people vote through ethnic or regional line.

Table 3 - Election result of the 2023 Nigeria's presidential election.

Candidate	Running mate	Party	Votes in Number	Percentage
Bola Tinubu	Kashim Shettima	APC	8,794,726	37.62
Atiku Abubakar	Ifeanyi Okowa	PDP	6,984,520	29.88
Peter Obi	Yusuf Baba Datti	LP	6,101,533	26.10
Rabi'u Kwankwaso	Isaac Idahosa	NNPP	1,496,687	6.4

The final results were announced during the early hours of March 1, 2023. Bola Tinubu of the All-Progressives Congress (APC) was declared the president-elect in a closely contested election, with Atiku Abubakar and Peter Obi receiving significant votes as well, seen from table 3 [70]. Even though the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) proclaimed that the election is free, fair, and credible, several observers, including the European Union, stated that the election lacked transparency [77].

Both the PDP and Labor Party individually filed formal petitions questioning Tinubu's victory on March 22, 2023, but On May 26, 2023, the Nigerian Supreme Court dismissed the PDP's lawsuit against Tinubu and Shettima. Another matter of concern is how the number of eligible voters is growing while voter's turnout is reducing. In 2003, 39 million Nigerians representing 69.1%, turned out to vote, the number of Nigerians participating in each general election cycle has continued to decline. For instance, in 1999, 29.8 million people voted (52.3%); in 2007, 35.4 million voted (57.5%) in 2011, 38.2 million voted (53.7%) in 2015, 28.6 million voted (43.7%) in 2019, 27.3 million voted (34.8%) and in 2023, only 24 million voted which accounted to (26.7%) of the total registered voters [78].

So, why have the numbers been decreasing? A combination of factors is responsible, like the voter apathy due to a lack of trust in the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), ongoing hardships voters face on election day, persistent logistical issues, election day violence that deters voters, and growing frustration among voters that their votes do not count.




Figure 10 - Nigeria's 2023 Presidential election result by geopolitical zone.

For clarification, (figure 10.) [70] shows how people cast votes using ethnic or regional identity as a pattern. Peter Obi recorded a dramatic win in South-East with a margin win of over 87% of the total votes in the region, this is due to the fact that the region never produced a president since the return to civilian rule and the coming back of democracy in 1999.

The region has also been yearning for equality in resource distribution and inclusive in government, but it has been critical for the region since the civil war and their failed claim of secession in 1967. Obi got the support of the Igbo tribe in both South-East and South-South, as he accumulated over 30% in the North-Central for the fact that there is a significant number of Igbos living in the region.

For Tinubu, the winner of the 2023 presidential election, South-West was his highest win with 53.59% followed by 39.64% from North-West and 35.58% in North-Central. It could be assumed fair, looking at his Yoruba background, both North-Central and South-West have a high number of Yoruba people, while the influence of his party and the incumbent president could justify his success in North-West.

Rabi'u Kwankwaso built a huge political empire in the North-Western city of Kano, and most of his followers are mainly from this state although he has some supporters in some few nearby states. His biggest win is evident in the North-West with 18.96% and had a major success in his State of origin only, hence he is widely known in the North.

Atiku Abubakar's legacy from 2019 Presidential election and his history of aligning together with Peter Obi as a running mate during the 2019 election gain

him a more win than Rabi'u Kwankwaso, he got 25.12% in the South-South, and South-East 22.15% as he swept North-East with over 50% of the total votes in the region. Atiku Abubakar is from the North-East, that is why he accumulated more than half of the votes there and 31% from North-Central in view of his party influence in the region [70]. People vote because they feel that they are more related ethnically or regionally to a particular candidate or his running mate.

Religion still is a factor of consideration for voters though not as much as it was before, voters view candidate's religious affiliation as a reason to vote. An example is the claim by the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) that the move by the All-progressive Congress to nominate Muslim-Muslim as presidential and vice president of the party was towards an aim to Islamize [79]. With such assertions it's proof that factors of divide like ethnic, religion or regional thread may influence voters in Nigeria on who to vote.

The Cause of Ethnic Politics in Nigeria

In Nigeria, voting patterns often follow ethnic lines due to a combination of historical, socio-political, and economic elements. Some key reasons that led to that are: Nigeria's colonial history and subsequent independence have significantly influenced its ethnic dynamics. Colonial powers drew the country's borders without regard for ethnic and cultural boundaries, resulting in a diverse population with strong ethnic identities.

This has fostered a sense of ethnic allegiance that often shapes voting behavior. Many Nigerians feel a deep loyalty to their ethnic group, leading them to vote for candidates who belong to their group or who are perceived to represent their group's interests. This loyalty is seen as a means of protecting and promoting the interests of one's community. People tend to trust leaders who share their ethnic background, believing such leaders will better understand and address their specific needs and concerns.

This trust is particularly important in a country where government institutions and officials are often perceived as corrupt or ineffective. Political parties and candidates frequently exploit ethnic identities to mobilize support, using ethnic rhetoric and promises of patronage to garner votes from specific ethnic groups. This strategy can be effective in a country where ethnic identity is a strong component of social and political life. Different ethnic groups often experience varying levels of socio-economic development and access to resources.

Voting along ethnic lines can be a way for marginalized groups to seek better representation and resource allocation. Ethnic voting can thus be seen as a strategy to address historical inequalities and ensure that the interests of a particular group are not overlooked. In a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria, there is often a fear among ethnic groups of being marginalized or excluded from power.

Voting for a candidate from one's own ethnic group can be seen as a way to ensure that the group has a voice in government and that its interests are protected. Nigeria has experienced numerous ethnic and religious conflicts [80],

which can deepen ethnic divisions and influence voting behavior. People may vote along ethnic lines as a response to perceived threats from other ethnic groups or to assert their group's power and security.

Cultural values and norms within ethnic groups can also shape voting behavior. Traditional leaders and community influencers often have significant sway over how their followers vote, and these leaders may advocate for candidates from their own ethnic group. These factors combine to create a political landscape where ethnic identity plays a crucial role in voting behavior.

Addressing these underlying issues requires comprehensive political reforms, efforts to build national unity, and policies aimed at reducing socio-economic disparities among different ethnic groups. In Nigeria's diverse, multi-ethnic society, religion is often scrutinized before one's skill, talent, or humanity. Frequently, religion or ethnicity becomes the standard by which a person's value is judged, overshadowing their individual capabilities and potential [81].

2.4 Roles of tribal relation in Nigerian Public system

Nigeria's public system is deeply influenced by tribal affiliations, which play a crucial role in governance, political appointments, public administration, and policy implementation. Given Nigeria's multi-ethnic composition, tribal relations have historically shaped political structures and administrative decision making [45]. While tribal relations contribute to representation and inclusivity, they also pose challenges such as ethnic favoritism, nepotism, and political instability.

Tribal considerations significantly impact political appointments in Nigeria. The principle of federal character, institutionalized through the Federal Character Commission (FCC), aims to ensure equitable representation of ethnic groups in government positions [56]. However, critics argue that this policy often leads to appointments based on ethnic affiliation rather than merit, resulting in inefficiencies in the public sector [58]. Political elites frequently leverage tribal networks to consolidate power, influencing key decision-making processes [57].

The structure of Nigeria's public administration is characterized by ethnic balancing to prevent dominance by any single group. However, such tribal favoritism remains prevalent in recruitment, promotions, and allocation of resources. Studies suggest that bureaucratic inefficiencies in Nigeria are partly due to ethnic patronage, which undermines professionalism and competence in the civil service [82]. Additionally, public service delivery is often affected by regional and tribal considerations, leading to disparities in development outcomes across different states [27].

Policy formulation and implementation in Nigeria are heavily influenced by tribal considerations. Government policies often reflect the interests of dominant ethnic groups, leading to uneven distribution of national resources [28]. For instance, infrastructure projects and federal allocations are sometimes disproportionately directed to regions based on ethnic affiliations rather than developmental needs. This has led to tensions and grievances among minority

groups, occasionally resulting in conflicts and agitations for regional autonomy [58].

Nigeria's electoral system is deeply affected by tribal affiliations, as political parties often align along ethnic lines. Elections are typically characterized by ethno-regional voting patterns, where candidates rely on support from their ethnic constituencies [51]. This has reinforced clientelism, where political loyalty is exchanged for economic and political benefits, further entrenching tribal divisions in governance [83]. The zoning system, which rotates key political offices among regions, was introduced to address ethnic imbalances, but it has also been criticized for limiting democratic competition [51].

While tribal relations have contributed to inclusivity in Nigeria's governance, they have also led to inefficiencies, corruption, and unequal resource distribution. Strengthening institutional frameworks that promote merit-based appointments, reinforcing national integration policies, and encouraging inter-ethnic cooperation could enhance the effectiveness of Nigeria's public system [45]. Additionally, civic education and inclusive political reforms are essential in reducing the negative impacts of tribalism on governance.

Tribal relations play a significant role in Nigeria's public system, influencing political appointments, public administration, policy implementation, and electoral politics. While these relations foster representation and inclusivity, they also pose challenges that hinder national development. Addressing the negative impacts of tribalism requires institutional reforms that prioritize meritocracy, transparency, and national unity to ensure a more efficient and equitable public system.

States Creation and Federalism

The creation of states in Nigeria has played a crucial role in shaping its federal structure. The evolution from a unitary colonial system to a multi-state federation was driven by ethnic, regional and political demands for self-governance, equitable resource distribution, and representation. Nigeria's federalism emerged as a response to these pressures, aiming at accommodating the country's diverse socio-political landscape while promoting national unity [84, 85].

Nigeria's territorial structure before independence was largely determined by British colonial rule. The amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1914 created a centralized administrative framework, but regionalism soon became a defining feature of governance [86]. By 1946, the Richards Constitution introduced three regional structures: Northern, Western, and Eastern regions, each dominated by major ethnic groups [30]. This laid the foundation for political competition along ethnic lines, a trend that continued into the post-independence era.

At independence in 1960, Nigeria retained the three-region structure but demands for minority representation and fears of ethnic domination intensified calls for more state creation. The first major restructuring occurred in 1963, with the creation of the Mid-Western Region, making Nigeria a four-region federation [87]. However, the unitary tendencies of the First Republic (1963-1966) led to

dissatisfaction, culminating in the military coup of 1966 and subsequent civil war (1967-1970).

To address ethnic and regional tensions, General Yakubu Gowon's military government dissolved the regional system in 1967, replacing it with a 12-state structure. This move was aimed at weakening secessionist movements, particularly the Biafran cause, while promoting federalism as a means of ensuring national stability [88] The expansion of states continued under subsequent military regimes, culminating in 19 states by 1976 under General Murtala Muhammed's administration, further institutionalizing federal governance [89].




Figure 11 - Map of Nigeria in 1976, showing the 12 states



Figure 12 - Map of Nigeria in 2025, showing the current 36 states with the Federal capital.

The process of state creation accelerated under military rule, with additional states established in 1987, 1991 and 1996, bringing the total to 36. The rationale behind these creations was to decentralize power, enhance governmental efficiency, and address ethnic or regional imbalances [91]. Federalism in Nigeria as it stands today, is deeply inter-twined with state creation, hence it ensures that governance is closer to the people while avoiding the dominance of any single ethnic or regional bloc [92].

Although the challenges remain, state creation has promoted federalism, it has also led to administrative inefficiencies, resource dependency on the federal government, and interstate rivalries [94]. Moreover, calls for further state creation persist occasionally, reflecting ongoing ethnic and regional demands for representation and resource control [95]. The uneven development among states has fueled debates over revenue allocation, state viability, and political restructuring in contemporary Nigeria [96].

The history of state creation in Nigeria illustrates its pivotal role in shaping the country's federal system. While initially a response to ethnic and regional tensions, the expansion of states has institutionalized federalism, fostering national unity and decentralization. Furthermore, inefficiencies and political

conflicts highlight the need for structural reforms to enhance the effectiveness of Nigeria's federal system.

2.5 Federal Character, The Constitution, The Parliament, Sharia and customary and civil law. Unity Institutions and Political Parties. Federalism and the return of Democracy in 1999

Nigeria's political and legal framework is shaped by a complex interplay of federalism, constitutional provisions, religious and customary laws, unity institutions, and political party dynamics. The ideal concept of federal character, as enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution, is aimed at ensuring equitable representation of different ethnic and regional groups in governance. The legislative and judicial systems incorporate elements of Islamic (Sharia), customary and civil law, reflecting the country's pluralistic nature.

Additionally, political parties and unity institutions play a crucial role in maintaining national cohesion. The return of democracy in 1999 marked a significant milestone in Nigeria's federal structure, ending decades of military rule and initiating a new era of governance. This chapter explores these key aspects of Nigeria's political and administrative system, examining their interconnections and implications for governance and national unity.

Federal Character and the Constitution

The principle of federal character is enshrined in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution as a mechanism for ensuring that no ethnic or regional group dominates public service appointments and government institutions [7]. The Federal Character Commission (FCC) was established to oversee the implementation of this policy, ensuring equitable representation in federal, state and the local government structures [45]. But critics argue that while the federal character principle promotes inclusivity, it sometimes compromises meritocracy, leading to inefficiencies in governance [58].

The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria serves as the supreme legal document governing the nation's federal system. It defines the separation of powers among the executives, legislature, and judiciary while outlining the responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments. The Constitution also accommodates the legal pluralism inherent in Nigeria's legal system, incorporating elements of Sharia, customary, and civil law [97]. Despite its role in stabilizing governance, the constitution has faced criticism for its centralizing tendencies, limiting the autonomy of state governments [98].

The Federal Character Commission (FCC) is a constitutional body established to ensure the equitable distribution of public sector appointments and resources among Nigeria's diverse ethnic, regional, and religious groups. Rooted in the principles of federalism, the FCC plays a crucial role in promoting national unity, mitigating ethnic domination, and fostering inclusivity in governance [57]. Its foundation is entrenched in Nigeria's 1999 Constitution, specifically in Sections 14 (3) and (4), which emphasize the need for the federal character principle in national integration and governance [7].

The Legal Basis of the FCC in the Nigerian Constitution

The Nigerian Constitution of 1999 as amended, explicitly provides for the application of the federal character principle. Section 14 (3) states:

"The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or any of its agencies" [7].

This provision underscores the constitutional necessity for inclusiveness in governance and the prevention of ethnic hegemony. Section 14 (4) further extends this principle to state and local governments, emphasizing fair representation at all levels of administration [58]

In extension of these provisions, the Federal Character Commission (FCC) was formally established through Decree No. 34 of 1996, which was later then incorporated into the 1999 Constitution under Section 153(1). The FCC is vested with the power to:

1. Formulate and implement guidelines for equitable distribution of public sector appointments and socio-economic infrastructure across the federation.
2. Monitor and enforce compliance with the federal character principle in public service institutions.
3. Promote fairness in employment, admissions, and other national opportunities [10].

The Role of the FCC in Nigeria's Public Administration

The FCC is integral to Nigeria's public administration, ensuring that all ethnic groups have fair representation in government appointments, civil service positions, and educational opportunities [82]. The objectives of the FCC align with the broader goals of federalism, which seek to balance power among Nigeria's diverse ethno-regional groups.

Equitable Distribution of Public Offices: One of the primary mandates of the FCC is to prevent the monopolization of government positions by any particular ethnic or regional group. The commission achieves this by ensuring compliance with federal character principles in the recruitment and appointment processes for ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs). This ensures that Nigeria's diverse ethnic groups are proportionally represented [4].

Socio-Economic Equity and National Integration: Beyond public sector appointments, the FCC also plays a role in distributing socio-economic infrastructure equitably among states and regions. This includes federal projects such as roads, hospitals, and educational institutions. The aim is to prevent economic disparity and political marginalization of minority groups, which could lead to ethnic grievances and political instability.

Challenges and Criticisms of the FCC

Despite its constitutional mandate, the (FCC) has faced several challenges and criticisms over the years. Some of these challenges are:

Political Manipulation and Corruption: The FCC has often been accused of being an instrument for political patronage rather than a neutral arbiter of fairness. Political elites sometimes manipulate the commission's recommendations to favor their ethnic or political constituencies, undermining its effectiveness [58].

Efficiency vs. Representation: While the FCC promotes inclusivity, it has also been criticized for potentially sacrificing meritocracy. The principle of federal character sometimes leads to the selection of candidates based on ethnic and regional considerations rather than qualifications and competence. This has resulted in inefficiencies in the civil service and other government institutions [10]

Implementation Challenges: The enforcement of federal character principles has been inconsistent, with some ethnic groups and regions alleging continued marginalization despite the FCC's efforts. Additionally, some agencies have failed to fully comply with the commission's directives, limiting its overall impact [82].

The FCC and the Future of Federalism in Nigeria

Despite its challenges, the FCC remains a critical institution in Nigeria's federal structure. For the commission to be more effective in addressing ethnic and regional disparities, several reforms have been suggested:

1. **Strengthening Meritocracy:** While federal character should ensure inclusivity, mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that merit and competence are not sacrificed.
2. **Enhancing Transparency:** The FCC should adopt a more transparent approach in monitoring and enforcing compliance with its mandates, reducing the risk of political interference.
3. **Decentralizing Implementation:** By allowing more regional autonomy in the enforcement of federal character principles, the FCC could better address local peculiarities while still promoting national integration.

The Federal Character Commission (FCC) remains a cornerstone of Nigeria's constitutional and administrative framework so far. It is instrumental in promoting national unity, reducing ethnic tensions, and ensuring fair representation in public administration. But to fulfill its mandate effectively, the commission must address challenges related to political interference, inefficiency,

and transparency. A reformed and strengthened FCC will be pivotal in sustaining Nigeria's federal structure and fostering greater national cohesion.

Resource Distribution in Nigeria

Resource distribution in Nigeria has been a major determinant of political, economic, and social stability since independence. As Africa's largest economy and most populous country, Nigeria is endowed with vast natural resources, including oil, natural gas, solid minerals, and arable land. Moreover, the management and allocation of these resources have been a subject of contention, contributing to regional disparities, economic inequalities, and political instability [99]. The nation's federal structure was designed to ensure equitable resource allocation, yet inefficiencies, corruption, and prebendalism continue to undermine the effectiveness of resource distribution [9]. This section explores the key mechanisms, challenges, and impacts of resource distribution in Nigeria, with focus on federal allocation, revenue sharing, oil wealth, and infrastructural disparities.

Nigeria's Oil Revenue Allocation, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC)

With petroleum extraction contributing roughly 60% of the country's GDP and a sizeable amount of its foreign exchange earnings, Nigeria's oil industry has a significant impact on the country's economic landscape [291]. Tribal ties and the efficiency of public administration are closely related to the controversial topic of oil revenue distribution among Nigeria's states.

Nigeria's oil revenue distribution has changed over time as well, reflecting changes in the country's political climate and economic strategies. Oil-producing states have historically been able to keep a sizable amount of the money made from their territories thanks to the derivation principle. For example, states kept half of oil earnings in 1958 [292]. In later years, though, this percentage varied, falling as low as 10% under some military regimes. Oil-producing states were permitted to keep this percentage of the money received from their resources as of 2001, when the derivation formula was set at 13% [293].

The current revenue-sharing formula is as follows [291]:

1. Federal Government: 48.5%
2. State Governments: 24%
3. Local Governments: 20%
4. Special Projects: 7.5%
5. Derivation given to oil-producing states: 13%

It is crucial to remember that the 13% derivation is a portion of the state's share, which is given to oil-producing states to address the infrastructure and environmental issues brought on by oil exploration activities [294].

The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC)

The Nigerian government created the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000 in response to the socioeconomic difficulties and environmental degradation that the Niger Delta region was experiencing due to widespread oil extraction. To improve the standard of living for communities in the Niger Delta, the NDDC is tasked with creating physical and social infrastructure, ecological remediation, and human development projects [295].

The NDDC has been criticized for its efficacy despite its admirable goals. The commission has been unable to fulfill its obligations due to allegations of poor management, corruption, and the hiring of unfit contractors [296]. According to reports, large sums of money intended for environmental remediation were mishandled, which had little effect on the ground [297]. Due to corruption and inefficiency, the commission has also been accused of not finishing significant infrastructure projects, with over N612 billion worth of projects canceled or abandoned [297].

Tensions have frequently arisen between different ethnic groups because of the centralization of oil revenues, especially between states that produce and those that do not. Communities that produce oil have frequently felt excluded, claiming that they are not given enough development or compensation despite bearing the environmental costs of extraction [294].

The establishment of the NDDC was in part, an attempt to address these grievances by ensuring that oil-producing regions received targeted development. But then, the commission's challenges have sometimes exacerbated feelings of neglect and mistrust among local communities [292]. For instance, the Ogoni people have long protested against environmental degradation and have called for greater autonomy and control over their resources [293].

Furthermore, as communities compete for scarce resources, the misappropriation of funds intended for development projects has exacerbated interethnic tensions [291]. This rivalry has the potential to erode national cohesion and present difficulties for efficient public management. Public institutions must support openness, fair resource distribution, and inclusive governance that honors the country's diverse ethnic makeup to promote unity [295].

Tribal relations, the NDDC's performance, and Nigeria's oil revenue distribution all interact to highlight the difficulties in running a resource-rich, ethnically diverse country like Nigeria. A diversified strategy is needed to address these issues, one that involves reexamining revenue-sharing arrangements, fortifying institutional frameworks to thwart corruption, and cultivating inclusive policies that support national cohesion. Nigeria can only use its oil wealth for the good of all its people, guaranteeing long-term unity and sustainable development, by implementing such all-encompassing strategies.

Federal Allocation and Revenue Sharing

Nigeria operates a federal system of government, in which resource distribution is managed through a revenue allocation formula. The central government collects major revenues from oil, taxes, and other sources and redistributes them among the states and local governments based on a defined formula. The current revenue sharing formula allocates 52.68% to the federal government, 26.72% to state governments, and 20.60% to local governments [7]. Additionally, 13% of oil revenues are allocated as derivation funds to oil-producing states to compensate for environmental degradation and resource exploitation.

The distribution of revenue has been a point of contention among the nation's six geopolitical zones despite these mechanisms. While non-oil-producing states support a more equitable distribution based on population and development needs, oil-producing states contend that they should receive a larger share of revenues [58]. Particularly in the Niger Delta region, where militant groups have demonstrated against perceived marginalization, the disparity in revenue sharing has exacerbated interregional tensions and calls for resource control [100].

More than 50% of Nigeria's government revenue and more than 80% of its total export earnings come from oil [101]. However, the country's enormous resources have not resulted in widespread economic prosperity, a phenomenon known as the "*resource curse*," which has been brought on by the heavy reliance on oil wealth [102]. Rather, political elites have accumulated a disproportionate amount of oil wealth, which has exacerbated economic disparities and encouraged corruption [103].

Despite making a substantial contribution to national income, the Niger Delta region which produces most of Nigeria's oil has remained underdeveloped. Oil production has occasionally been disrupted because of resentment and militancy stoked by the region's inadequate infrastructure, environmental degradation, and lack of social services [104]. Calls for more fiscal federalism and decentralization of resource control have been strengthened by the inability of succeeding governments to distribute oil wealth fairly ([105]).

Serious inequalities in Nigeria's infrastructure and development have also been exacerbated by the unequal distribution of resources. While some areas, like the North-East and North-West, suffer from widespread poverty, poor infrastructure, and low human development indices, other areas, like Abuja and Lagos, have seen rapid urban development [106]. Ethno-regional complaints have been exacerbated by the perception of neglect and marginalization brought about by the concentration of federal investments in particular areas [107].

Services like healthcare and education are dispersed unevenly throughout the nation. While northern states continue to face high maternal mortality rates

and low school enrollment, southern states, especially those in the South-West, boast better healthcare facilities and higher literacy rates [108]. In certain areas, these disparities have contributed to ongoing underdevelopment and strengthened socioeconomic divisions.

Corruption is one of the biggest issues affecting Nigeria's resource distribution. Because public servants frequently misappropriate funds for their own personal benefit, governance is ineffective and lacks accountability [72]. The mismanagement of resources has resulted in failed infrastructure projects, unpaid salaries for public workers, and a decline in essential services [109]. Several anti-corruption agencies, including the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), have been established to curb corruption. But their efficacy is still weakened by institutional weaknesses and political meddling [110]. Resource distribution will continue to be a divisive topic and impede national development in the absence of an open and accountable system of governance.

The Federal Character Principle, which seeks to guarantee fair representation of all ethnic groups in government appointments and resource distribution, was adopted by Nigeria in response to worries about ethnic and regional marginalization [98]. For the sake of ensuring regional controls federal appointments and that resources are distributed fairly among the states, the Federal Character Commission (FCC) supervises the application of this principle [45].

While the principle has helped to promote inclusivity, critics argue that it has also institutionalized mediocrity by prioritizing ethnic balancing over meritocracy [31]. The application of Federal Character in resource distribution often leads to inefficiencies, where unqualified individuals occupy strategic positions, thereby affecting productivity and development outcomes [111].

While maintaining inclusivity, the Federal Character Principle should be reformed, to basically balance meritocracy with equitable representation, ensuring that competence remains a key factor in appointments and resource allocation [45].

Resource distribution in Nigeria remains a highly contentious issue due to its direct impact on political stability, economic development, and social cohesion. Even though federalism, revenue allocation mechanisms, and the Federal Character Principle aim to promote fairness, inefficiencies, corruption, and political interests continue to hinder equitable distribution. A diversified strategy is needed to address these issues, one that includes targeted infrastructure investments, transparency reforms, and fiscal decentralization. Nigeria can achieve a more balanced and sustainable development trajectory and promote national unity by putting these measures into practice.

Political Parties

Because political parties have traditionally been established along tribal and regional lines, Nigeria's political landscape is also intricately linked to its ethnic makeup [112]. Ethnic factors have dominated party politics since independence, impacting political alliances, voter behavior, and party formation [58]. This section looks at the historical development, the effects of tribalism on governance, and the ramifications for maintaining national unity in Nigeria's relationship between political parties and tribal affiliations.

Nigerian political parties have their origins in the colonial era, when early nationalist movements were mainly based on ethnic affiliations. The Northern People's Congress (NPC), Action Group (AG), and National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), the three main political parties of the First Republic, all had strong ties to particular ethnic groups [21]. The AG, under Chief Obafemi Awolowo, was primarily Yoruba, while the Northern region was ruled by the Hausa-Fulani elite-dominated NPC. Nnamdi Azikiwe founded the NCNC, which enjoyed strong support from the Eastern Igbo. Tribal rivalry in governance was made possible by this ethnically based political structure, which strengthened divisions.

In Nigeria, the ethnic makeup of political parties has persisted in influencing voting patterns. Instead of judging candidates on their qualifications or policy platforms, voters frequently support those who share their ethnic backgrounds [32]. Because parties align themselves based more on regional and ethnic calculations than on ideological differences, this tribal loyalty also prevents there from being true opposition.

For example, during the 1979 and 1983 elections of the Second Republic, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) secured broad support by forming alliances with different ethnic groups but remained largely Hausa-Fulani dominated [9].

Ethnic and regional divisions are still reflected in political parties, even in the Fourth Republic. To win votes in various areas, the All-Progressive Congress (APC), the People's Democratic Party (PDP), and other parties frequently employ ethnic balancing tactics. Although it was institutionalized to preserve political stability, the zoning principle, which rotates important positions among major ethnic groups, serves to deepen rather than to eliminate ethnic divisions [113].

Nigeria's political parties' tribal makeup has several effects on governance and national cohesion. First, political leaders are frequently chosen more for their ethnicity than their qualifications, undermining meritocracy [51]. This erodes democratic institutions and makes governance ineffective. Second, as demonstrated by the 2011 and 2019 elections, where conflicts broke out between various ethnic groups backing opposing candidates, ethnic party affiliations contribute to electoral violence [114]. Third, because elected officials put their ethnic constituencies ahead of the interests of the country, it encourages corruption and prebendalism [3].

Nigeria has responded to these issues by addressing ethnic imbalance in

politics through the Federal Character Principle and federalism [1]. The 1999 Constitution's Federal Character Principle requires that government appointments and resource distribution consider Nigeria's ethnic diversity [45]. Nevertheless, detractors contend that although this policy encourages inclusivity, it also strengthens quota-based governance and ethnic patronage instead of fostering competence and competition [113].

Tribalism is stronghold in Nigeria's political parties continues to be a major barrier to the country's unity and the consolidation of democracy. Although the Federal Character Principle and federalism offer a framework for ethnic inclusion, more proactive steps are required to reduce tribalism's political influence. A more cohesive political environment can be achieved by promoting issue-based politics, encouraging cross-ethnic political alliances, and enacting electoral reforms that deter ethnic-based voting [112]. Strengthening civic education and likewise promoting a national identity over ethnic affiliations will also be crucial in ensuring that political participation in Nigeria transcends tribal lines.

2.6 The Parliament and Legislative Framework

Nigeria operates a bicameral legislature consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The National Assembly oversees enacting laws, monitoring the executive branch, and allocating funds [115]. Therefore, political party influence, corruption, and executive-legislative conflicts have frequently impeded legislative processes. The National Assembly was given more legislative autonomy when democratic governance was restored in 1999, but issues like political clientelism and electoral fraud still exist.

As the legislative branch of the nation, the Nigerian Parliament also known as the National Assembly plays a crucial role in oversight, legislation, and governance. The National Assembly, a bicameral legislature made up of the Senate and the House of Representatives, was established by the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. The Nigerian Parliament is a crucial democratic institution that serves as a conduit between the people and the government, guaranteeing representation, accountability, and the formulation of national development policies [116].

Structure of the Nigerian Parliament

The Nigerian Parliament consists of two chambers:

1. The Senate

The Senate is the upper chamber of the National Assembly, consisting of 109 members. Each of Nigeria's 36 states elects three senators, while the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) elects one senator. The Senate is led by the Senate President, who is assisted by the Deputy Senate President. The Senate is responsible for confirming executive appointments, reviewing legislation, and participating in impeachment proceedings [117].

2. The House of Representatives

The House of Representatives is the lower chamber of the National Assembly, consisting of 360 members elected based on population distribution across constituencies in Nigeria. The Speaker of the House of Representatives leads this chamber, with support from the Deputy Speaker. The House plays a critical role in budget approval, lawmaking and oversight of the executive [118].

Functions of the Nigerian Parliament

The National Assembly performs several key functions that are crucial to Nigeria's governance:

Lawmaking: The primary function of the Nigerian Parliament is to make laws for the peace, order, and good governance of the country. Bills, or legislative proposals, are presented, discussed, and eventually enacted [119].

Accountability and Oversight: Through budget scrutiny, questioning of ministers and government officials, and investigative committees, the Parliament keeps an eye on the executive branch of government. This role lowers corruption and guarantees transparency [120].

Representation: By raising issues and promoting laws that help their local communities, National Assembly members speak for their constituents [121].

Budget and Appropriations: The executive's proposed national budget is approved by the National Assembly. It can make changes and distribute funds to various economic sectors [122].

Impeachment Powers: To ensure accountability in governance, the Parliament has the authority to remove the President, Vice President, or other high-ranking officials if they are found to have engaged in flagrant misconduct [124].

Challenges Facing the Nigerian Parliament:

Despite its crucial role in governance, the Nigerian Parliament faces several challenges like:

Corruption and Lack of Transparency: The Nigerian legislative system continues to face significant challenges due to corruption. It has been alleged that lawmakers have engaged in corrupt activities, mismanaged public funds, and failed to maintain transparency in their transactions [125].

Ethnic and Regional Politics: The country's long-standing ethnic and regional divisions are frequently reflected in the Nigerian Parliament. Legislative inefficiencies and policy impasses result from lawmakers' frequent preference for sectional interests over national unity [126].

Weak Legislative-Executive Relations: Nigerian governance has been hindered by disputes between the legislature and the executive. The effectiveness of the Parliament has been weakened by power struggles, disagreements over the budget, and executive meddling in legislative matters [127].

Lack of Independence: Despite being a constitutionally independent body, the National Assembly frequently receives pressure from the executive branch, which results in situations where legislative decisions are influenced by outside forces rather than the interests of the public.

Ineffective Lawmaking Process: Many bills introduced in the Nigerian Parliament fail to pass into law due to inefficiencies, lack of quorum, and political interests. This inefficiency affects governance and policy implementation [128]. The Nigerian Parliament remains a vital institution in the country's democracy, providing a platform for legislation, representation and oversight. The National Assembly still has to deal with issues like corruption, ethnic politics, executive meddling, and ineffective lawmaking procedures despite its constitutional mandate.

Reforms that promote national unity, increase transparency, and fortify parliamentary independence are necessary to meet these issues. To achieve sustainable development and good governance, Nigeria's legislative framework must be strengthened.

2.7 Religion and Tribal Relations in Nigeria's Public Administration System

Nigeria's public administration operates within a complex tapestry of religious and tribal affiliations. With the abundant ethnic and tribal groups and a nearly equal division between Islam and Christianity, these identities significantly influence governance structures and processes. This section of the study explores the historical background, expressions, and policy and governance implications of religion and tribalism as they intersect in Nigerian public administration. The foundation for current issues in Nigeria's public administration was established by the blending of various ethnic and religious groups during colonial rule. Inadvertently sowing the seeds of division, the British colonial strategy of indirect rule frequently strengthened preexisting tribal hierarchies [278]. These divisions remained after independence, impacting administrative procedures and political allegiance.

Recruitment and promotion in public institutions are frequently determined by tribal affiliations. Meritocracy is weakened by this practice, which results in inefficiencies and a decline in public confidence. According to Oluwaseyi (2020) [279], this kind of partiality encourages exclusion and reduces the efficiency of public administration. Godfatherism is a subset of tribalism in which powerful individuals known as "godfathers" exercise authority over their political protégés, also known as "godsons" or "goddaughters." This dynamic strengthens corruption

and inefficiency by sustaining patronage networks where loyalty takes precedence over skill [280].

Public administration is greatly impacted by religious affiliations, especially in Northern Nigeria, where Sharia law has been incorporated into the legal framework of multiple states since 1999 [281]. One example of how religious norms have been institutionalized within public governance structures is the creation of the Islamic religious police, or Hisbah.

Minority communities experience unequal development and marginalization because of policies that are frequently designed to appease dominant tribal or religious groups. Social unrest is stoked, and regional disparities are made worse by this selective policy-making process. Trust in governmental institutions is damaged when public administration is perceived to be biased. Resentment is stoked and national unity is threatened when people think that access to public services and opportunities is determined by one's tribal or religious affiliations.

Political instability and electoral violence have been associated with the integration of religion and tribalism in public administration. For example, there was violence in the Northern region during the 2011 elections, which led to many fatalities and property damage [282].

Strategies for Mitigation

Tribalism and religious prejudice can be lessened by putting policies in place that support fair representation. A more equitable distribution of public positions among diverse groups is ensured by fortifying frameworks such as the Federal Character Principle [282]. Tribalism and godfatherism can be lessened by implementing open, merit-based hiring and promotion procedures. This change would improve administrative institutions' effectiveness and public trust. Understanding and reconciliation are fostered by promoting communication between diverse religious and ethnic communities.

Projects such as Kaduna's Interfaith Mediation Centre have shown promise in fostering harmonious coexistence and overcoming barriers [282]. Reliance on tribal or religious patronage can also be reduced by addressing economic disparities. Citizens are empowered by programs that emphasize skill development and fair resource distribution, which lessen their vulnerability to polarizing influences.

Nigeria's public administration is significantly shaped by religion and tribal relations, which offer both opportunities and challenges. Although these identities have the potential to strengthen cultural bonds, their politicization further erodes social cohesiveness and government.

To resolve these problems and create a more cohesive and efficient public administration system, comprehensive strategies that support inclusivity, meritocracy, and communication are needed.

Sharia, Customary, and Civil Law in Nigeria

Nigeria's varied ethnic, religious, and historical influences are reflected in the country's intricate legal system, which combines Sharia, customary, and civil law. In a multiethnic society, this tripartite legal system is essential for upholding order, managing tribal relations, and guaranteeing justice. Nigeria aims to maintain justice and inclusivity by incorporating modern statutory law with religious and traditional legal frameworks [129].

Through centuries of indigenous governance, colonial rule, and post-independence reforms, Nigeria's legal system has changed. Ethnic groups used indigenous legal traditions based on religious and cultural norms to govern themselves during the pre-colonial era.

The colonial administration introduced English common law, which later became the foundation of Nigeria's civil legal system [311]. Hence, recognizing the deeply ingrained religious and customary laws, the British colonial government allowed for the coexistence of Sharia and Customary laws in certain regions [130]. The Nigerian Constitution later codified this legal pluralism, giving various communities a framework for laws that reflect their customs and values.

Nigerian states with majority of Muslims are subject to sharia law, which regulates matters of personal status for Muslims, including marriage, inheritance, and the criminal justice system. Sharia supporters contend that it preserves moral order and offers followers an efficient legal system, even though its 1999 reintroduction in 12 northern states triggered discussions on religious pluralism and human rights [131]. Only Muslims who willingly submit to their authority are subject to the jurisdiction of sharia courts, which coexist with civil and customary courts [132]. Sharia law cannot be imposed on non-Muslims because the Nigerian Constitution protects religious freedom as in Constitution of Nigeria, 1999, Sec. 38 [7].

Deeply ingrained in Nigeria's ethnic communities, customary law still regulates chieftaincy affairs, land tenure, and personal and family matters. Although this system differs from one ethnic group to another, it is typically defined by oral traditions, group decision-making, and the resolution of conflicts by elder councils or traditional rulers [133]. Many states have customary courts, which give people a way to settle conflicts according to traditional principles. To guarantee gender equality and fairness in adjudication, however, reforms are sometimes required when customary practices conflict with human rights principles or statutory law [134].

Nigerian civil law, which is primarily based on English common law, provides a unifying framework for regulating criminal justice, business transactions, constitutional issues, and fundamental human rights. By ensuring that civil law functions in conformity with the Constitution, the Nigerian judiciary, including the Supreme Court and other federal courts, balances the

power of customary and religious laws [135]. For preventing legal ambiguity or discrimination resulting from conflicts between Sharia, customary and civil law, the judiciary is essential in balancing the coexistence of various legal systems [136].

By enabling communities to be governed by laws that reflect their values and beliefs, the coexistence of Sharia, customary law and civil law foster tribal harmony. In addition to providing access to the larger national legal system, this legal pluralism promotes inclusivity by allowing people to pursue justice through well-known legal frameworks [137]. By giving states the freedom to choose the legal frameworks that best suit their citizens, federalism helps to preserve the delicate balance [58].

Furthermore, there are drawbacks to legal pluralism, such as jurisdictional disputes, inconsistent legal interpretation, and worries about human rights abuses under certain traditional and religious laws. Nigeria has put in place constitutional protections and judicial oversight procedures that put fundamental rights and national unity first, so as to address these problems [130].

Nigeria's tripartite legal system Sharia, Customary, and Civil law has been instrumental in ensuring fair tribal relations by accommodating the country's religious and ethnic diversity. While challenges persist in harmonizing these legal traditions, the framework remains a vital tool for maintaining social cohesion and promoting justice across different communities. Further, judicial reforms and continuous dialogue among religious, traditional, and legal institutions will be essential in strengthening this pluralistic legal system while safeguarding fundamental rights and national unity.

IPOB and the Call for Separatism in Nigeria

The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) is one of the most significant separatist movements in Nigeria, advocating for the secession of the southeastern region, primarily inhabited by the Igbo ethnic group. The demand for Biafra's independence is primarily rooted in historical grievances, including perceived political marginalization, economic inequality, and human rights violations. IPOB has utilized social media, protests, and international lobbying to push its agenda, while the Nigerian government has responded with military crackdowns, arrests and proscription of the group as a terrorist organization [138]. Examining IPOB's causes, tactics, and ramifications is crucial because its rise reflects deeper structural problems with Nigeria's federalism, ethnic relations, and governance.

The demand for Biafran autonomy is not a recent development. Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu led the initial attempt to create the Republic of Biafra, which ultimately led to the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970). Millions of people died from famine and fighting during the war, which caused serious humanitarian problems [139]. Biafra's reintegration into Nigeria marked the end of the war, but the underlying problems of political and ethnic marginalization remained.

IPOB, under the leadership of Nnamdi Kanu, has been instrumental in the 21st century revival of the Biafran cause. In contrast to the earlier Biafran organization, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), IPOB has taken a more assertive stance, using global networks and contemporary technology to rally supporters. IPOB's message has been widely disseminated and has received international attention thanks in large part to social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube [140].

Causes of IPOB's Separatist Agitation

Political Marginalization and Lack of Representation: The Igbo people's alleged political exclusion from Nigerian governance is one of IPOB's main grievances. There have been allegations of intentional marginalization since no Igbo person has been elected president of Nigeria since the end of the Civil War. Igbo dissatisfaction has also been exacerbated by the Nigerian federation's structure and the power of northern political elites [30]. Since many Igbos feel they are routinely left out of important political and military appointments, the Federal Character principle which was meant to guarantee fair representation has not adequately addressed these issues [141].

Economic Deprivation and Unequal Development: Separatist sentiments are made worse by economic disparities among Nigeria's regions. The federal government invests little in social services and infrastructure in the Southeast, despite the region's substantial contributions to national revenue from trade and commerce. While their own communities continue to be underdeveloped, many IPOB supporters contend that resources from their area are utilized to develop other regions of the nation [142]. Since many people think that an independent Biafra would provide better economic opportunities and development, this economic disparity has bolstered calls for self-determination.

Human Rights Violations and State Repression: The Nigerian government's heavy-handed response to IPOB has also intensified separatist agitation. Amnesty International reported several instances of extrajudicial killings, mass arrests and violent suppression of IPOB protests by security forces [147]. The proscription of IPOB as a terrorist organization in 2017 further escalated the tensions, hence many Igbos saw it as an attempt to silence legitimate grievances [143]. State repression has reinforced IPOB's claims that Nigeria is an oppressive state that cannot guarantee the rights of the Igbo people.

IPOB employs various strategies to push its agenda, including:

Social Media Usage and Digital Activism: IPOB has effectively used social media to mobilize supporters, spread propaganda, and counter state narratives [140].

International Lobbying: The group has sought recognition from foreign governments and international organizations, portraying Nigeria as a failed state that oppresses its minorities [144].

Civil Disobedience and Protests: IPOB organizes sit-at-home orders, boycotts, and street protests to disrupt economic activities and draw attention to its cause [145].

Use of Radio Biafra: The group operates an independent radio station to broadcast its message, often spreading anti-government rhetoric and separatist ideologies [146].

The Nigerian government has taken a hardline stance against IPOB, banning the organization and arresting its leader, Nnamdi Kanu. However, this approach has not quelled the movement but rather fueled more resentment. The military's Operation Python Dance, launched in the southeastern region, led to further human rights violations, increasing public sympathy for IPOB [147].

The state's failure to address the root causes of separatist agitation such as political inclusion, economic development, and human rights protection means that repression alone will not resolve the crisis. Rather, it is evidently necessary to adopt a more inclusive governance approach that truly incorporates all ethnic groups into Nigeria's political and economic structures [148].

The IPOB movement is a sign of more serious structural issues in Nigeria, such as state repression, economic marginalization, and political exclusion. The Nigerian government has suppressed IPOB through military and legal means, but these tactics have frequently backfired, escalating grievances and separatist sentiment. Respect for human rights, economic growth, and political reforms are necessary for a lasting solution. Nigeria can only address the underlying causes of separatist movements and achieve national unity by means of sincere dialogue, inclusion, and equitable governance.

Unity Institutions and Ethnic Organization

Nigeria's ethnic diversity presents both a challenge and an opportunity for national unity and equitable public administration. The National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) and Unity Schools were established as policy instruments to foster national integration, counteract ethnic division and promote fair tribal relations within Nigeria's socio-political landscape. These institutions serve as mechanisms for bridging ethnic gaps, reducing sectionalism, and enhancing mutual understanding among diverse ethnic groups in the country.

The National Youth Service Corps (NYSC)

The NYSC was established in 1973 under Decree No. 24 by General Yakubu Gowon as a response to the divisive aftermath of the Nigerian Civil War [149]. The program mandates that university and polytechnic graduates under the age of 30 serve the country in a state different from their state of origin for a year. This compulsory national service was designed to encourage inter-ethnic interaction, promote national unity and to discourage ethnic exclusivism [150].

The NYSC scheme has achieved some success in fostering cross-cultural exchange and reducing inter-ethnic prejudices. Corps members are exposed to different cultures, traditions and languages, which encourages tolerance and

appreciation of Nigeria's diversity [151]. By placing young graduates in different states, the program enhances national integration and provides an avenue for equitable public service recruitment, as corps members often seek employment in the states where they served [152]. As part of ethnography data gathering, the author participated in the NYSC program in 2023 as part of the ethnographic study, which gave him the opportunity to observe how the program helps in managing ethnic and tribal relations in Nigeria's public administration.

The author stayed with other Nigerian peers from different ethnic and tribal background for a duration of one month at a state camp. The program teaches the participants a sense of national belonging, where more than 500 participants from different ethnicities and states came together to live and cohabit in the same camp for a duration of over 20 days. The author also noted the impact of unity, as the participants engaged in different extracurricular activities that portray culture and traditions of Nigerian tribes.

Although, the program has faced significant challenges, including insecurity in some parts of the country, poor remuneration, and ethnic favoritism in posting [153]. Some corps members face discrimination and exclusion in host communities, undermining the program's core objective of unity [154]. Despite these limitations, the NYSC remains a crucial instrument for fostering fair tribal relations and should be strengthened through enhanced security measures, better incentives, and more inclusive community engagement programs.

Unity Schools

Unity Schools, which are formally known as Federal Government Colleges, were established in the 1970s to basically promote social integration among young Nigerians from different ethnic backgrounds [155]. For the purpose of promoting inter-group harmony and a sense of national identity, these schools were created to offer high-quality education while uniting students from various ethnic and geographic backgrounds [156]. A quota system founded on federal character principles governs admission to those Unity Schools, guaranteeing equitable representation of all states and ethnic groups [157].

Throughout Nigeria's six geopolitical zones, this system was intended to foster inclusivity and fair access to high-quality education [158]. Unity Schools make a substantial contribution to the reduction of ethnic stereotypes and prejudices by fostering an atmosphere in which students engage and develop friendships across ethnic boundaries [159].

Notwithstanding these initiatives, problems still exist, such as a lack of funding, deteriorating infrastructure, and worries about the quality of education in Unity Schools [160]. Furthermore, the importance of Unity Schools as tools of national integration has diminished due to the growth of private schools and the preference for state-owned establishments [161]. The Nigerian government must make infrastructural investments, guarantee equitable student distribution across ethnic divides, and strengthen laws that promote interethnic cooperation and cultural exchange, so, to revive the role of these institutions in promoting just

tribal relations.

Within Nigeria's public administration system, the NYSC and Unity Schools were created as strategic national policies to address ethnic divisions and foster equitable tribal relations. Despite their admirable efforts to promote national unity, structural flaws, financial constraints, and regional insecurities have limited their efficacy. These institutions can have a greater influence on promoting interethnic relations and guaranteeing a more inclusive and cohesive Nigerian society if they are strengthened through policy changes, sufficient funding, and security measures.

Forum of Northern Elders (NEF)

A political and sociocultural group that was formally founded in 2010, the Northern Elders Forum (NEF) aims to represent the interests of northern Nigeria. The group was formed in response to the North's alleged exclusion from Nigeria's political and economic spheres. In addition to addressing issues like poverty, insecurity, and the need for fair resource distribution, the NEF has been outspoken in its support of northern unity [162].

The forum is also seen as a counterbalance to the power and influence of other regional bodies in the country. NEF's leadership often engages in national debates regarding security, especially in relation to the rise of insurgency and banditry in the North. Through its advocacy, the NEF has maintained its status as a crucial player in Nigeria's political landscape, although critics argue that the group is sometimes too focused on promoting northern dominance rather than addressing the genuine socio-economic challenges of the region [163].

Ohanaeze Ndigbo

The Ohanaeze Ndigbo is a socio-political organization representing the interests of the Igbo people, one of Nigeria's three major ethnic groups. Established in 1976, the organization has become a major advocate for the rights and interests of the Igbo people within the context of a unified Nigeria. The group is known for its stance on restructuring Nigeria's federal system, advocating for greater regional autonomy and addressing the marginalization of the South-East region [164]. Ohanaeze Ndigbo has been a vocal advocate for the presidency to be rotated to the South-East, arguing that this would foster greater national unity. The group also often calls for peaceful coexistence among Nigeria's ethnic groups while pushing for Igbo inclusion in federal appointments. Critics, however, accuse the group of sometimes fueling ethnic tensions, particularly in its responses to national political issues [165].

Afenifere (Yoruba Group)

Afenifere is the foremost socio-political organization representing the interests of the Yoruba people, predominantly from the South-West of Nigeria. Established in the post-independence era, Afenifere has played a key role in advocating for democratic governance, federalism, and the protection of Yoruba cultural values. The group has historically aligned itself with progressive causes,

particularly in pushing for the devolution of power and restructuring of Nigeria's federal system [166]. Afenifere has been an influential voice in advocating for Yoruba interests in national discourse. The group was actively involved in opposing military rule and has continued to push for democratic reforms. It frequently collaborates with other regional bodies in advocating for national unity, albeit from the perspective of regional autonomy [167]. The group's vision for a restructured Nigeria aims to strengthen national unity by reducing the concentration of power in the central government.

These organizations represent regional interests, but also function within the broader objective of maintaining Nigeria's unity, hence the three organizations are not the only ethnic groups in the country, but they represent 70% of the nation's population with federal character principle advocating for other minor tribes a. Each organization, while advocating for its respective ethnic or regional group, acknowledges the need for a unified Nigeria. However, their focus on regional or ethnic interests sometimes raises questions about their contributions to national integration. The challenge remains finding a balance between addressing regional grievances and promoting the overall unity of the country.

As Nigeria continues to grapple with issues of ethnic diversity, economic inequality, and security concerns, these institutions will remain critical players in shaping the nation's political future.

3 THE ROLE OF TRIBAL RELATIONS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM OF NIGERIA

3.1 Role of Tribal Relations in the Public Administration System of Nigeria

Tribal ties have a big impact on governance, policymaking, and bureaucratic structures in Nigeria's highly diverse sociopolitical environment, where the public administration system functions. For the efficiency and equity of public service delivery, the relationship between ethnic identity and governance continues to present both opportunities and difficulties.

By establishing an indirect rule system that gave traditional rulers in various areas more authority, the colonial government set the groundwork for ethnic-based governance [174]. This tactic solidified ethnicity as a political instrument in public administration and strengthened tribal divisions. Ethnic politics took center stage in state affairs after Nigeria gained independence in 1960, with tribal ties impacting resource allocation, policy choices, and bureaucratic appointments [1].

Nigeria implemented a federal system that aimed to distribute power among various groups to reduce ethnic dominance. Also to prevent any single tribe from controlling all government jobs, the 1979 Constitution established the Federal Character Commission (FCC), which formalized ethnic representation in public service. The federal character principle was intended to encourage inclusivity, but it has also come under fire for limiting meritocracy in bureaucratic appointments and strengthening ethnic favoritism.

In Nigeria's public administration, tribal affiliations frequently control hiring, advancement, and decision-making. Research shows that professional competence can occasionally be subordinated to ethnic loyalty, resulting in ineffective governance [5]. Nigerian politics' patron-client dynamic encourages a system in which public servants put ethnic interests ahead of the country's progress, which exacerbates corruption and ineffective administration [3].

The distribution of resources among Nigeria's geopolitical zones is greatly influenced by tribal relations. Ethnic ties are used by political elites to obtain social programs, infrastructure development, and government funding for their areas [48]. Disparities in the provision of public services have arisen as a result, and certain ethnic groups feel excluded from the national development agenda [10]. For example, perceived ethnic exclusion in oil revenue management is a contributing factor in the Niger Delta crisis [99].

Ethnic rivalries have historically contributed to political instability and governance crises in Nigeria. The civil war (1967-1970) was largely driven by ethnic tensions, and subsequent coups have been linked to tribal considerations in military and administrative structures. Recently, ethnic conflicts in the Middle Belt, competition over land resources, and the rise of separatist movements

highlight how such tribal relations continue to affect governance and national unity [175].

Despite the challenges posed by tribal relations, Nigeria has made efforts to enhance national integration in governance. Policies such as the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) and the constitutional provisions for federal inclusion seek to foster cross-ethnic collaboration in public administration [6]. Strengthening institutional frameworks that emphasize competence over ethnicity and promoting inter-ethnic dialogue could enhance efficiency in Nigeria's public administration system.

Tribal relations play a central role in shaping Nigeria's public administration system, influencing bureaucratic efficiency, resource allocation, and national stability. While ethnic representation policies such as the federal character principle aim to balance power among Nigeria's diverse groups, challenges related to tribal favoritism, corruption, and inefficiencies persist. Filling these gaps requires reforms that emphasize meritocracy, national integration, and equitable governance to ensure a more effective and inclusive public administration system.

The role of tribal relations in Nigerian public administration is a crucial topic, especially considering the country's ethnic diversity and complex socio-political landscape. Academic discussions frequently highlight how tribal affiliations shape public administration, particularly through colonial legacies, federalism, ethnic politics, and efforts at administrative reform. Colonial policies introduced during British rule institutionalized ethnic divisions, setting the stage for tribal relations as a central element in governance.

The British colonial administrators used a "divide-and-rule" strategy, which segmented the Nigerian population along tribal lines, politicizing ethnicity and embedding it within the governance structure. This approach influenced post-independence Nigeria, where political elites inherited administrative frameworks entrenched in ethnic divisions. Ekeh [1] conceptualizes this as the "two publics" framework, differentiating between the civic public associated with formal institutions and colonial governance, and the primordial public linked to ethnic and tribal loyalties.

In the post-independence era, the federal system was introduced in Nigeria with the intention of managing ethnic diversity by allowing regional autonomy and ensuring representation of major groups in governance. However, federalism has, paradoxically, entrenched tribal identities further within Nigeria's political and administrative systems. One key example of this is the federal character principle, which mandates equitable representation of ethnic groups in federal appointments to foster national unity and prevent ethnic dominance [4]. While intended to unify, this principle has also contributed to reinforcing tribal allegiances in public administration. Ethnic politics in Nigeria is often characterized by "prebendalism," a system where public offices are treated as "prebends" or sources of personal or group benefit [9].

This system has significant implications for public administration, as it encourages corruption, nepotism, and inefficiency. Ayoade [5] notes that ethnic loyalty frequently influences appointments, promotions, and policy formulation, creating an administrative framework where resources are allocated based on tribal affiliations rather than developmental needs. Consequently, institutions intended to embody national unity are often perceived as representing particular ethnic interests, undermining their legitimacy among the broader public [10]. This environment complicates the effectiveness of public administration, as officials may prioritize tribal representation over professional competence, which, in turn, hinders the development of an efficient, neutral civil service capable of advancing Nigeria's development agenda.

Political economy of Ethnicity and Public Administration in Nigeria

Tribe and ethnicity play a pivotal role in shaping the dynamics of public administration in Nigeria, influencing policy formulation, resource allocation, and governance structures. The political economy approach provides a robust lens to examine how ethnic identities intersect with economic and political factors to impact public administration. This framework integrates theories of ethnicity, public administration, and political economy to analyze the complexities of Nigeria's administrative system.

Ethnicity, as posited by Barth [177], is not a fixed attribute but a dynamic construct shaped by social, economic, and political contexts. In Nigeria, ethnic identities have been historically amplified by colonial administrative policies, which institutionalized ethnic divisions through indirect rule [3]. These colonial legacies persist, influencing the interactions between ethnic groups and the state.

The political economy perspective views how ethnic identities intersect with resource control, power distribution, and economic inequality. Horowitz [178] highlights that ethnic affiliations often determine access to political power and economic resources, fostering competition and conflict. In Nigeria, this dynamic manifests in the federal character principle, designed to ensure equitable representation but often criticized for promoting mediocrity and inefficiency [179]. The federal character principle, enshrined in Nigeria's constitution, seeks to address ethnic imbalances in public service. While this policy aims to promote inclusivity, it often undermines meritocracy and fosters inefficiency [8].

The political economy perspective reveals that this trade-off reflects deeper struggles over power and resources among Nigeria's ethnic groups. Furthermore, Public administration in Nigeria operates within a context of ethnic pluralism, where administrative decisions are frequently influenced by ethnic considerations [58]. This ethnicization of public administration impacts governance outcomes, often leading to patronage, nepotism, and corruption [1]. The dual mandate of balancing ethnic representation and administrative efficiency creates systemic challenges in policy implementation.

The structure of Nigeria's federalism, rooted in ethnic balancing, reflects the political economy of ethnicity. And so, resource allocation became a contentious issue, with oil revenues predominantly sourced from the Niger Delta often leading

to disputes over revenue-sharing formulas [181]. The ethnic elites leverage public administration systems to secure resources for their constituencies, reinforcing ethnic divisions.

Ethnic affiliations influence governance styles and policy priorities, often leading to the marginalization of minority groups. The political economy framework underscores how public administrators navigate ethnic dynamics to maintain stability and legitimacy, albeit at the cost of long-term development goals [45]. Ethnic politics in public administration exacerbate corruption, weakens institutional capacity and undermines national integration [182]. These challenges are compounded by the lack of a cohesive national identity, which fuels ethnic grievances.

Reforming public administration through merit-based recruitment, decentralization, and conflict-sensitive policies offers pathways to mitigate ethnic tensions [183]. Strengthening civic education and promoting inclusive governance can also foster national unity.

3.2 Methodology

This part of the study employs an empirical and quantitative research methodology to understand the role of tribal relations in the public administration system of Nigeria. The research aims to analyze the influence of tribal affiliations on administrative effectiveness, recruitment, resource allocation, and overall governance within the public sector. The research follows a descriptive survey design, which is well-suited for obtaining quantifiable information from a large population. This approach enables the collection of data on respondents' perceptions and experiences concerning the impact of tribal affiliations on public administration in Nigeria. By using a cross-sectional survey, the study captures a snapshot of current opinions and attitudes regarding ethnic influences in the public sector at a particular point in time.

Population: The target population for this study comprises Nigerian citizens across different ethnic groups, states, and regions. The study aims to include respondents from the major ethnic groups Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo as well as individuals from minority ethnic groups. This diverse sampling approach ensures that the data gathered is representative of Nigeria's ethnic diversity for better data validity and reliability.

Sampling: A multi-stage sampling technique was used to select the respondents. In the first stage, six states were purposively selected, two from each of the three major geopolitical zones of Nigeria: Kano and Kaduna states from the Northern region, then Lagos and Oyo states from the West, and Enugu and Port Harcourt from the Eastern region. In the second stage, simple random sampling was used to select local government areas within the states, ensuring that rural and urban settings as well as ethnic balancing within the local governments were both represented by selecting major and minor ethnic groups in each local government.

Finally, systematic random sampling was used to select individual respondents from households within each selected local government area,

respondents were selected on a maximum of 4 respondents per local government in Kano and Oyo states which have higher number of local governments, and 3 respondents per local government in the other 4 states. The sample size for the study was calculated using Cochran's formula for an unknown population size, ensuring a statistically reliable estimate.

A total of 660 respondents were targeted in total, projecting 110 respondents per state. The total number of valid responses returned was 633 which shows over 95% response rate, with Kano 107, Kaduna 103, Lagos 108, Oyo 107, Port Harcourt 106 and Enugu 105. A total of 600 valid responses were then analyzed, picking 100 valid responses from each of the six selected states. The justification for picking 100 valid responses from each state was to balance the sample size across the states chosen for the study, and again for the fact that there were 29 invalid responses among the 33 responses omitted. This 600-sample size was deemed adequate for generalizing the findings to the larger population.

Data Collection: Primary data was collected using structured questionnaires administered to respondents. The questionnaire was designed in both English and Pidgin English to ensure inclusivity and comprehension by a broad cross-section of the population. It comprised closed-ended questions, using a likert scale ranging from "Strongly Disagree" (5) to "Strongly Agree"(1), to measure respondents' attitudes towards the influence of tribal relations in the public administration system.

The questionnaire was distributed in printed form and the questionnaire consisted of 4 parts; the first part introduced the survey to the respondents then the second section collected the general and socio-demographic information of the respondents. The third and fourth sections collected the tribal affiliation and the role of tribal relation in the public administration system of Nigeria. The questions in the last two sections covered various aspects, including perceptions of fairness in public sector recruitment, the role of tribal affiliation in accessing public services, and the perceived impact of the federal character principle on administrative efficiency (See Appendix E).

Data Analysis: The collected data were coded and entered into Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software version 28 for analysis. Descriptive statistics, including frequency distributions, percentages, means, and standard deviations, were calculated to provide a summary of the data. Inferential statistics were also employed to test the study's hypotheses. A multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine the extent to which tribal affiliation influences key aspects of public administration, including recruitment practices, resource allocation, and administrative efficiency.

The regression model allowed for the identification of statistically significant relationships between respondents' tribal affiliation and their experiences with public administration. Additionally, chi-square tests were performed to examine the association between ethnic background and respondents' perception of fairness in public sector practices.

Hypotheses: The Hypotheses to be tested in this study are:

H1: Recruitment fairness positively influences trust in public administration.

H2: Influence of tribal affiliation negatively affects trust in public administration.

H3: Federal character impact positively influences trust in public administration.

H4: Service delivery efficiency positively influences trust in public administration.

Model and Result

A survey was conducted with 633 respondents and the study selected 600 valid responses across 6 Nigerian states selected from the Northern, Western, and Eastern regions. The primary ethnic groups represented include Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo, and other minority groups. Data were collected using variables such as demographic characteristics and responses on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree). This approach enabled a quantitative assessment of tribal and regional perspectives within Nigeria's public administration system, facilitating an analysis of cross-regional sentiment and trends.




Figure 13 - Representation of Nigerian tribes in the survey of role of tribal relation in the Public Administration system of Nigeria.

Out of the 600 valid responses, representation from Nigeria's major ethnic groups includes Hausa-Fulani (157), Yoruba (163), Igbo (148), and Minority Groups (132), as seen in Figure 2. This distribution allowed for a balanced analysis of perspectives across Nigeria's diverse ethnic landscape. Additionally, gender representation was nearly even, with 311 females and 289 males, providing insights into gendered perspectives within public administration.

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Hausa-Fulani in the survey of role of tribal relation in the public administration system of Nigeria.

Variable	Mean	Median	St. Dev.
Age	40.52	40.0	13.49
Recruitment Fairness	3.17	3.0	1.49
Influence of Tribal Affiliation	3.06	3.0	1.39
Federal Character Impact	3.17	3.0	1.45
Service Delivery Efficiency	2.83	3.0	1.40
Trust in Public Administration	3.11	3.0	1.40

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Igbo in the survey of role of tribal relation in the public administration system of Nigeria.

Variable	Mean	Median	St. Dev.
Age	41.62	42.0	12.79
Recruitment Fairness	2.91	3.0	1.51
Influence of Tribal Affiliation	3.12	3.0	1.51
Federal Character Impact	3.13	3.0	1.34
Service Delivery Efficiency	3.04	3.0	1.45
Trust in Public Administration	2.99	3.0	1.42

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Minority in the survey of role of tribal relation in the public administration system of Nigeria.

Variable	Mean	Median	St. Dev.
Age	43.71	46.0	14.07
Recruitment Fairness	3.16	3.0	1.37
Influence of Tribal Affiliation	2.99	3.0	1.40
Federal Character Impact	3.03	3.0	1.42
Service Delivery Efficiency	2.80	3.0	1.48
Trust in Public Administration	3.20	3.0	1.40

Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Yoruba in the survey of role of tribal relation in the public administration system of Nigeria.

Variable	Mean	Median	St. Dev.
Age	41.75	43.0	13.96
Recruitment Fairness	2.97	3.0	1.38
Influence of Tribal Affiliation	2.88	3.0	1.38
Federal Character Impact	2.93	3.0	1.44
Service Delivery Efficiency	2.91	3.0	1.45
Trust in Public Administration	3.07	3.0	1.37

The findings in Tables 1-4 highlight diverse perceptions among Nigerian ethnic groups regarding public administration, with a particular focus on the role of tribal affiliations. While the age of respondents varies from 18 to 65, the average age of respondents (around 40 years) shows a balanced adult demographic, enhancing the representativeness of these insights across life stages.

Perceptions of recruitment fairness vary slightly across ethnicities, with Hausa-Fulani and Minority groups reporting a marginally higher sense of fairness (mean values of 3.17 and 3.16, respectively) compared to Yoruba respondents (2.97). The way that various groups perceive representation in public administration may be influenced by historical and sociopolitical factors [184]. All groups agree that tribal affiliation has an impact, but Igbo respondents (mean 3.12) perceive it more strongly, perhaps as a result of the past marginalization [2].

With mean values ranging from 2.93 (Yoruba) to 3.17 (Hausa-Fulani), the federal character principle which aims for equitable representation is thought to have a moderate impact on administrative efficiency. According to historical regional dynamics, this discrepancy implies that Hausa-Fulani respondents may feel more inclusive under this principle [185]. Although all groups generally consider service delivery to be moderately effective, Igbo respondents have a slightly higher positive perception (mean 3.04) of service delivery efficiency than Minority respondents (2.80).

Despite the pervasive tribal biases, trust in public administration is likewise moderate, with the Minority group displaying a marginally higher mean trust level (3.20) [186]. Within each ethnic group, standard deviations show significant individual variance, reflecting a range of individual experiences with public administration [187].

All things considered, the findings highlight how strongly tribal ties affect opinions about justice, reliability, and effectiveness in Nigerian public administration. To create a more equitable public administration system, this emphasizes the necessity of policies that encourage inclusivity and lessen tribal biases [188; 2].

Table 8: Regression Analysis of the result in the survey of role of tribal relation in the public administration system of Nigeria.

Predictor	Coefficient	Std. Err	t-Value	P-Value	95%Conf. int.(Low)	95% Conf. int.(Up)
Intercept	2.728	0.243	11.21	<0.001	2.250	3.206
Recruitment Fairness	0.006	0.040	0.0164	0.870	-0.071	0.084
Influence of Tribal Relation	-0.014	0.040	-0.341	0.733	-0.093	0.065
Federal Character Impact	0.080	0.040	1.997	0.046	0.001	0.159
Service Delivery Eff	0.047	0.039	1.189	0.235	-0.031	0.124

Intercept: The baseline trust in public administration is 2.728, statistically significant ($p < 0.001$).

Recruitment Fairness: Has a small, positive but non-significant effect ($p = 0.870$) on trust in public administration.

Influence of Tribal Affiliation: Shows a slightly negative but non-significant relationship ($p = 0.733$) with trust.

Federal Character Impact: Positively and significantly affects trust ($p = 0.046$), suggesting that when the federal character principle is perceived as effective, trust increases.

Service Delivery Efficiency: Has a positive but non-significant effect ($p = 0.235$) on trust in public administration.

R-squared : 0.938: This suggests that 93.8% of the variation in trust in public administration is explained by the model's independent variables. The high R-squared value indicates a strong model fit, suggesting that the included variables effectively explain the variation in trust in public administration. However, further research with a larger and more diverse sample might be necessary to explore other factors that could play significant roles.

Adjusted R-squared : 0.921 This value, slightly lower than the R-squared, accounts for the number of predictors and the sample size.

F-statistics: 56.71 (p -value = $7.06e-09$). The model is statistically significant, suggesting that the independent variables collectively have a significant effect on the dependent variable.

Further Analysis

R-Squared for the Reduced Model: After excluding the non-significant variables and keeping only the significant predictor (*Federal Character Impact*), the R-squared dropped to 0.0066. This substantial decrease from the full model indicates that the excluded variables, although not individually significant, collectively contribute to explaining the variance in the dependent variable (*Trust in Public Administration*). This suggests their potential relevance in a broader context or interaction effects. By refitting the model using only the significant predictor (*Federal Character Impact*) and exclude the non-significant ones to see how the R-squared changes. A significant drop in R-squared might suggest that the excluded variables are contributing to the overall model fit, even if their individual contributions are not statistically significant.

Furthermore, high correlations between independent variables (multi-collinearity) can inflate R-squared values and make individual predictors appear insignificant. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) will be calculated to identify such issues.

Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the Full Model: The VIF values for all predictors are below 10, indicating no concerning multi-collinearity in the model:

Recruitment Fairness: 1.004

Influence of Tribal Affiliation: 1.001

Federal Character Impact: 1.002

Service Delivery Efficiency: 1.002

The absence of multi-collinearity suggests that the predictors are not strongly correlated with each other, and the high R-squared in the full model is not due to redundancy among the variable.

Implications: The significant drop in R-squared suggests that while individual predictors (other than *Federal Character Impact*) were not significant, their collective contribution to explaining trust in public administration is meaningful. Likewise, there is no evidence of multi-collinearity inflating the R-squared value.

Single Source Bias: To confirm that there's no single source bias in the data, Harman's single-factor test was conducted to check if a single latent factor accounts for most of the variance. Also to evaluate whether responses might be systematically biased due to social desirability, misunderstanding of questions, or other common-method biases. Additionally residual analysis was analyzed to help determine if there are patterns suggesting model misspecification or unexplained variation.




Figure 14 - Q-Q Plot of residuals from the data set of the survey




Figure 15 - Histogram of Residuals from the data set of the survey.

Harman's Single-Factor Test: The first principal component accounts for 26.87% of the variance in the predictors. This is below the commonly used threshold of 50%, suggesting that single-source bias is unlikely to be a major concern in this dataset.

Residual Analysis: Q-Q Plot: The Q-Q plot of residuals shows some deviations from the reference line, indicating potential minor departures from normality. However, the residuals appear approximately normally distributed overall.

Histogram: The histogram of residuals reveals a rough symmetrical distribution centered around zero, consistent with the assumptions of linear regression.

Interpretation: The low variance explained by a single factor in Harman's test reduces concerns about common method bias. The residual analysis suggests the model assumptions are generally valid, though there may be slight deviations from perfect normality. Variables that are individually insignificant might have combined effects that are not captured by the main-effects model. And so, combinations of predictors (e.g., *Recruitment Fairness* $\times$ *Federal Character Impact*) might have influenced additional variance in the dependent variable.

H1: The effect of recruitment fairness on trust in public administration was positive but not statistically significant ($p > 0.05$). This suggests that recruitment fairness alone may not be a substantial driver of trust in the public administration system in this sample.

H2: The influence of tribal affiliation had a negative, non-significant impact on trust in public administration ($p > 0.05$), indicating that while tribal affiliation's influence may be perceived, it is not a significant determinant of trust in this model.

H3: The federal character impact positively and significantly influences trust in public administration ($p < 0.05$), implying that perceptions of inclusivity under the federal character principle help foster trust among citizens.

H4: Service delivery efficiency had a positive but non-significant effect on trust ($p > 0.05$). While efficiency is desirable, it alone does not significantly predict trust in public administration based on the sample data.

The study results partly support the hypotheses, with only H3 the impact of the federal character principle being statistically significant, emphasizing its role in shaping trust in Nigeria's public administration. According to Table 5, trust is positively impacted by federal character, but there are weaker, nonsignificant correlations between other factors like recruitment fairness, the influence of tribal affiliation, and the effectiveness of service delivery. Federal character impact produced a positive, significant coefficient ($p = 0.046$), and the regression results indicate a moderate baseline trust in public administration (intercept = 2.728).

This result is consistent with studies showing that mechanisms for ethnic inclusivity can enhance public perceptions of governance. On the other hand, trust is not greatly impacted by hiring equity or the effectiveness of service delivery, despite their theoretical relevance. Inclusion may help counteract any mistrust

associated with tribal dynamics, as indicated by the lack of significance in the influence of tribal affiliation ($p = 0.733$). The federal character impact is a significant factor in the overall complexity of trust in Nigeria's public administration, highlighting the importance of procedural inclusivity over administrative efficiency alone [306].

The study clarifies the complex connection between public trust in Nigeria's public administration and tribal affiliations. The results highlight the distinct sociopolitical dynamics of Nigeria, a country characterized by ethnic diversity and historical inequalities, when compared to existing literature and governance frameworks. The importance of Federal Character Impact in elucidating public administration trust aligns with fundamental theories of representation and equity. Symbolic measures like the federal character principle are crucial in influencing how citizens perceive inclusion in diverse societies like Nigeria [189].

Nigeria's sociopolitical environment has been significantly shaped by ethnic identity. Loyalty to ethnic groups frequently trumps national identity due to the nation's diverse ethnic makeup, which includes over 250 ethnic groups [29]. Ethnic identity still plays a significant role in Nigerian politics today, impacting public administration, resource distribution, and governance [96]. In an effort to ensure that various ethnic groups were fairly represented in government, the federal character principle was introduced. Finding a balance between ethnic diversity and the quest for a unified national identity continues to be Nigeria's challenge.

Enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution, this principle seeks to guarantee that all regions and ethnic groups are represented proportionately in public service positions and government appointments. The results demonstrate that trust is more dependent on perceived fairness in representation than on other administrative factors, confirming its ongoing relevance.

This finding is consistent with research conducted in South Africa, which found that affirmative action policies and other similar inclusivity measures increased public trust in institutions [190]. Critics counter that placing too much focus on representation might weaken meritocratic government. For example, Obiora emphasized that ineffective federal character policies could undermine confidence in service delivery [192; 191].

According to Okeke and Nwankwo [193], the comparatively low statistical impact of recruitment fairness may be a reflection of the public's growing mistrust of the actual impartiality of Nigerian hiring practices. Despite not being statistically significant, tribal affiliation has an impact that cannot be disregarded.

Prior research has shown that tribal identity is a subtle but ubiquitous factor that influences hiring decisions, promotions, and even service delivery priorities [194]. The findings suggest that while overt tribal biases may have diminished, they persist in nuanced ways that are harder to quantify but still perceptible to the populace. While the lack of significance for *Service Delivery Efficiency* in explaining trust contrasts with governance literature emphasizing performance-based trust. In most Western democracies, efficient service delivery is a primary

determinant of trust [195]. However, in Nigeria, and arguably in other multi-ethnic developing nations, symbolic factors like representation and fairness often outweigh performance metrics.

This finding can be explained by two factors:

Low Baseline Expectations: Studies have shown that citizens in countries with systemic governance challenges often have lower expectations of public service efficiency [196]. As such, their trust is more contingent on symbolic assurances of fairness. *Historical Context:* Nigeria's history of ethnic marginalization and uneven development may have conditioned citizens to prioritize equity and representation over performance.

The robustness check, including Harman's single-factor test affirms the validity of the study model, and the high R-squared despite the significance of only one predictor could indicate that unobserved variables such as personal experiences with public officials or perceptions of corruption play a significant role in shaping trust. Studies in similar contexts, such as Sharma and Singh's work in India [197], have suggested that latent cultural and historical variables often explain the variance in trust beyond observable metrics.

This study's findings diverge from governance frameworks in homogeneous societies, where performance metrics like service delivery dominate trust formation [195]. Instead, they align more closely with findings from diverse and stratified societies like South Africa and India, where representation and fairness are critical [190;197].

For instance, in the United States, citizen trust in governance is often tied to tangible outputs such as economic growth and security [198]. However, in Nigeria, which reflects the sociopolitical realities of managing diversity, intangible factors like inclusivity are given more weight. According to the findings, policymakers ought to uphold a balance between encouraging meritocracy and tribal representation.

Despite its good intentions, the Federal Character Principle needs to be significantly changed to promote inclusivity without sacrificing competence. This can be accomplished by making sure that merit is not sacrificed for ethnic representation and by bolstering oversight systems that keep an eye on appointments to public service [30].

Additionally, by making sure that appointments are free from political influence, a determined effort must be made to depoliticize the public service.

This can be accomplished by giving autonomous organizations, such as the Civil Service Commission, the authority to supervise hiring and advancement procedures free from political influence [58]. Furthermore, national unity and professionalism should be prioritized over tribal allegiances in public service training programs. Additionally, even if overt biases are declining, reassess hiring procedures to address latent perceptions of tribal favoritism. To offset the polarizing effects of tribal affiliations, support civic education that places an emphasis on solidarity and shared identity. Additionally, spend money gathering and analyzing data to find unquantifiable factors that affect trust, like direct

encounters with public servants or the degree of perceived corruption.

Using quantitative data from various ethnic groups throughout Nigeria, the primary goal of this study was to investigate the complex relationship between tribal relations and public trust in the country's public administration system. The results show a complicated relationship in which tribal ties have a subtle but significant impact on views of administrative justice and governance, while the federal character principle is crucial in establishing trust. According to the study's analysis, trust was not significantly influenced by service delivery efficiency. Rather, the federal character principle largely influenced how people perceived fairness and inclusivity.

This supports the claim that performance metrics in trust formation are frequently overshadowed by symbolic measures of equity in ethnically diverse societies such as Nigeria. Due to historical circumstances and their perception of inclusivity in public institutions, the Hausa-Fulani and minority respondents viewed recruitment fairness more favorably overall [184]. On the other hand, Yoruba respondents had somewhat lower opinions about how fair the hiring process was, which may be a sign of underrepresentation or discontent with how inclusive the hiring procedures were. As evidenced by the responses of various tribes, these findings show that although Nigeria's federal character principle seeks to promote balanced representation, its efficacy varies depending on tribal perspectives, possibly because of the systemic biases or disparate experiences in obtaining public service [185].

Tribal affiliations' combined effect on the model's explanatory power highlights their subtle influence, even though they were not statistically significant as independent predictors. Higher assessments of tribal influence by the Igbo respondents are consistent with historical narratives of marginalization and current fights for fair representation and access to public services [2]. These results demonstrate that, particularly among marginalized groups, tribal relations continue to play a significant, albeit complex, role in the dynamics of public administration in Nigeria. Furthermore, the moderate levels of trust seen in all ethnic groups point to a tenuous but enduring faith in the system's potential for improvement. This suggests that public trust has not completely been undermined, despite apparent inefficiencies and biases. Rather, it expresses the cautious optimism of the populace for inclusiveness and reform in government.

This demonstrates a cautious optimism among citizens who, even with the present constraints, may still see public administration as a potential force for equitable service [188]. All things considered, the results urge Nigeria's public administration to take an introspective approach for addressing the subtle, frequently disregarded tribal influences that may affect interactions and perceptions within the public sector. Improving the federal character principle's inclusivity, offering equal representation among the tribes, and promoting an accountable and equitable culture could all help address these problems. A more cohesive, effective public administration that considers Nigeria's ethnic diversity

would be supported by such initiatives, which would increase trust and perceptions of fairness.

3.3 The Modern problems of Nigerian system of Public Administration

Nigeria's political structure has undergone numerous shifts from military to civilian rule since gaining independence in 1960. Despite these advancements, contemporary problems persist and affect the efficiency, responsibility, and overall performance of the administrative structure. These problems include ineffective bureaucracy, ethnic patronage, political interference, insecurity, and corruption. Understanding these issues within the larger context of public administration theory is necessary to come up with practical solutions.

Corruption continues to be one of the main problems plaguing Nigeria's administrative structure. According to Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index [199], Nigeria is among the most corrupt countries, highlighting systemic problems with governance and public service delivery [199]. Corrupt practices like financial mismanagement, bribery, and nepotism have seriously weakened the integrity of institutions [200]. Bureaucratic inefficiencies also hinder service delivery, as excessive red tape and administrative bottlenecks slow down decision-making processes [201]. This inefficiency not only affects governance but also discourages investment and economic development.

Nigeria's multi-ethnic composition has contributed to administrative dysfunction due to ethnic and political patronage. The Federal Character Principle, designed to ensure fair representation in public service appointments, has often been misused to favor certain ethnic groups over merit-based selections [45]. This has resulted in inefficiency, as many administrative positions are filled based on ethnic affiliation rather than competence [58]. Consequently, public administration suffers from poor leadership and ineffective policy implementation.

Weak institutional frameworks contribute significantly to administrative inefficiencies in Nigeria. The lack of autonomy in public institutions often results in excessive political interference, undermining professionalism in governance [202]. Many government agencies operate without clear mandates or strategic goals, leading to overlapping responsibilities and administrative redundancies [203]. The political elites frequently manipulate institutions such as the civil service, police, and judiciary to serve personal interests rather than public good [204].

The rise of insecurity in Nigeria which is characterized by terrorism, banditry and communal conflicts has significantly impacted public administration [205]. In areas impacted by insurgency, government institutions find it difficult to operate efficiently, especially in the country's northeast, where threats from Boko Haram and ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province) persist [206]. Additionally, internal security issues like urban crime and farmer-herder conflicts put additional strain on administrative capabilities, causing funds intended for

development projects to be diverted to security expenditures [207].

Nigeria's public administration system is severely underfunded, mostly due to poor management and unstable economic conditions. Due to the nation's excessive reliance on oil income, governance is vulnerable to changes in the price of oil globally, which can result in budget deficits and delays in infrastructure projects and civil service pay [208]. Government spending on public sector salaries takes up a significant amount of funds, leaving little left over for essential social services like healthcare and education [209]. The public debt has increased because of fiscal mismanagement, which further limits the government's ability to carry out significant reforms [210].

Nigeria's administrative sector faces challenges with digital transformation, even in the face of global e-governance advancements. Numerous government organizations continue to use antiquated record-keeping systems, which results in inefficiencies and improper handling of data [211]. Inadequate infrastructure and a lack of coordination have made it difficult to implement programs like the National Identity Management System (NIMC), which aims to digitize public services [212]. Transparency, accountability, and governance efficiency are all hampered by this digital backwardness.

A vital part of public administration, Nigeria's legal and judicial system is frequently cumbersome and inefficient. Because of case backlogs, corruption, and insufficient funding, judicial processes are often delayed [38]. The failure to enforce laws in a timely manner erodes governance, as legal disputes pertaining to elections, contract enforcement, and human rights violations remain unresolved for years [213]. Improving Nigeria's administrative structure requires bolstering the judiciary with more resources and judicial independence.

Nigeria's administrative system still faces many contemporary issues that impede efficient public service delivery and governance. Public administration is inefficient due to a few factors, including political meddling, corruption, ethnic patronage, insecurity, economic limitations, technological inadequacies, and ineffective laws. Comprehensive reforms are needed to contain such issues, such as bolstering institutions, encouraging merit-based hiring, improving digital governance, and guaranteeing more fiscal restraint. Nigeria's administrative structure will find it difficult to satisfy the needs of its quickly expanding population and changing sociopolitical environment without these enhancements.

Corruption as a Significant Challenge in Nigerian Public Administration

In Nigeria, corruption has long been a major barrier to efficient public administration, eroding public trust, economic growth, and governance. Corruption affects all tiers of government and public institutions and takes the form of actions like bribery, embezzlement, nepotism, and resource misallocation. This widespread problem presents significant obstacles to Nigeria's socioeconomic development since it not only impairs service delivery but also

makes poverty and inequality worse.

Corruption in Nigeria has its origins in the colonial era, when resource exploitation and indirect rule created the conditions for corrupt behavior. The 1950s oil discovery revolutionized Nigeria's economy after independence, but it also exacerbated patronage politics and rent-seeking practices. A cycle of corrupt practices has been established due to successive military and civilian administrations' inability to combat corruption and their own complicity.

Public officials frequently ask for bribes to carry out or refrain from acting in their official capacities, which drives up contract costs and results in poor project execution. Money intended for public services like infrastructure, healthcare, and education is regularly taken for private gain, leaving behind deteriorating infrastructure and insufficient services. In the public sector, promotions and appointments are usually determined by personal connections rather than qualifications, which demoralizes and inefficiently employs qualified staff. As a result, vote-buying, violence, and fraud frequently taint electoral processes, undermining democratic ideals and fostering the rise of unaccountable leaders.

Corruption has serious effects on Nigerian public administration. When corruption is pervasive, citizens lose faith in government institutions, which results in apathy and a decline in civic participation. Corruption hinders economic growth, raises transaction costs, and discourages foreign investment. Development is hampered by the misallocation of resources, which leads to subpar public services and infrastructure. The syphoning off of resources intended for public welfare exacerbates poverty and increases the wealth gap. When decision-making processes are compromised and unqualified people hold important positions, corruption causes public institutions to malfunction.

Nigeria has set up several number of anti-corruption organizations in response to the widespread corruption:

The ICPC, or Independent Corrupt Practices Commission: The ICPC was established on September 29, 2000, with the responsibility of receiving, looking into, and prosecuting corruption allegations. Additionally, it looks at how government agencies identify and get rid of corrupt practices [273]. Notwithstanding early difficulties, such as inadequate funding and poor prosecutorial performance, the ICPC has played a significant role in increasing public awareness and launching reforms.

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was founded in 2003 with the goal of preventing financial crimes like advance fee fraud and money laundering. The EFCC made great progress under the direction of its first chairman, Nuhu Ribadu, by bringing high-profile cases against politicians and high-ranking government officials [274]. One significant victory in the battle against corruption was the conviction of Tafa Balogun, the former Inspector

General of Police.

Policy for Whistleblowing: This policy, which was introduced on December 21, 2016, offers financial incentives ranging from 2.5% to 5% of the recovered funds in an effort to incentivize people to report fraudulent activity. Significant amounts of money have been recovered through this initiative, which has also increased public participation in anti-corruption initiatives.

Even with these initiatives, several obstacles prevent anti-corruption measures from being effective: Strong political figures frequently exert pressure on anti-corruption organizations, undermining their independence and efficacy. The prosecution of corruption cases is frequently delayed by the judicial system's slow pace and legal technicalities, which can result in a backlog and, in certain cases, the escape of offenders. Anti-corruption organizations usually lack the resources and personnel necessary to adequately investigate and prosecute cases. Because of the lack of proper protection for whistleblowers and the fear of reprisals, there is a culture of silence that discourages people from reporting corrupt activities.

The following actions are suggested for improving the efficacy of anti-corruption campaigns in Nigeria:

Maintaining Anti-Corruption Agencies' Independence: By giving organizations like the ICPC and EFCC complete autonomy, we can protect them from political influence and allow for unbiased investigations and prosecutions. *Judicial Reforms:* By speeding up the legal system, corruption cases can be decided quickly, discouraging future offenders.

Adequate Funding and Capacity Building: Anti-corruption organizations can operate more effectively if they allocate enough funds and regularly train their staff.

Enhancing Protection for Whistleblowers: More people may come forward to expose corrupt practices if strong legal frameworks are put in place to shield whistleblowers from reprisals.

Public Awareness and Education: A culture of integrity and accountability can be promoted by launching national campaigns to inform the public about the negative impacts of corruption and their part in thwarting it.

International Cooperation: Adopting the best practices in anti-corruption tactics and tracking down and repatriating stolen assets can be facilitated by collaborating with international organizations.

3.4 Ethnic Identity and Nationalism in Nigeria

Nigeria's complex socio-political landscape is significantly shaped by ethnic identity and nationalism. With over 250 ethnic groups, including the three dominant ones the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba as well as Igbo ethnicity plays a crucial role in political representation, resource distribution, and national cohesion [45]. Nationalism in Nigeria, on the other hand, has evolved through different historical phases, from anti-colonial struggles to contemporary debates over federalism and

statehood [21]. The tension between ethnic identity and nationalism remains one of the defining challenges of Nigeria's governance, often influencing elections, public administration and socio-economic development [27].

Ethnic identity in Nigeria predates colonial rule, as pre-colonial societies were organized along ethnic and tribal lines with distinct political and economic systems [1]. The colonial administration reinforced ethnic divisions through the policy of indirect rule, which strengthened regionalism and created artificial boundaries between groups [214]. The introduction of Western education and economic opportunities further widened the disparities among ethnic groups, fostering sense of ethnic consciousness that would later influence nationalist movements [215]

The nationalist movements of the 1940s and 1950s sought to unify Nigerians against British rule, but these movements were fragmented along ethnic lines [216]. While the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) led by Nnamdi Azikiwe advocated for a Pan-Nigerian nationalism, the Action Group (AG) and Northern People's Congress (NPC) prioritized ethnic and regional interests [50]. This divergence in nationalist ideologies contributed to post-independence struggles over state-building and national integration.

Post-independence Nigeria has been characterized by an interplay between ethnic identity and nationalism, often manifesting in political competition and governance structures. The First Republic (1963-1966) saw intense rivalry among the three dominant ethnic groups, leading to political instability and the eventual military coup of 1966 [58]. Ethno-regional politics persisted through the military and civilian regimes, with political parties largely reflecting ethnic affiliations [51].

The Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970 further underscored the challenges of ethnic nationalism. The secessionist movement by Biafra, led by Igbo nationalists, was rooted in perceptions of ethnic marginalization and economic exclusion [217]. The war reinforced ethnic tensions and deepened divisions that continue to shape Nigeria's political landscape [98].

Nigeria's adoption of federalism was intended to manage ethnic diversity and promote national unity. The creation of states from the 1960s to the present has been an effort to decentralize power and accommodate ethnic minorities [3]. However, federalism has also reinforced ethnic identity, as competition for resources and political power remains largely ethnic-based [58].

The Federal Character Principle, enshrined in the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions, was designed to ensure equitable representation of all ethnic groups in public administration (Federal Character Commission Act, 1996). While this policy aims to promote national unity, it has also been criticized for fostering mediocrity and ethnic patronage [45].

In contemporary Nigeria, ethnic nationalism continues to shape socio-political developments. The resurgence of ethnic militias such as the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) reflects

ongoing grievances about political marginalization and resource control [218]. These movements highlight the limitations of state led nationalism and the persistence of ethnic consciousness in Nigeria's political discourse [219]. Moreover, ethnic conflicts over land, political representation, and religious differences have further complicated national cohesion. The Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast, the farmer and herder conflicts in the Middle Belt, and secessionist agitations in the southeast all illustrate the challenges of forging a unified national identity [220].

In Nigeria's sociopolitical structure, nationalism and ethnic identity are still closely related. Ethnic loyalties frequently threaten national unity, whereas nationalism aims to advance a shared Nigerian identity. Although ethnic diversity has been managed through federalism and laws like the Federal Character Principle, enduring ethnic nationalism indicates that more institutional changes are required. Strengthening national unity and guaranteeing sustainable development will require addressing issues of political representation, economic inequality, and ethnic grievances.

Elitism and Nigerian System of Public Administration

A small group of people, usually those with wealth, education, political clout, or social standing, hold disproportionate power over decision-making processes, according to the theory of elitism [221; 222]. The public administration system in Nigeria is significantly shaped by elitism. Elite groups, including political, bureaucratic, military, and economic elites, have controlled Nigeria's governance structure since the country's independence and have a major say in how policies are developed and carried out [5]. The theoretical foundations of elitism, its expressions in Nigerian public administration, and its consequences for development and governance are all examined in this dissertation section.

With significant contributions from Pareto [222; 223], elitism has its roots in classical political theory. According to Vilfredo Pareto's theory of the "circulation of elites," power is still concentrated, but new groups that arise from the non-elite masses continuously replace the elites [223]. According to Gaetano Mosca [221], organized minorities are better suited to rule over unorganized majorities, so elite dominance is unavoidable. This is further developed by C. Wright Mills [222] in *The Power Elite*, which emphasizes the interdependence of the military, political, and economic elites in determining national policies.

The dominance of political elites in Nigeria, who use their hold on public institutions to preserve power and influence, is a clear example of these theoretical underpinnings [58]. Nigeria's public administration has been shaped by the concentration of power among a small number of people, frequently at the price of meritocracy and democratic governance [20].

Manifestations of Elitism in Nigerian Public Administration

Bureaucratic Domination and Political Elitism: Historically, a small number of political elites many of whom come from aristocratic families, the military, or well-established political networks have dominated Nigeria's political system [51]. To consolidate power, political leaders manipulate bureaucratic structures,

creating a vicious cycle in which public sector appointments are made based on political patronage rather than qualifications [224]. As a result, public service delivery is ineffective and unaccountable [3].

Public Administration and Economic Elites: Public policy is greatly influenced by economic elites, especially those in charge of important industries like banking and oil [83]. Nigeria's rentier state model, which is typified by a strong reliance on oil earnings, has limited widespread economic participation while allowing a small elite class to accumulate wealth [225]. And so, to further their interests, these economic elites frequently have an impact on government contracts, privatization laws, and regulatory frameworks [226].

Administrative elitism and military influence: Nigeria's history of military rule (1966–1979, 1983–1999) solidified an administrative elitist culture in which public institutions were controlled by military elites [218]. Former military officers maintain powerful positions in public administration and government even after democracies have been established, thereby sustaining hierarchical decision-making processes that restrict participatory governance [58].

Ethnic and Regional Elite Networks: The federal character principle is used to distribute power among dominant groups in the Nigerian state, which is characterized by competition between ethnic and regional elites [45]. Although the goal of this principle was to encourage inclusivity, elite groups have frequently used it to their advantage to hold onto important positions in the government and other public institutions [57].

Implications of Elitism on Public Administration

Weak Institutional Development: Ineffective, corrupt, and opaque institutions are the result of elites' hegemony in Nigeria's public administration [224]. Efforts to establish strong governance structures that put the good of the public before private benefit are hampered by elite capture of state institutions [20].

Patronage and Nepotism: One of the main effects of elitism is the ubiquity of patronage politics, in which administrative appointments prioritize loyalty to elite figures over professional competence [51]. This approach reduces the efficacy of public service organizations, inhibits innovation, and dissuades meritocracy [225].

Issues with Governance and Public Discontent: Elite domination has prevented the general populace from actively participating in governance, which has exacerbated social unrest, political instability, and public mistrust of public institutions [83]. The elite class's continued marginalization has given rise to movements calling for economic reforms, democratization, and youth inclusion [58].

Nigerian public administration is still characterized by elitism, which affects governance frameworks and policy results. Reforms are required to guarantee a

more inclusive and effective administrative system, even though elite participation in governance is unavoidable. The detrimental effects of elitism can be lessened by bolstering democratic institutions, encouraging meritocracy in public service appointments, and enhancing transparency in the application of policies. Furthermore, increasing citizen participation in governance through decentralized decision-making and civil society engagement can improve the responsiveness and accountability of the public sector.

Nepotism and Cronyism in Nigeria's Public Administration System

Favoritism that subverts the values of meritocracy and equity in public administration includes nepotism and cronyism. These practices are deeply ingrained in Nigeria and have an impact on socioeconomic development, public trust, and governance. Using a variety of academic sources, the study investigates the effects, causes, and manifestations of nepotism and cronyism in Nigeria's public administration in this section.

Preferential hiring, promotions, and contract distributions based on personal connections rather than merit are clear examples of nepotism and cronyism in Nigeria's public administration. For example, qualified candidates are frequently excluded from government agencies because positions are frequently filled by relatives or associates of powerful officials [276]. This practice also occurs when government contracts are awarded, giving businesses connected to public officials unfair advantages [276].

In Nigeria, nepotism and cronyism are common due to several factors: Kinship and communal ties are highly valued in traditional Nigerian society, and this can lead to favoritism in public administration [1]. An atmosphere that is favorable to nepotism and cronyism is produced by inadequate enforcement of anti-corruption laws and a lack of transparency mechanisms [110].

These behaviors have significant ramifications: Favoritism hinders the hiring and advancement of qualified people, which results in ineffective public service delivery [277]. Because they provide opportunities for embezzlement and improper handling of public funds, nepotism and cronyism are closely associated with corruption [276]. Apathy and disengagement result from a decline in public trust in government institutions when people believe that public offices are given out in a favorable manner [110]. Economic growth is hampered by ineffective public administration because resources are misallocated, and public projects are poorly carried out [9].

A diversified strategy is needed to bridge the gap between nepotism and cronyism: Favoritism can be avoided by strengthening the independence and capability of anti-corruption organizations [110]. Nepotism and cronyism can be less common when open hiring and procurement procedures are used [276]. Campaigns for public awareness have the power to change cultural norms so that merit is valued above interpersonal relationships [1]. The expectation of rewards

through public appointments can be lessened by reducing the influence of patronage in politics [9].

In Nigeria's public administration, nepotism and cronyism pose serious problems that threaten development and governance. To combat such practices, institutional reforms, cultural shifts, and a dedication to meritocracy and transparency are required.

3.5 The Role of Mass Media in Tribal Relations in Nigeria

The mass media, comprising traditional and digital platforms, play a significant role in shaping, reinforcing, and sometimes challenging tribal relations in Nigeria. Media can either promote unity by fostering national integration or exacerbate ethnic divisions through biased reporting and agenda-setting [227]. This section lays the role of mass media in tribal relations in Nigeria, highlighting its ideal impact on political participation, social cohesion and interethnic conflicts.

The history of mass media in Nigeria dates back to the colonial era, when newspapers such as *Iwe Irohin* were used as instruments of resistance and political mobilization [228]. And so, over time the media outlets became a platform for ethnic advocacy, with different regions establishing their own press to champion sectional interests. Post-independence Nigeria saw the proliferation of state-owned and private media that reflected ethnic and political alignments. This historical evolution has influenced the way mass media engage with tribal relations in contemporary Nigeria [229].

One of the significant roles of mass media is fostering national unity, by promoting inclusive narratives and facilitating interethnic dialogue. National broadcast stations such as the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) and Radio Nigeria have played roles in transmitting programs that showcase Nigeria's cultural diversity, thereby fostering mutual understanding between the ethnic groups [230]. Media campaigns have also been used to promote national identity through slogans like “*One Nigeria*” and cultural festivals that highlight ethnic harmony.

Furthermore, digital media platforms such as social media have provided spaces for Nigerians from different ethnic backgrounds to interact and exchange ideas, breaking traditional barriers of tribal divisions [231]. Social media activism, as practically seen during movements like #EndSARS, has demonstrated the power of mass media in uniting Nigerians beyond ethnic lines [232].

Tribal ties in politics have occasionally been strengthened by the historical use of mass media in Nigeria for ethnic political mobilization [233]. Ethnic leaders and political elites frequently utilize media outlets to further their collective interests, affecting how the public views politics and national issues. For instance, ethnic media outlets frequently support local political parties during

election seasons, which amplifies tribal rhetoric and affects voter behavior [234].

State-run media have also come under fire for giving preference to the dominant ethnic groups, which marginalize minorities and feed feelings of exclusion. Tribal divisions are exacerbated when dominant ethnic groups monopolize media narratives, resulting in an imbalance in the representation of smaller tribes [235].

Reinforcing ethnic stereotypes is one of the problems with mass media in tribal relations. Tribal hostilities are exacerbated by sensational reporting and slanted news framing, which frequently reinforce prejudices against a particular ethnic group. Research has indicated that inflammatory language used by newspapers and broadcast media can worsen ethnic tensions, particularly during times of conflict [236].

The representation of the Fulani ethnic group in relation to disputes between farmers and herders serves as one illustration. Ethnic animosity and violence have been exacerbated by media reports that have frequently generalized the situation and characterized all Fulani as aggressors [237]. The necessity of responsible journalism in addressing ethnic issues is highlighted by such misrepresentation.

Social media's introduction has drastically altered Nigeria's mass communication environment. Tribal relations have become a source of both unity and division due to platforms like Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter [231]. On the one hand, social media promotes a sense of national identity by allowing the younger generation to engage with people from different ethnic backgrounds. However, it has been used as a weapon to disseminate hate speech, false information, and propaganda that is ethnically charged, which has resulted in the rise of digital tribalism [238].

Social media is frequently used to rally ethnic support during political campaigns, sometimes at the expense of national unity. Strong ethnic sentiments were evident in Twitter political debates during the 2019 Nigerian general elections, for instance, where political candidates used their tribal ties to win support [239].

To address these challenges, there is need to stringent media regulations and digital literacy campaigns to promote responsible online engagement.

To enhance the role of mass media in promoting positive tribal relations in Nigeria, several measures should be considered.

Social Media Ethnic Discourse in Nigeria

In contemporary Nigeria, social media has become a powerful tool for political engagement, civic activism, and public discourse. Its influence extends to shaping ethnic relations, public perceptions, and political participation [240]. While social media has been instrumental in exposing government inefficiencies and mobilizing civic action, it has also exacerbated ethnic divisions by amplifying tribal sentiments and political biases [241]. This section contrasts the role of social

media in shaping ethnic discourse in Nigeria and how it can be leveraged to promote fair tribal relations in public administration.

Social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp serve as spaces for political debate, activism, and ethnic identity expression. These platforms have basically utilized to highlight grievances, mobilize ethnic groups, and promote political interests [242]. However, they have also been used to propagate misinformation, ethnic stereotyping, and hate speech, leading to heightened tensions among Nigeria's diverse groups [243].

During the aftermath of Trump's threat to intervene militarily in Nigeria over alleged "mass slaughter" of Christians (2025), social-media channels lit up with intense debate and polarized reactions. Many Nigerian Twitter and X users expressed anger and frustration at the framing of the crisis as a purely Christian genocide, arguing that the narrative ignored the multi-faceted nature of violence in Nigeria, farmers-herders conflicts, banditry, insurgency, and cross-religious victimhood. One commenter wrote that "to reduce our suffering to one religion is to deny the wider injustices suffered by all Nigerians," reflecting a widespread sentiment that the discourse was oversimplified [310].

Despite the challenges, social media presents a unique opportunity to foster fair tribal relations and enhance inclusivity in Nigeria's public administration. The following strategies highlight how social media can be leveraged to improve ethnic relations in governance:

Promoting National Integration Campaigns: The government and civil society organizations should use social media to promote messages of national unity and social cohesion. Campaigns like #OneNigeria and #UnitedWeStand can be strengthened to counter ethnic bigotry and foster inter-ethnic understanding [244].

Fact-Checking and Media Literacy: To combat misinformation and ethnic propaganda, social media companies and regulatory agencies should invest in fact-checking initiatives. Encouraging digital literacy programs will equip citizens with skills to identify false information as well as engage constructively in online discussions [245].

Ethnic-Inclusive Policy Debates: Government institutions should create social media forums where diverse ethnic voices can contribute to policy discussions. These forums can serve as virtual town halls where citizens engage with public administrators on issues of national importance [246].

Regulating Hate Speech without Stifling Free Speech: While censorship may be counterproductive, a balanced regulatory approach is needed to curb online hate speech without infringing on free speech rights. Social media policies should focus on penalizing incitement while allowing constructive ethnic discourse [247].

Social media plays a dual role in Nigeria's ethnic discourse: it serves as a platform for political engagement and ethnic inclusivity while also fueling tribal divisions. To ensure that social media fosters fair tribal relations in public administration, there must be deliberate efforts in countering misinformation, promoting unity-based narratives, and encourage inclusive policy debates. A well-regulated and strategically utilized digital space can contribute to a more equitable and representative Nigerian public administration system.

Mass media play a crucial role in shaping tribal relations in Nigeria, acting as both a unifying force and a tool for division. While national and digital media have contributed to national integration, they have also been instrumental in ethnic mobilization and the reinforcement of tribal stereotypes. The future of tribal relations in Nigeria depends on how media institutions, government agencies, and the public leverage mass communication to promote unity, tolerance, and inclusive political participation. A responsible and diversified media landscape can help fill the gap in ethnic divides and even contribute to the sustainable development of Nigeria as a pluralistic society.

3.6 Unity in Public Administration as a road to National Development in Nigeria

A country's development trajectory is significantly shaped by its public administration. Unity in public administration is crucial for promoting national development in Nigeria, a nation marked by ethnic, religious, and regional diversity. Only when public institutions operate inclusively and fairly can social cohesion, economic growth, and effective governance be attained. Historically, inefficiencies, corruption, and disputes that obstruct national advancement have been caused by the public administration of Nigeria's lack of unity [248]. This section examines the value of unity in Nigerian public administration as a means of achieving national development, with a focus on governance structures, institutional frameworks, and policy implementation that support inclusivity.

Cooperation, inclusivity, and fair representation in governmental institutions are all necessary for public administration unity. Nnoli (1995) [10] asserts that unity promotes stability in governance, facilitating the development and execution of policies. A unified public administration guarantees that national policies serve the interests of the entire population rather than the interests of specific regions, which is crucial in Nigeria where administrative decisions are frequently influenced by ethnic and religious divisions [58]. By guaranteeing balanced representation in appointments to public service, the Federal Character Commission (FCC) aims to foster unity in governance [56]. Such policies, when properly carried out, improve national integration and keep minority groups from being marginalized.

Efficiency and accountability are fostered by a cohesive administrative

structure. Better service delivery and infrastructure development result from the efficient management of public resources by bureaucratic agencies working toward a common goal [249]. The necessity of unity in governance is illustrated by Nigeria's experience with fragmented administration, where regional favoritism, political patronage, and nepotism compromise institutional efficacy [250].

Institutional Frameworks for Unity in Public Administration

To foster unity in Nigeria's public administration, some institutional frameworks have been put in place. By preventing a single region from controlling national governance, the 1999 Constitution establishes guidelines for cooperation between the federal, state, and local governments [7]. Furthermore, citizen-centered service delivery and accountability are emphasized by public service reforms like the SERVICOM initiative [260]. To promote administrative coherence and raise the legitimacy of public institutions, these frameworks are essential.

Nevertheless, there are still issues with putting these frameworks into practice. The efficacy of national unity policies has been undermined by political meddling, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and corruption [251]. Adherence to the rule of law, institutional autonomy, and a dedication to national interest over sectional allegiances are necessary for strengthening these frameworks.

Unity and Economic Development

A unified public administration significantly contributes to economic development by fostering a stable business environment, improving infrastructure, and attracting foreign investment [252]. Countries that maintain cohesion in governance experience higher levels of productivity and economic competitiveness. Nigeria's economy has suffered from administrative fragmentation, where policies are inconsistently implemented across different regions [253]. The lack of coordination in economic planning has resulted in inefficiencies in key sectors such as agriculture, energy, and industrialization.

The Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP), which was introduced in 2017, is one example of an attempt to unify Nigeria's economic governance. It emphasizes the importance of administrative unity in promoting national development [254]. Nigeria can attain sustainable economic growth by fostering an inclusive policy environment, minimizing bureaucratic bottlenecks, and guaranteeing synergy among federal agencies.

Despite its significance, Nigeria in general faces many obstacles to unity in public administration. Administrative cohesion is still in danger due to polarization along ethnic and religious lines, corruption, and inadequate institutional frameworks [27]. Furthermore, professionalism has been weakened by the politicization of the civil service, which has resulted in inefficiencies and a lack of public trust [204].

Institutional changes that support meritocracy, openness, and inclusive

governance are necessary to address these issues. Achieving administrative unity requires bolstering anti-corruption organizations, enforcing adherence to federal character principles, and improving intergovernmental collaboration [256].

For Nigeria to develop as a nation, public administration unity is a basic requirement. Stability, economic growth, and the efficacy of governance are all enhanced by a unified and inclusive public service. Even though there are institutional frameworks in place to encourage unity, issues like political meddling, corruption, and ethnic bias must be addressed to guarantee sustainable development. Nigeria can leverage the potential of a unified public administration to propel national progress by promoting inclusive policies, bolstering intergovernmental relations, and enforcing merit-based hiring.

Summary, Recommendation and Conclusion

Nigeria's system of public administration is shaped by the interplay of ethnic, regional, and political dynamics, leading to unique governance structures and challenges. This dissertation has explored these complexities through the lens of consociationalism, federalism, and federal character principles, examining how they contribute to governance, elite dominance and national unity. The research findings indicate that the hierarchical and elitist structure of Nigeria's public administration is a product of prebendalism, which has also historically shaped power distribution. Moreover, consociationalism has emerged as a relevant theoretical framework for understanding Nigeria's governance model, while federalism and the federal character principle serve as essential mechanisms for fostering tribal unity in a multiethnic society. The following outcomes and final result are determined from the study:

Elitism and Hierarchical System in Nigeria: An Outcome of Prebendalism

One of the main and significant findings of this research is the entrenched elitism and hierarchical structure in Nigeria's public administration, driven primarily by prebendal politics. Prebendalism, a concept articulated by Richard Joseph [9], describes a political system where state resources are appropriated for personal and group interests by elites. In Nigeria, this has resulted in a governance structure where political offices are treated as avenues for wealth accumulation and patronage distribution rather than public service.

Consociationalism as an Applied Theory in Nigeria's System of Public Administration

This study has shown that Arend Lijphart's consociationalism offers a helpful theoretical framework for comprehending Nigeria's public administration system [12]. Consociationalism's focus on power-sharing provides a means of managing diversity and averting conflicts considering the nation's highly divided society (plural society), which is marked by regional, religious, and ethnic divisions.

Nigeria's governance reflects the four pillars of consociationalism: proportional representation, mutual veto rights, segmental autonomy, and grand

coalition governments. While mutual veto mechanisms are ingrained in constitutional provisions requiring broad regional consensus for major policy decisions, the grand coalition principle is clearly demonstrated by the requirement for political balance in key government appointments. The federal character principle institutionalizes proportional representation, guaranteeing that public sector jobs are allocated to various ethnic and regional groups. Furthermore, Nigeria's federal system reflects segmental autonomy by giving states and local governments substantial authority over their affairs.

Even with its advantages, consociationalism in Nigeria is hindered by weak institutional protections and elite manipulation. Instead of fostering true inclusivity, political elites frequently take advantage of power-sharing arrangements to hold onto power. Consociationalism provides a theoretical solution, but its actual implementation necessitates more robust institutional oversight and political commitment to equitable governance, as evidenced by the persistence of ethnic and regional tensions.

Federalism and Federal Character as Effective Means for Tribal Unity in Nigeria's Public Administration

Nigeria's constitution, which upholds federalism, provides an essential framework for addressing the nation's ethnic diversity. Federalism offers a structural answer to the problems of multiethnic society's governance by distributing authority and allowing subnational entities autonomy. With 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Nigeria's federal structure supports the nation's various cultural, linguistic, and religious groups while enabling localized decision-making.

The federal character principle, which aims to guarantee fair representation of all ethnic groups in public administration, is a crucial adjunct to federalism. This principle, which was established by the Federal Character Commission (FCC), requires that the public sector's hiring, resource allocation, and appointments reflect the diverse makeup of the nation. Federal character is a tool for fostering national unity and lowering intergroup tensions to prevent the dominance of any one ethnic group.

Nonetheless, there have been issues with Nigeria's application of federalism and federal character. Despite being intended to promote inclusivity, the federal character principle has occasionally been invoked to excuse incompetence and nepotism, with political elites taking advantage of the system for their own and their groups' benefit. Similarly, even though federalism offers a framework for decentralized governance, state and local government autonomy is still threatened by an overabundance of federal power.

For enhancing the effectiveness of federalism and federal character, this research suggests reforms that emphasize merit-based recruitment, transparency in resource allocation plus a stronger commitment to equitable governance. By

reinforcing these principles, Nigeria can strengthen tribal unity and create a more functional and inclusive public administration system.

State Creation as a Great Means of Reducing Ethnic Friction

One of the major structural reforms that have contributed to reducing ethnic tensions in Nigeria is the continuous creation of states. Initially organized into three regions at independence, Nigeria's political structure evolved to accommodate demands for increased representation and autonomy. By creating additional states, the Nigerian government has decentralized power, which then allows previously marginalized ethnic groups to gain political recognition and control over their affairs.

State creation has played a crucial role in addressing ethnic grievances, mitigating intergroup tensions and promoting a sense of belonging among minority groups. By granting local governance structures to different ethnic communities, state creation has reduced the political dominance of larger ethnic groups, thereby promoting a more inclusive governance system. Hence, while this approach has helped to address certain historical injustices, it has also led to new challenges, like increased administrative costs and the politicization of state boundaries for electoral advantages.

For state creation to continue serving as an effective means of reducing ethnic friction, it has to be accompanied by policies that enhance economic development, equitable resource allocation, and strong governance institutions. The mere multiplication of administrative units without corresponding economic viability may lead to increased dependence on federal allocations, weakening the overall effectiveness of governance.

In summary, this research highlights how elitism and hierarchical governance in Nigeria have been shaped by prebendal politics, leading to challenges in public administration. The application of consociationalism as a theoretical framework reveals both its relevance and limitations in Nigeria's governance structure. Furthermore, federalism and the federal character principle emerge as essential tools for managing ethnic diversity and fostering national unity, though their effectiveness depends on proper implementation and institutional reforms. Moving forward, addressing these governance challenges requires a commitment to political inclusivity, meritocracy and transparency to build more equitable and efficient public administration system in Nigeria.

CONCLUSION

Nigeria is a multiethnic state, looking at how diverse it is with high number of different ethnic groups which individually traces its separate origin and differ with another in language, culture and religion. Over 70% of the Nation population are categorized as the ethnic majority (Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo) and the 30% are identified as the ethnic minority, in which they include hundreds of smaller tribes and ethnic groups.

Further we see how modern politics drags more lines in making the country more ethnically diverse, as one may be identified as northern, southern, eastern or

western with addition to the state of origin. As a pluralistic society, Nigeria rolls a dice of ethnic politics with the populous only tracing the dots of ethnic background before answering the name of Nigerians. Examining how tribes affect Nigeria's public administration system reveals complex dynamics that influence social cohesion, governance, and the application of policies.

Based solely on secondary data, this study has investigated the function of tribal institutions, the rule of law, and the development of public service in Nigeria. The results highlight the value of unity institutions, which act as vital forums for communication and cooperation between the various tribal groups. These organizations are essential for resolving disputes and advancing national cohesion because they cultivate respect and understanding between people.

However, it is still difficult to make sure that these institutions of unity function well in a pluralistic society where tribal allegiances can occasionally take precedence over national interests. These institutions' ability to heal divisions and advance inclusive governance may be improved by strengthening them. The study brought to light the intricacies of the rule of law in an environment where statutory laws and tribal customs frequently collide.

Inconsistencies in legal interpretations and enforcement are also brought about by the prevalence of customary law, even though the Nigerian Constitution provides a framework for legal equality. This dichotomy calls into question fair treatment under the law and access to justice. Legal reforms are desperately needed to address these issues by recognizing and balancing national statutes with customary laws, guaranteeing that all citizens, irrespective of their tribal affiliations, benefit from the protections provided by the rule of law.

Tribal ties can have an impact on hiring decisions, policymaking, and service delivery, according to an analysis of the Nigerian public service. Favoritism and nepotism based on tribal ties can frequently erode the efficacy of public institutions, resulting in inefficiencies and disenchantment among the populace. Furthermore, it is equally critical to acknowledge that tribal leaders can also positively influence service delivery by enlisting community support for government initiatives. Reviving Nigeria's public service requires a well-rounded strategy that values tribal engagement while promoting merit-based hiring.

Decentralized governance, in which local chiefs and councils held the power, was a common feature of pre-colonial systems. On the other hand, tribal governance systems were marginalized by the colonial administration's imposition of centralized bureaucratic structures. Public administration is still shaped by the legacy of this duality as tribal institutions work to restore their significance in the face of contemporary governance issues. It is essential to comprehend this historical background to create policies that respect traditional governance while encouraging efficient and responsible public administration.

In conclusion, tribes have a significant and varied influence on Nigeria's public administration system. Policymakers can develop strategies that promote unity, enforce the rule of law, and fortify public institutions by acknowledging the advantages and disadvantages of tribal affiliations within governance

frameworks. In the end, the development of public administration in Nigeria depends on cultivating an inclusive strategy that honors tribal diversity while advancing national unity. A just society for all Nigerians will be realized and more effective governance will result from this thorough understanding.

This study aimed to explore the intricate relationship between tribal relations and public trust in Nigeria's public administration system, utilizing quantitative data from diverse ethnic groups across the country. The findings reveal a complex dynamic where the federal character principle plays a pivotal role in shaping trust, while tribal affiliations exert a latent yet meaningful influence on perceptions of governance and administrative fairness. As shown from the study analysis, *Service Delivery Efficiency* was not just a significant determinant of trust. Instead, trust was primarily shaped by perceptions of fairness and inclusivity through the federal character principle. This reinforces the argument that in ethnically diverse societies like Nigeria, symbolic measures of equity often overshadow performance metrics in trust formation. The Hausa-Fulani and minority respondents generally perceived recruitment fairness more positively, likely due to historical factors, and perceived inclusivity within public institutions [184].

Conversely, the perceptions of recruitment fairness were slightly lower among Yoruba respondents, indicating a possible perception of under-representation or dissatisfaction with the inclusiveness of recruitment practices. These finding highlights that, while Nigeria's federal character principle aims to foster balanced representation, its effectiveness varies based on tribal perspectives as seen from responses of different tribes, potentially due to systemic biases or differing experiences in public service access [185].

Although tribal affiliations were not statistically significant as independent predictors, their collective impact on the model's explanatory power evidently underscores their subtle influence. The Igbo respondents' higher perceptions of tribal influence align with historical accounts of marginalization and ongoing struggles for equity in representation and access to public services [2].

These findings further confirm that tribal relations remain a critical, albeit nuanced, factor in public administration dynamics in Nigeria especially among marginalized groups. More to that, the moderate trust levels observed across all ethnic groups suggest a fragile but persistent belief in the system's capacity to improve. In spite of the perceived inefficiencies and biases, this indicates that public trust, though tenuous, has not been entirely eroded. Instead, it proves to reflect citizens' cautious optimism for reform and inclusiveness in governance.

This highlights a cautious optimism among citizens, who may still view public administration as a potential driver of equitable service despite current limitations [188]. Overall, the findings call for an introspective approach in Nigeria's public administration to address the subtle, often overlooked tribal influences that may shape the perceptions and interactions within the public sector.

To solve these issues, there is need for enhancing the inclusivity of the federal character principle, providing equitable representation across the tribes,

and fostering a culture of accountability and fairness. Such efforts would improve trust and perceptions of fairness, supporting a more unified, efficient public administration that reflects Nigeria's ethnic diversity.

This study thus, contributes to a deeper understanding of the interplay between ethnic diversity and public administration (especially in plural states), providing a basis for future policies to bridge the gaps and promote inclusivity across Nigeria's tribes. Future studies should delve deeper into the latent variables that mediate trust, such as perceptions of corruption, historical grievances and regional disparities. Longitudinal analyses could also provide insights into whether evolving socio-political dynamics are reducing the salience of tribal affiliations in public administration.

Recommendations

Nigeria must adopt a governance structure that promotes inclusivity, tolerance, and national unity because it is a diverse state. The nation's long-standing ethnic and religious ties frequently influence social interactions, political behavior, and economic prospects, fostering a climate of marginalization and division. The following suggestions are put forth to address these issues:

1. Fostering National Cohesion

Nigeria needs to fund initiatives that foster a strong sense of national identity that cuts across racial and religious divides. Civic education, national identity, and the historical importance of unity in promoting development should all be emphasized in educational curricula. Nigeria can progressively reduce the influence of ethnically based allegiances in politics and governance, or even politics, by instilling these values in the next generation. To promote a cohesive populace, nationalism should take precedence over ethnic consciousness.

The idea that Nigeria is a single country rather than a collection of various ethnic groups should be promoted by government-led campaigns as an extra benefit. To improve relations between groups and foster a sense of national identity, such campaigns ought to make use of national dialogue forums, interethnic festivals, and cultural exchanges.

2. Political Engagement That Is Inclusive

Inclusion should be given top priority in Nigerian politics by advocating for laws that consider the diversity of the country. Instead of concentrating on local strongholds, political parties ought to be urged to embrace frameworks that accept candidates from diverse ethnic backgrounds. To eliminate feelings of marginalization, especially among minority ethnic groups like the Igbo, the federal government must also guarantee proportional representation in all government institutions.

Moreover, the electoral system should discourage ethno-religious bias by implementing policies that promote issue-based politics rather than identity-based campaigns. Political debates and manifestos should portray national development strategies rather than exploiting ethnic sentiments for electoral gains.

3. Addressing Socio-economic Inequalities

Economic and social inequalities remain significant drivers of ethnic friction in Nigeria. Many minority groups perceive their exclusion from national wealth as a deliberate act of marginalization. Henceforth, policies that ensure equitable distribution of resources and economic opportunities across all regions must be implemented. Infrastructure development, industrialization projects and job creation initiatives should be evenly spread to enhance national integration and economic stability.

Revolving inequality in Nigeria also requires reforms in public administration to ensure equitable representation in government agencies. Marginalized groups should have fair access to federal appointments, scholarship programs, and social empowerment initiatives. By doing so, such perception of ethnic dominance in governance will be significantly reduced.

4. Enhancing the Function of the Media in Promoting National Unity

The media is a potent instrument that can either strengthen national cohesion or ethnic divisions. By discouraging polarizing reporting and false information, the Nigerian media environment should promote responsible journalism. Ethnic and religious propaganda has turned social media platforms into battlefields, frequently escalating needless tensions.

Strict rules must be established by the government and media regulatory organizations to stop divisive speech and encourage unity in the country through media discourse. Campaigns to raise public awareness of the negative impacts of racial and religious bias in politics ought to be strengthened. To lessen polarization, the media should promote narratives of national unity, highlight successful examples of interethnic cooperation, and offer objective coverage of political events.

5. Equitable Representation and Federal Character

The Nigerian constitution's Federal Character Principle was created to guarantee equitable representation for all ethnic groups in positions of authority. But because of its poor execution, it has been criticized for being ineffective and biased. The Federal Character Commission should be reorganized to ensure meritocracy and openness in the selection process to increase its efficacy.

Thus, the principle should be extended beyond public service appointments to include equitable access to government contracts, educational opportunities, and developmental projects. By strengthening this framework, Nigeria can foster an administrative system that reflects the nation's diversity and discourages the monopolization of power by dominant ethnic groups.

6. State Creation as a Tool for Reducing Ethnic Friction

One of the most effective strategies Nigeria has employed in mitigating ethnic tensions is state creation. Historically, the restructuring of Nigeria's territorial divisions has helped to dilute ethnic dominance and enhance administrative efficiency. Further devolution of powers through the creation of

additional states and local government areas can provide smaller ethnic groups with a greater sense of representation and political autonomy.

Moreso, the creation of new states must be carefully managed to avoid unnecessary political fragmentation and economic inefficiency. It should be driven by genuine developmental needs rather than mere political maneuvering. The process must ensure that new states are economically viable and capable of sustaining themselves without excessive reliance on federal allocations.

Creating and implementing these recommendations requires a concerted effort from the government, civil society, educational institutions, and international partners. The promotion of national unity, inclusive politics, economic equity, media responsibility, federal character enforcement and strategic state creation will collectively foster a more integrated and functional public administration system in Nigeria. These measures will also not only strengthen democracy but also create a political environment where ethnic and religious diversity is a source of strength rather than a divisive factor. A holistic approach to governance, emphasizing representation and inclusivity will position Nigeria as a model for diverse yet harmonious nation-building.

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Appendix A

Title Page

AL-FARABI KAZAKH NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

UDC: 321.53 (669)

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YAKASAI BASHIR ALIYU

**The Role of Tribal Relations in the System of Public Administration in
Nigeria**

8D03104 - Political Science

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Philosophy and Political Science as a
Requirement for the Fulfillment of PhD in Political Science

Research Supervisor: Abzhapparova Aigul
Abdulmutallipovna, PhD

Foreign Supervisor: Prof. Erhan Dogan
Marmara University
Istanbul, Turkey

Republic Of Kazakhstan

Almaty, 2025

Appendix B

List of Publications from the dissertation

S/ N	Title of Publication	Published /In-review	Name of Journal, Year and ISSN	No. Of Pages	Name of Co- Author
1.	Role of Tribal Relations in the Public Administration system of Nigeria	Published SCOPUS Q1	Public Integrity 2025 <u>ISSN 1099-9922</u> https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10999922.2025.2472977?src=exp-la	17	
2.	Ethnic Politics Towards The Influence of Voter's Behavior: A Case Study Of Nigeria's 2023 Presidential Election	In-Review SCOPUS Q3	Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 2025 <u>1473-8481</u> https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/17549469	18	Aigul Abzhapparova Abdulmutalipovna
3.	Nigeria's System of Government and Administration From the Post-Colonial Era to Date	Published	2023 Vol. 84 No. 4 https://bulletin-socpolit.kaznpu.kz/index.php/ped/article/view/509	16	
4.	Inter-Ethnic Relation in a Multi-ethnic society	Published	2024 Vol. 109 No. 1 https://journal-ks.kisi.kz/index.php/ks/article/view/272/142	11	
5.	The Concept of Pluralistic Society: An Overview of Nigerian Tribes	Published	2024 Vol. 89 No. 2 https://journal.apa.kz/	17	

6.	The impact of tribes in the system of state governance in Nigeria	Published	https://journal-kogam.kisi.kz/index.php/kd/authorDashboard/submission/353	17	
7.	Unity or Division: The Impact of Modern Media in Promoting Peace or developing conflict	Published	2023 Proceedings of the National Academy of Science	12	
8.	Introduction of ICT to Reshape Public Institutions in Rural Areas	Published	2022 Vol. 8 No. 2 https://jhumansoc-sc.kaznu.kz/index.php/1- eurasian/article/view/568	16	

Appendix C

Approval of the Legal and Ethical Commission of the university to carry out the dissertation study

«ӘЛ-ФАРАБИ АТЫНДАҒЫ
ҚАЗАҚ ҰЛТТЫҚ УНИВЕРСИТЕТІ»
КОММЕРЦИЯЛЫҚ ЕМЕС АКЦИОНЕРЛІК ҚОҒАМЫ
ҒЫЛЫМ ЖӘНЕ ИННОВАЦИЯЛЫҚ
ҚЫЗМЕТ ДЕПАРТАМЕНТІ
ЖЕРГІЛІКТІ ЭТИКАЛЫҚ КОМИТЕТ



НЕКОММЕРЧЕСКОЕ АКЦИОНЕРНОЕ ОБЩЕСТВО
«КАЗАХСКИЙ НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ
УНИВЕРСИТЕТ ИМЕНИ АЛЬ-ФАРАБИ»
ДЕПАРТАМЕНТ ПО НАУКЕ
И ИННОВАЦИОННОЙ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ
ЛОКАЛЬНЫЙ ЭТИЧЕСКИЙ КОМИТЕТ

№ 588
Алматы қаласы

№ _____
город Алматы

Ethical approval

1.	Full name of PhD student	Yakasai Bashir Aliyu
2.	Specialty of PhD Program	«8D03104 - Political Science»
3.	Time period of study at PhD Program	2022-2025
4.	Theme of the thesis, date of approval	«Role of Tribal Relations in the Public Administration System of Nigeria», 27.10.2022
5.	Information about scientific supervisor (-s) (Name, title, degree, work position and citizenship)	Abzhapparova Aigul Abdumutalipovna, PhD, acting Associate Professor - Kazakh Erhan Dogan, PhD, Professor, Marmara University. – Turkish
6.	Objects of study	Pubic Administration System of Nigeria
7.	Planning, sampling and conducting of study	Violations are not revealed
8.	Dissemination of results or practical implementation	Violations are not revealed
9.	Protection of rights, safety and welfare of research objects	According to ethical principles
10.	Code of approval	IRB - A1657
11.	Date of study approval	27.05.2025

Chair of LEC

G. Ussatayeva

Secretary of LEC

M. Shaukharova



Appendix D
Questionnaire of the dissertation survey

Tribal Relation

1. I do things with people who share the same _____ with me
 1. Tribe
 2. Nation
 3. Religion
 4. Region

2. I choose whom to vote as president based on.....?
 1. Ethnicity
 2. Religion
 3. Region
 4. Nation

3. Based on your opinion which system of government or administration is best for Nigeria's multi-ethnic society?
 1. Federalism
 2. Unitary
 3. Local administration
 4. Independent regional State

4. Selection of administrators should be based on
 1. National Identity
 2. Region/State
 3. Tribe
 4. Competition
 5. Quota

5. Share of National Resources should be based on _____
 1. State of origin
 2. Quota
 3. Revenue return
 4. Administration decision

Section II

Answer the Questionnaire from the table below to the best of your knowledge by circling the chosen number. You may choose from 1-5 where 1 is strongly disagree 3 is Neutral and 5 is Strongly agree.

S/N	Question	Degree of Agreement				
1.	To what degree do you trust the public administration system of Nigeria.	1	2	3	4	5
2.	To what extent do you agree that tribe affiliation is influential in Nigeria's public administration system.	1	2	3	4	5
3.	To what extent do you agree that the Federal Character has impact on job and resource distribution?	1	2	3	4	5
4.	How much do you agree or disagree on the efficiency of public service delivery in Nigeria's Public Administration.	1	2	3	4	5
5.	To what extent do you agree that there is recruitment fairness in job distribution in the Federal government.	1	2	3	4	5

Section III


Answer the Questionnaire from the table below to the best of your knowledge by circling the chosen number. You may choose from 1-5 where 1 is strongly disagree 3 is Neutral and 5 is Strongly agree.

S/N	Question	Degree of Agreement				
1.	The sharing system of economic and social resources among regions and ethnicities is fair. To what extent do you agree?	1	2	3	4	5
2.	How much do you agree that the Federal Character commission is not operating fairly?	1	2	3	4	5
3.	I feel a sense of fairness between different tribes in institutional services and social interaction.	1	2	3	4	5
4.	Each state should have its own	1	2	3	4	5

	security and police department. To what extent do you agree?					
5.	Nigeria has enough programs that support national unity and inter-tribal relation. To what extent do you agree?	1	2	3	4	5
6.	How much do you agree that one tribe or ethnic group has been ruling Nigeria for long time?	1	2	3	4	5
7.	I value tribal origin or regional origin over Nationalism. To what extent do you agree?	1	2	3	4	5
8.	The Quota system should be abolished during the employment process of the federal government. To what extent do you agree?	1	2	3	4	5
9.	How much do you agree that the Representation of Parliament members in the lower and upper house is fair/Proportionate.	1	2	3	4	5
10.	How much do you agree that the present political and democratic system of Nigeria is fair to all tribes and ethnic groups?	1	2	3	4	5

Appendix E

Consultation with Arend Lijphart, the founder of the theory of “Consociationalism”. September, 2024



Appendix F

Author's Practical experience of The National Youth Service Corps (NYSC). May 2023.



Appendix G

Data of the survey of Tribal Relation in the Public Administration of Nigeria collected 2023-2024.

R Id	State	Ethnic Group	Age	Gender	Recr. Fair.	Tribe. And Aff.	FCC imp	Ser. Del.	Trust in Pub. Ad
1	Kaduna	Yoruba	30	Female	4	2	2	4	5
2	Ibadan	Minority	57	Male	2	3	5	1	5
3	Enugu	Minority	19	Female	5	1	5	3	4
4	Ibadan	Yoruba	37	Male	1	2	1	2	5
5	Ibadan	Yoruba	18	Male	3	5	1	3	3
6	Kano	Igbo	54	Female	5	3	1	1	2
7	Enugu	Minority	26	Male	5	3	4	1	5
8	Enugu	Yoruba	34	Male	3	2	5	5	3
9	Enugu	Igbo	26	Female	5	1	3	1	3
10	Ibadan	Minority	28	Male	1	5	2	3	3
11	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	32	Male	1	1	4	4	3
12	Enugu	Igbo	41	Male	3	4	3	4	4
13	Port Harcourt	Minority	55	Male	4	4	5	5	3
14	Ibadan	Minority	52	Female	2	2	1	3	4
15	Kano	Igbo	47	Female	4	2	5	3	4
16	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	48	Female	5	2	2	1	3
17	Port Harcourt	Igbo	22	Male	2	4	4	3	2
18	Port Harcourt	Minority	61	Male	3	1	4	2	3
19	Kano	Yoruba	31	Female	3	1	2	1	3
20	Kaduna	Yoruba	28	Male	2	2	3	2	3
21	Ibadan	Igbo	26	Male	1	5	3	5	2
22	Lagos	Minority	51	Male	2	1	4	4	1
23	Kaduna	Yoruba	29	Male	5	4	4	5	1
24	Kano	Minority	52	Female	1	3	1	4	4
25	Port Harcourt	Igbo	52	Female	3	3	3	5	4
26	Ibadan	Yoruba	18	Female	2	3	2	3	2
27	Kaduna	Minority	57	Male	4	5	3	2	5
28	Lagos	Yoruba	39	Female	4	2	1	4	1
29	Lagos	Igbo	46	Female	5	4	4	1	4
30	Enugu	Minority	25	Male	4	5	4	2	1
31	Enugu	Yoruba	28	Male	2	4	1	1	2
32	Kano	Igbo	58	Female	2	4	2	2	2
33	Kaduna	Yoruba	54	Female	4	2	4	2	5
34	Kaduna	Yoruba	31	Female	2	3	5	5	5

35	Port Harcourt	Hausa- Fulani	47	Female	5	2	4	4	2
36	Port Harcourt	Hausa- Fulani	52	Male	1	5	5	4	4
37	Port Harcourt	Igbo	38	Female	5	5	1	2	1
38	Enugu	Hausa- Fulani	54	Female	5	5	1	3	3
39	Kaduna	Igbo	22	Male	2	2	4	3	5
40	Kaduna	Hausa- Fulani	36	Female	1	4	3	1	3
41	Lagos	Yoruba	31	Male	2	4	5	1	4
42	Enugu	Igbo	43	Male	3	1	2	5	5
43	Ibadan	Igbo	21	Male	2	5	4	2	3
44	Enugu	Yoruba	42	Female	2	4	2	1	4
45	Ibadan	Igbo	62	Female	2	1	4	1	1
46	Lagos	Igbo	59	Male	1	4	3	2	4
47	Kano	Hausa- Fulani	42	Female	2	5	3	5	5
48	Kaduna	Igbo	35	Female	1	3	3	1	2
49	Lagos	Minority	57	Male	4	5	3	5	1
50	Kaduna	Yoruba	25	Male	3	2	1	4	3
51	Port Harcourt	Hausa- Fulani	56	Female	1	4	1	5	5
52	Kano	Hausa- Fulani	57	Male	4	4	5	3	2
53	Kano	Minority	31	Female	1	2	2	3	4
54	Lagos	Yoruba	49	Female	1	2	4	5	2
55	Kano	Yoruba	55	Female	3	3	4	3	5
56	Ibadan	Hausa- Fulani	50	Female	5	4	1	4	5
57	Kano	Igbo	40	Male	5	4	4	2	2
58	Kaduna	Hausa- Fulani	32	Male	1	3	1	3	4
59	Kaduna	Yoruba	50	Male	2	1	5	3	2
60	Kaduna	Minority	42	Male	4	3	2	5	5
61	Kaduna	Hausa- Fulani	34	Female	2	5	5	4	5
62	Ibadan	Yoruba	50	Female	2	4	3	2	3
63	Enugu	Hausa- Fulani	64	Male	1	2	3	5	3
64	Port Harcourt	Igbo	19	Female	1	5	3	5	1
65	Lagos	Hausa- Fulani	31	Female	1	4	5	4	5
66	Kaduna	Hausa- Fulani	57	Female	1	3	4	2	3
67	Kano	Yoruba	57	Male	5	5	2	4	2
68	Kaduna	Yoruba	56	Male	1	4	3	2	4
69	Kano	Yoruba	23	Male	5	1	3	4	2
70	Port Harcourt	Hausa- Fulani	23	Female	5	1	3	5	4
71	Port Harcourt	Igbo	20	Male	1	2	2	5	3

72	Port Harcourt	Minority	24	Male	3	4	3	1	1
73	Kano	Minority	25	Male	4	1	2	3	2
74	Kaduna	Yoruba	59	Male	2	3	3	4	2
75	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	32	Male	5	4	5	1	2
76	Ibadan	Hausa-Fulani	64	Male	4	3	5	3	4
77	Kano	Minority	46	Female	3	3	2	4	3
78	Kano	Yoruba	50	Female	2	1	5	2	2
79	Kaduna	Igbo	47	Male	2	4	2	3	2
80	Kano	Igbo	56	Male	5	5	5	5	1
81	Kano	Yoruba	44	Female	1	1	5	1	1
82	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	53	Female	3	1	2	3	3
83	Kaduna	Minority	46	Male	5	4	4	3	3
84	Port Harcourt	Minority	55	Male	3	4	5	5	5
85	Port Harcourt	Hausa-Fulani	50	Male	1	3	3	4	1
86	Kaduna	Minority	54	Male	1	4	4	2	5
87	Lagos	Igbo	44	Female	5	3	2	5	4
88	Port Harcourt	Igbo	50	Male	1	1	4	2	5
89	Ibadan	Yoruba	21	Male	4	2	1	4	2
90	Ibadan	Minority	39	Male	2	5	1	3	5
91	Kano	Hausa-Fulani	19	Male	5	1	5	2	3
92	Ibadan	Igbo	27	Female	3	4	5	1	4
93	Kano	Igbo	22	Female	4	5	3	1	2
94	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	27	Female	5	2	4	5	5
95	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	50	Male	1	2	1	4	4
96	Kaduna	Igbo	55	Male	1	3	5	5	4
97	Kaduna	Igbo	30	Female	1	5	4	5	2
98	Ibadan	Hausa-Fulani	48	Male	1	3	5	5	5
99	Lagos	Igbo	64	Male	3	1	5	1	4
100	Ibadan	Yoruba	53	Female	4	5	1	1	4
101	Ibadan	Yoruba	62	Female	2	1	1	5	1
102	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	41	Female	3	3	5	1	4
103	Lagos	Minority	32	Female	3	5	2	4	1
104	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	46	Male	2	3	5	5	5
105	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	25	Male	2	5	5	1	5
106	Kaduna	Minority	22	Female	1	3	3	2	5
107	Enugu	Minority	46	Male	3	2	3	5	3
108	Enugu	Minority	64	Female	5	3	3	5	5
109	Lagos	Yoruba	21	Female	2	2	2	4	4

110	Enugu	Igbo	29	Male	2	3	2	3	2
111	Enugu	Yoruba	62	Female	4	5	5	3	1
112	Lagos	Igbo	19	Male	5	5	3	4	3
113	Enugu	Yoruba	44	Male	5	5	2	4	5
114	Ibadan	Igbo	48	Male	2	4	1	4	5
115	Kano	Yoruba	53	Male	1	1	5	3	2
116	Kano	Minority	53	Female	4	5	4	4	2
117	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	43	Male	5	2	5	1	3
118	Kaduna	Yoruba	60	Female	2	5	4	5	1
119	Lagos	Igbo	44	Female	5	4	3	5	5
120	Kaduna	Minority	22	Female	4	2	4	2	3
121	Kano	Yoruba	37	Female	4	4	3	2	4
122	Lagos	Yoruba	28	Male	3	2	1	5	4
123	Port Harcourt	Minority	27	Male	2	3	4	1	3
124	Ibadan	Yoruba	57	Female	4	1	5	3	5
125	Enugu	Hausa-Fulani	55	Female	3	1	3	3	3
126	Kaduna	Yoruba	23	Male	3	4	5	1	5
127	Port Harcourt	Hausa-Fulani	25	Female	5	1	2	3	2
128	Enugu	Hausa-Fulani	40	Male	5	4	3	4	3
129	Enugu	Minority	64	Female	3	4	4	5	5
130	Lagos	Yoruba	43	Male	5	4	3	5	3
131	Enugu	Minority	63	Female	4	1	5	1	3
132	Ibadan	Yoruba	60	Female	1	4	1	3	5
133	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	29	Male	4	1	3	2	5
134	Enugu	Igbo	43	Female	3	4	4	2	1
135	Lagos	Yoruba	30	Female	3	5	2	3	3
136	Ibadan	Minority	57	Male	4	4	1	2	4
137	Kano	Hausa-Fulani	35	Female	5	2	2	1	3
138	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	42	Male	5	4	3	1	3
139	Enugu	Igbo	50	Male	3	3	5	3	5
140	Lagos	Minority	64	Female	2	4	5	2	3
141	Kano	Yoruba	57	Female	5	2	4	1	3
142	Kano	Minority	60	Female	4	2	5	1	4
143	Kaduna	Igbo	29	Female	5	1	1	4	5
144	Ibadan	Igbo	61	Female	4	5	5	4	3
145	Enugu	Minority	53	Female	3	4	4	1	2
146	Lagos	Yoruba	21	Female	5	1	3	3	1
147	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	22	Male	4	5	3	5	4
148	Ibadan	Igbo	54	Female	3	4	5	5	3
149	Kaduna	Yoruba	25	Male	2	3	2	1	2
150	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	59	Female	4	4	3	1	3

151	Ibadan	Hausa-Fulani	45	Female	2	2	5	1	3
152	Ibadan	Igbo	48	Male	2	2	4	3	5
153	Enugu	Igbo	26	Female	1	3	5	4	5
154	Ibadan	Yoruba	46	Female	5	1	3	1	5
155	Kaduna	Yoruba	31	Male	4	5	4	1	2
156	Ibadan	Hausa-Fulani	57	Female	2	4	5	2	3
157	Enugu	Hausa-Fulani	58	Female	1	2	1	3	1
158	Enugu	Igbo	39	Female	3	1	4	1	4
159	Port Harcourt	Minority	28	Male	4	3	1	2	5
160	Kaduna	Igbo	40	Female	2	2	2	5	5
161	Kano	Yoruba	18	Female	5	3	4	1	3
162	Kano	Igbo	63	Female	1	4	1	1	3
163	Ibadan	Minority	54	Female	2	5	3	2	2
164	Port Harcourt	Hausa-Fulani	38	Male	5	2	3	3	2
165	Lagos	Minority	43	Male	2	2	2	1	5
166	Ibadan	Minority	63	Female	4	4	4	5	3
167	Port Harcourt	Minority	53	Female	4	1	4	1	1
168	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	40	Male	4	5	4	5	4
169	Kaduna	Minority	18	Male	1	2	2	4	3
170	Kaduna	Minority	57	Female	4	5	4	4	3
171	Kaduna	Minority	32	Male	5	2	3	5	2
172	Kaduna	Yoruba	38	Female	2	5	1	3	4
173	Port Harcourt	Minority	64	Male	3	3	3	1	5
174	Port Harcourt	Hausa-Fulani	26	Male	5	2	3	1	3
175	Enugu	Minority	26	Male	5	5	1	4	5
176	Kano	Minority	27	Male	4	1	3	5	3
177	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	43	Female	1	3	2	1	5
178	Lagos	Minority	58	Male	2	3	1	1	4
179	Port Harcourt	Hausa-Fulani	52	Male	1	1	3	3	2
180	Lagos	Minority	42	Female	2	5	5	2	4
181	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	43	Male	2	4	3	4	1
182	Lagos	Minority	28	Male	1	1	2	4	2
183	Enugu	Minority	55	Female	5	5	4	2	4
184	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	19	Male	2	1	3	1	1
185	Lagos	Yoruba	24	Female	1	1	4	3	3
186	Kaduna	Minority	35	Female	2	2	5	3	3
187	Ibadan	Minority	44	Female	3	5	3	4	5
188	Lagos	Igbo	51	Female	5	4	1	3	2

189	Enugu	Hausa-Fulani	44	Male	4	2	4	2	3
190	Port Harcourt	Igbo	34	Female	2	1	5	1	2
191	Enugu	Yoruba	60	Male	3	1	1	2	3
192	Lagos	Yoruba	61	Male	4	1	1	5	5
193	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	41	Male	4	5	1	4	4
194	Ibadan	Yoruba	42	Male	2	5	1	3	5
195	Lagos	Minority	24	Male	1	2	3	5	1
196	Enugu	Yoruba	23	Male	2	4	3	3	3
197	Kano	Minority	41	Male	3	2	3	1	1
198	Kaduna	Minority	50	Male	4	3	5	1	1
199	Enugu	Yoruba	46	Male	2	1	5	1	2
200	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	60	Male	1	1	5	3	3
201	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	39	Female	2	1	2	5	1
202	Kaduna	Igbo	43	Female	5	2	5	1	4
203	Lagos	Yoruba	45	Female	1	2	3	5	1
204	Port Harcourt	Hausa-Fulani	38	Male	3	1	3	3	4
205	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	24	Female	4	2	2	5	2
206	Kano	Igbo	34	Female	2	5	2	3	1
207	Kaduna	Minority	37	Female	1	5	5	3	5
208	Kaduna	Yoruba	58	Male	5	2	4	4	2
209	Port Harcourt	Igbo	37	Male	1	1	2	3	4
210	Kano	Yoruba	39	Male	5	2	1	3	2
211	Enugu	Hausa-Fulani	45	Male	3	2	3	2	1
212	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	57	Female	4	2	1	1	3
213	Ibadan	Minority	24	Female	3	3	3	4	3
214	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	18	Female	2	5	3	4	4
215	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	49	Female	1	4	2	4	4
216	Enugu	Igbo	30	Male	5	4	2	2	3
217	Lagos	Yoruba	47	Male	5	3	1	3	4
218	Kano	Yoruba	40	Male	1	2	3	1	2
219	Kano	Igbo	36	Female	1	3	1	5	5
220	Kaduna	Minority	49	Male	2	3	4	3	5
221	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	47	Male	3	1	1	2	2
222	Ibadan	Hausa-Fulani	46	Female	5	5	5	3	5
223	Lagos	Yoruba	62	Female	2	4	1	3	1
224	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	46	Male	3	2	5	2	2
225	Enugu	Minority	47	Male	2	4	5	4	4

226	Port Harcourt	Igbo	33	Male	5	4	5	4	2
227	Kano	Yoruba	57	Male	1	5	4	1	3
228	Ibadan	Igbo	36	Male	1	4	1	1	4
229	Kaduna	Yoruba	35	Male	3	4	1	4	3
230	Kano	Hausa- Fulani	18	Female	4	3	4	5	4
231	Port Harcourt	Igbo	31	Female	3	5	3	3	5
232	Kaduna	Yoruba	64	Female	4	1	2	5	2
233	Enugu	Hausa- Fulani	19	Male	2	2	1	3	1
234	Enugu	Igbo	45	Female	2	4	2	4	4
235	Lagos	Igbo	47	Male	5	2	4	1	4
236	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	55	Male	4	1	3	1	3
237	Ibadan	Yoruba	21	Female	5	2	3	5	5
238	Kaduna	Yoruba	18	Male	1	1	3	1	3
239	Kano	Hausa- Fulani	25	Male	4	3	4	4	3
240	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	46	Female	3	4	5	5	5
241	Port Harcourt	Igbo	56	Female	1	1	5	3	1
242	Enugu	Igbo	20	Female	1	2	2	1	3
243	Lagos	Yoruba	49	Male	3	4	5	2	3
244	Lagos	Yoruba	27	Female	1	3	5	1	4
245	Kaduna	Minority	27	Female	4	4	3	3	5
246	Enugu	Igbo	36	Male	5	1	3	5	2
247	Port Harcourt	Hausa- Fulani	63	Female	1	3	2	3	1
248	Ibadan	Minority	51	Female	4	2	1	2	1
249	Enugu	Yoruba	50	Female	2	3	2	4	5
250	Kaduna	Yoruba	40	Male	4	3	2	1	4
251	Kaduna	Igbo	45	Male	5	5	4	5	4
252	Enugu	Yoruba	49	Male	4	3	4	4	5
253	Kaduna	Hausa- Fulani	24	Male	3	3	2	3	4
254	Enugu	Igbo	46	Female	5	4	2	5	1
255	Kano	Yoruba	25	Male	2	2	2	4	1
256	Enugu	Igbo	18	Male	3	4	5	5	2
257	Enugu	Yoruba	20	Female	4	4	4	2	5
258	Kaduna	Yoruba	41	Female	5	1	2	2	3
259	Kaduna	Yoruba	40	Female	2	4	3	1	3
260	Lagos	Hausa- Fulani	25	Male	3	5	3	1	2
261	Lagos	Hausa- Fulani	64	Male	2	5	5	2	2
262	Kano	Igbo	54	Male	4	1	5	5	4
263	Lagos	Yoruba	20	Female	2	2	1	2	2
264	Enugu	Yoruba	50	Female	1	2	1	1	2

265	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	45	Male	3	4	1	2	3
266	Lagos	Yoruba	64	Female	2	4	5	2	4
267	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	25	Female	4	4	5	5	2
268	Kano	Yoruba	51	Female	4	2	5	4	2
269	Port Harcourt	Igbo	52	Male	2	3	3	1	4
270	Kano	Yoruba	49	Female	4	5	5	5	5
271	Enugu	Yoruba	41	Female	5	3	3	2	4
272	Kaduna	Minority	31	Male	5	3	1	2	3
273	Kano	Hausa-Fulani	49	Male	5	2	1	4	5
274	Lagos	Yoruba	63	Female	1	3	1	1	1
275	Kaduna	Yoruba	60	Female	2	1	2	1	4
276	Kaduna	Minority	33	Male	1	4	2	3	3
277	Lagos	Minority	21	Male	4	1	4	1	5
278	Kano	Hausa-Fulani	54	Female	1	5	4	4	4
279	Lagos	Minority	38	Female	4	4	4	3	2
280	Port Harcourt	Igbo	31	Female	4	3	2	3	4
281	Kaduna	Minority	48	Female	3	5	2	2	1
282	Ibadan	Igbo	35	Male	5	4	4	2	4
283	Ibadan	Hausa-Fulani	24	Female	4	3	4	1	5
284	Enugu	Hausa-Fulani	27	Female	3	1	5	3	5
285	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	24	Male	5	4	4	2	4
286	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	50	Female	4	3	5	4	5
287	Enugu	Hausa-Fulani	40	Male	4	1	3	2	2
288	Enugu	Igbo	38	Female	1	5	2	2	4
289	Enugu	Igbo	36	Female	1	5	4	3	2
290	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	36	Male	5	5	2	3	2
291	Port Harcourt	Minority	53	Male	4	5	2	5	3
292	Lagos	Yoruba	46	Female	2	2	2	4	4
293	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	35	Female	1	4	3	3	5
294	Enugu	Minority	19	Female	5	4	1	1	2
295	Lagos	Yoruba	18	Male	4	2	4	4	3
296	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	64	Female	4	3	1	4	4
297	Port Harcourt	Hausa-Fulani	22	Male	2	3	1	3	4
298	Kaduna	Igbo	37	Male	5	5	1	4	1
299	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	28	Female	4	1	2	3	1
300	Enugu	Yoruba	59	Male	1	3	5	2	2

301	Port Harcourt	Minority	19	Female	2	1	2	5	1
302	Lagos	Igbo	20	Female	5	4	2	2	2
303	Enugu	Igbo	40	Female	2	1	1	3	5
304	Lagos	Igbo	29	Female	1	4	2	3	2
305	Ibadan	Igbo	37	Female	5	2	1	2	1
306	Kano	Yoruba	22	Male	2	2	5	1	5
307	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	54	Male	3	5	4	1	1
308	Kano	Hausa- Fulani	55	Female	1	3	1	1	2
309	Kano	Hausa- Fulani	47	Female	1	5	5	3	3
310	Port Harcourt	Igbo	26	Male	1	4	4	4	4
311	Enugu	Igbo	51	Male	3	5	3	3	1
312	Ibadan	Igbo	61	Male	3	1	1	4	2
313	Lagos	Hausa- Fulani	52	Male	4	4	1	2	5
314	Kaduna	Minority	39	Female	2	2	3	5	1
315	Lagos	Minority	61	Female	4	3	3	4	1
316	Kaduna	Hausa- Fulani	41	Male	2	4	1	1	4
317	Lagos	Hausa- Fulani	34	Female	3	4	3	3	2
318	Port Harcourt	Hausa- Fulani	27	Male	3	1	2	2	3
319	Ibadan	Hausa- Fulani	47	Female	4	3	4	1	5
320	Kaduna	Hausa- Fulani	63	Male	5	2	4	2	2
321	Enugu	Hausa- Fulani	40	Female	4	4	4	5	5
322	Lagos	Igbo	49	Male	2	4	2	3	1
323	Lagos	Igbo	34	Male	4	1	3	3	4
324	Kaduna	Igbo	34	Female	1	5	5	5	4
325	Enugu	Igbo	31	Male	2	2	3	3	3
326	Enugu	Hausa- Fulani	26	Female	2	3	1	4	4
327	Port Harcourt	Minority	57	Female	5	4	4	2	1
328	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	19	Male	3	4	3	1	3
329	Port Harcourt	Hausa- Fulani	62	Female	2	2	5	5	2
330	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	42	Female	3	5	1	4	4
331	Port Harcourt	Minority	56	Female	4	4	2	1	3
332	Port Harcourt	Igbo	26	Female	1	2	2	1	1
333	Ibadan	Minority	39	Female	5	1	5	5	5
334	Enugu	Hausa- Fulani	60	Male	3	5	1	4	5
335	Port Harcourt	Igbo	63	Female	2	3	4	1	1

336	Enugu	Hausa-Fulani	21	Female	3	4	3	1	1
337	Enugu	Igbo	43	Female	2	2	1	4	5
338	Kano	Yoruba	46	Female	3	1	2	3	3
339	Ibadan	Yoruba	62	Female	2	3	5	1	5
340	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	51	Male	4	2	5	2	1
341	Lagos	Minority	40	Female	2	2	3	4	4
342	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	54	Male	2	3	5	1	2
343	Lagos	Minority	28	Male	1	1	5	5	4
344	Ibadan	Yoruba	23	Male	2	1	1	2	4
345	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	35	Male	1	5	4	1	1
346	Ibadan	Yoruba	38	Female	5	4	3	2	5
347	Enugu	Minority	59	Male	1	3	1	2	3
348	Kaduna	Minority	53	Male	4	3	4	3	4
349	Enugu	Minority	58	Female	1	3	1	2	5
350	Lagos	Yoruba	55	Female	5	1	1	3	3
351	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	51	Female	4	4	5	4	4
352	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	34	Male	3	5	4	3	3
353	Kaduna	Yoruba	54	Female	3	2	3	5	5
354	Port Harcourt	Hausa-Fulani	42	Female	1	2	3	1	2
355	Ibadan	Yoruba	55	Male	1	3	4	4	5
356	Port Harcourt	Hausa-Fulani	29	Female	5	4	5	4	1
357	Ibadan	Igbo	40	Female	5	1	2	5	3
358	Port Harcourt	Igbo	59	Female	2	4	1	3	2
359	Enugu	Minority	39	Female	5	4	5	1	3
360	Kaduna	Igbo	38	Male	2	1	4	3	3
361	Lagos	Igbo	44	Female	4	3	1	2	4
362	Ibadan	Igbo	48	Female	1	4	3	3	1
363	Ibadan	Yoruba	23	Male	4	2	2	4	3
364	Lagos	Igbo	44	Female	5	1	3	1	5
365	Port Harcourt	Igbo	57	Male	4	5	4	3	5
366	Ibadan	Minority	51	Female	4	3	1	1	4
367	Enugu	Igbo	29	Male	4	1	4	1	1
368	Kaduna	Igbo	62	Male	5	5	1	2	1
369	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	24	Male	4	5	5	2	5
370	Kaduna	Minority	27	Male	2	4	2	4	2
371	Ibadan	Minority	62	Female	5	4	5	5	4
372	Ibadan	Minority	34	Male	4	4	5	1	4
373	Lagos	Minority	43	Female	5	1	4	5	5
374	Enugu	Minority	38	Male	3	1	2	4	5
375	Kano	Minority	45	Male	2	3	1	1	2

376	Lagos	Yoruba	63	Male	4	4	1	1	2
377	Kano	Igbo	19	Female	3	5	3	5	1
378	Port Harcourt	Minority	60	Male	3	2	1	3	4
379	Kano	Igbo	18	Female	5	3	4	2	4
380	Enugu	Igbo	53	Female	3	1	5	3	5
381	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	43	Female	2	3	5	5	1
382	Kano	Minority	46	Female	2	3	5	2	4
383	Port Harcourt	Hausa- Fulani	38	Female	1	3	2	3	1
384	Kano	Yoruba	28	Female	2	3	1	2	1
385	Enugu	Hausa- Fulani	57	Female	3	2	4	1	5
386	Kano	Igbo	28	Female	2	4	2	3	1
387	Kano	Igbo	53	Female	5	5	3	2	2
388	Kano	Yoruba	56	Male	1	3	4	2	2
389	Lagos	Yoruba	57	Male	3	3	4	2	3
390	Lagos	Hausa- Fulani	52	Male	1	3	4	3	5
391	Lagos	Minority	51	Male	3	4	5	4	3
392	Enugu	Hausa- Fulani	64	Male	5	1	4	3	2
393	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	41	Female	1	1	1	5	3
394	Ibadan	Hausa- Fulani	39	Female	4	2	4	3	5
395	Kano	Yoruba	22	Female	3	1	5	2	5
396	Kano	Hausa- Fulani	50	Female	4	3	4	1	1
397	Enugu	Yoruba	53	Female	1	3	3	3	4
398	Kano	Yoruba	64	Female	4	3	3	3	1
399	Lagos	Yoruba	37	Female	4	2	5	2	5
400	Ibadan	Minority	36	Male	1	3	1	1	2
401	Kaduna	Hausa- Fulani	52	Male	5	1	1	1	2
402	Kano	Hausa- Fulani	60	Male	4	4	2	5	1
403	Lagos	Hausa- Fulani	34	Male	4	4	5	3	5
404	Kaduna	Yoruba	62	Female	5	5	4	1	2
405	Ibadan	Hausa- Fulani	60	Female	4	1	5	1	5
406	Kaduna	Hausa- Fulani	51	Female	4	3	2	4	2
407	Lagos	Yoruba	26	Male	4	4	5	4	5
408	Port Harcourt	Igbo	43	Female	2	1	5	1	3
409	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	19	Female	5	4	2	5	5
410	Kaduna	Hausa- Fulani	26	Female	4	3	1	1	5
411	Enugu	Yoruba	26	Male	5	4	4	2	1
412	Kaduna	Igbo	57	Female	3	5	2	3	3

413	Kano	Yoruba	34	Male	3	5	3	5	4
414	Kano	Hausa-Fulani	18	Male	4	4	1	2	1
415	Port Harcourt	Igbo	42	Male	5	1	3	5	4
416	Enugu	Minority	60	Male	5	1	1	2	2
417	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	57	Female	5	1	4	3	4
418	Kano	Igbo	59	Male	2	4	4	3	5
419	Port Harcourt	Igbo	42	Male	3	1	5	4	4
420	Ibadan	Minority	56	Female	5	3	3	2	1
421	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	52	Female	5	5	1	4	1
422	Kano	Yoruba	20	Male	2	3	4	2	4
423	Kano	Hausa-Fulani	54	Female	2	1	2	4	1
424	Port Harcourt	Minority	61	Male	5	3	4	3	1
425	Lagos	Yoruba	61	Male	1	1	2	5	4
426	Kaduna	Minority	47	Male	5	4	1	4	3
427	Kano	Yoruba	55	Male	5	3	4	2	3
428	Port Harcourt	Igbo	51	Female	2	4	4	2	2
429	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	29	Male	2	4	1	3	1
430	Enugu	Minority	36	Female	5	2	4	2	4
431	Kaduna	Igbo	54	Female	5	1	2	1	1
432	Ibadan	Igbo	61	Female	5	5	4	5	5
433	Lagos	Igbo	34	Female	2	1	3	4	1
434	Ibadan	Minority	27	Male	5	5	5	5	1
435	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	64	Female	5	1	2	3	3
436	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	29	Male	4	4	3	4	4
437	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	33	Female	1	3	1	4	1
438	Ibadan	Minority	41	Female	3	3	2	1	3
439	Kaduna	Igbo	36	Male	1	2	5	3	2
440	Port Harcourt	Hausa-Fulani	25	Male	4	5	5	2	3
441	Ibadan	Minority	48	Male	3	5	1	1	3
442	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	38	Female	5	5	1	1	3
443	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	34	Female	4	4	2	5	1
444	Enugu	Hausa-Fulani	40	Male	5	5	4	5	1
445	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	54	Male	2	3	1	5	2
446	Ibadan	Igbo	33	Male	4	4	4	1	5
447	Kano	Minority	23	Male	2	1	3	2	5
448	Kaduna	Igbo	25	Female	4	5	5	4	5
449	Kano	Igbo	42	Male	4	5	4	5	2

450	Port Harcourt	Igbo	35	Male	2	1	5	2	5
451	Enugu	Igbo	42	Male	3	5	4	3	5
452	Lagos	Igbo	29	Male	1	1	3	5	3
453	Enugu	Hausa- Fulani	32	Female	5	4	1	4	1
454	Kaduna	Igbo	43	Male	4	3	3	3	1
455	Kano	Igbo	58	Female	5	1	1	3	3
456	Kano	Minority	62	Male	2	2	1	4	3
457	Ibadan	Yoruba	43	Male	5	1	5	5	3
458	Kano	Hausa- Fulani	64	Female	2	5	3	1	1
459	Ibadan	Hausa- Fulani	49	Male	5	4	4	4	5
460	Port Harcourt	Hausa- Fulani	27	Female	1	4	3	4	3
461	Lagos	Igbo	33	Female	1	1	5	4	2
462	Kaduna	Igbo	24	Male	1	3	1	3	3
463	Ibadan	Igbo	34	Female	1	2	5	2	4
464	Lagos	Minority	40	Female	1	4	2	1	3
465	Kano	Yoruba	43	Female	1	5	2	5	1
466	Kano	Igbo	38	Female	2	5	4	5	3
467	Lagos	Yoruba	39	Female	4	3	5	2	4
468	Kano	Minority	24	Female	5	4	4	4	2
469	Port Harcourt	Hausa- Fulani	31	Female	1	1	4	1	5
470	Port Harcourt	Igbo	32	Female	2	5	2	5	3
471	Lagos	Yoruba	24	Male	2	3	4	5	4
472	Ibadan	Yoruba	26	Male	2	4	2	4	4
473	Ibadan	Igbo	25	Female	4	4	1	2	2
474	Lagos	Hausa- Fulani	40	Male	5	4	5	1	1
475	Ibadan	Hausa- Fulani	46	Female	4	4	4	2	3
476	Ibadan	Hausa- Fulani	35	Female	3	4	2	2	4
477	Port Harcourt	Minority	48	Male	2	5	3	1	2
478	Ibadan	Yoruba	47	Female	3	3	4	1	5
479	Enugu	Yoruba	56	Female	1	4	1	5	4
480	Kaduna	Yoruba	52	Female	1	2	1	5	2
481	Kano	Minority	35	Female	4	2	3	1	1
482	Enugu	Yoruba	59	Male	5	3	2	3	1
483	Ibadan	Minority	56	Female	3	1	4	5	4
484	Port Harcourt	Hausa- Fulani	34	Female	5	1	2	3	4
485	Lagos	Igbo	31	Female	4	1	1	1	3
486	Ibadan	Yoruba	48	Male	1	2	2	5	2
487	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	41	Female	5	1	1	2	4

488	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	52	Male	5	5	2	1	3
489	Ibadan	Igbo	61	Male	1	4	3	4	3
490	Lagos	Minority	62	Female	3	2	5	3	4
491	Port Harcourt	Igbo	51	Female	1	3	3	1	1
492	Port Harcourt	Hausa-Fulani	20	Male	5	3	3	1	2
493	Port Harcourt	Hausa-Fulani	54	Female	3	4	5	5	2
494	Kaduna	Igbo	60	Male	3	2	5	5	1
495	Ibadan	Minority	57	Male	1	1	4	5	4
496	Kaduna	Minority	43	Female	5	1	4	4	2
497	Kano	Yoruba	40	Female	4	5	3	5	4
498	Kano	Minority	61	Male	5	5	3	1	4
499	Ibadan	Igbo	56	Male	2	1	1	5	3
500	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	32	Male	4	3	1	2	1
501	Lagos	Yoruba	21	Male	3	3	4	5	4
502	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	46	Female	4	5	4	4	5
503	Port Harcourt	Hausa-Fulani	39	Female	3	4	1	2	1
504	Ibadan	Minority	42	Female	3	1	1	1	2
505	Kano	Hausa-Fulani	30	Female	4	5	2	1	3
506	Kano	Minority	35	Female	3	5	2	3	2
507	Port Harcourt	Hausa-Fulani	50	Male	3	1	1	2	2
508	Ibadan	Igbo	33	Female	2	1	2	3	1
509	Kaduna	Minority	62	Female	5	3	5	2	2
510	Kano	Igbo	59	Female	5	4	4	2	4
511	Kaduna	Yoruba	61	Female	2	4	4	4	2
512	Kano	Hausa-Fulani	19	Female	4	1	1	3	3
513	Kano	Yoruba	52	Male	1	2	3	4	3
514	Enugu	Yoruba	59	Male	1	5	1	2	5
515	Kano	Yoruba	51	Male	1	5	2	1	3
516	Lagos	Yoruba	47	Female	2	1	3	2	2
517	Ibadan	Hausa-Fulani	30	Male	2	2	2	4	3
518	Ibadan	Yoruba	30	Male	3	3	5	3	1
519	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	35	Female	1	1	2	3	3
520	Kano	Hausa-Fulani	49	Female	4	1	5	4	4
521	Lagos	Igbo	49	Female	4	5	5	3	1
522	Kaduna	Minority	52	Male	1	1	2	5	5
523	Enugu	Minority	56	Male	1	1	2	1	4
524	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	63	Female	1	1	5	1	2
525	Kaduna	Igbo	46	Female	2	5	3	1	2

526	Kano	Hausa-Fulani	46	Male	2	3	5	3	2
527	Enugu	Hausa-Fulani	61	Male	2	3	4	3	4
528	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	33	Female	5	1	5	2	4
529	Lagos	Igbo	61	Female	4	5	3	2	4
530	Lagos	Minority	64	Male	4	3	4	1	1
531	Ibadan	Igbo	27	Female	3	3	1	5	1
532	Enugu	Yoruba	47	Male	2	3	1	2	2
533	Enugu	Igbo	42	Male	5	5	3	2	3
534	Ibadan	Igbo	56	Male	5	5	5	3	2
535	Kaduna	Igbo	37	Male	4	1	2	5	5
536	Enugu	Igbo	22	Female	2	4	3	1	1
537	Lagos	Minority	18	Female	3	3	4	2	4
538	Lagos	Yoruba	47	Male	2	4	4	5	1
539	Kano	Minority	20	Male	1	5	1	5	4
540	Enugu	Minority	62	Male	2	5	4	1	5
541	Kaduna	Igbo	31	Male	1	5	3	5	5
542	Ibadan	Hausa-Fulani	47	Male	1	4	4	5	1
543	Ibadan	Hausa-Fulani	21	Female	3	5	3	5	4
544	Kaduna	Minority	35	Female	4	1	2	2	5
545	Port Harcourt	Minority	54	Female	2	5	1	1	2
546	Kano	Igbo	42	Female	1	2	4	5	2
547	Ibadan	Minority	18	Male	2	4	3	5	4
548	Enugu	Igbo	63	Male	4	2	5	2	1
549	Kano	Hausa-Fulani	32	Male	4	5	1	1	5
550	Enugu	Hausa-Fulani	26	Male	5	1	2	3	1
551	Lagos	Yoruba	32	Male	4	3	3	2	2
552	Kano	Hausa-Fulani	41	Female	3	5	2	1	5
553	Ibadan	Minority	21	Male	1	1	2	5	1
554	Kano	Hausa-Fulani	29	Female	5	4	4	1	3
555	Kano	Igbo	54	Female	3	2	4	1	4
556	Kano	Hausa-Fulani	54	Female	2	2	3	1	4
557	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	60	Female	1	2	5	3	3
558	Kano	Hausa-Fulani	23	Male	4	4	3	1	2
559	Enugu	Igbo	56	Female	1	1	5	3	5
560	Lagos	Igbo	63	Female	2	4	2	5	4
561	Kaduna	Minority	41	Female	5	2	1	3	3
562	Kano	Hausa-Fulani	28	Male	5	5	3	5	3
563	Ibadan	Igbo	30	Male	5	3	3	5	2

564	Kano	Yoruba	51	Male	4	4	5	3	2
565	Ibadan	Minority	42	Female	3	4	2	2	1
566	Enugu	Yoruba	24	Female	3	1	2	4	4
567	Ibadan	Hausa-Fulani	21	Male	1	1	5	1	1
568	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	25	Female	4	4	2	4	3
569	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	37	Male	5	2	4	1	5
570	Ibadan	Minority	46	Male	5	3	1	1	5
571	Ibadan	Igbo	62	Female	2	1	3	5	2
572	Lagos	Minority	63	Female	2	2	1	1	5
573	Kaduna	Yoruba	27	Female	5	5	3	1	5
574	Kano	Minority	60	Female	5	1	4	3	5
575	Ibadan	Yoruba	51	Male	4	2	2	4	3
576	Lagos	Minority	43	Male	3	2	5	3	5
577	Enugu	Igbo	58	Male	2	3	4	1	5
578	Lagos	Yoruba	20	Male	3	3	1	5	5
579	Enugu	Hausa-Fulani	23	Male	4	5	5	3	1
580	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	22	Female	5	2	2	3	3
581	Kano	Minority	22	Male	3	2	4	2	2
582	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	64	Male	5	3	5	1	1
583	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	40	Male	5	1	4	5	4
584	Ibadan	Hausa-Fulani	26	Female	1	1	4	3	3
585	Kaduna	Igbo	52	Female	3	4	2	3	3
586	Lagos	Igbo	37	Female	3	3	3	5	4
587	Ibadan	Minority	59	Female	5	4	5	1	4
588	Lagos	Yoruba	52	Male	4	3	2	2	4
589	Enugu	Igbo	35	Male	1	5	4	3	2
590	Lagos	Igbo	34	Female	5	2	2	2	5
591	Port Harcourt	Yoruba	41	Female	2	5	3	4	3
592	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	20	Male	2	3	5	1	5
593	Lagos	Hausa-Fulani	49	Male	1	2	3	4	5
594	Port Harcourt	Minority	52	Female	4	1	1	4	4
595	Kaduna	Hausa-Fulani	55	Female	5	1	5	4	2
596	Lagos	Yoruba	30	Female	3	4	3	1	1
597	Port Harcourt	Igbo	64	Female	1	3	4	1	2
598	Ibadan	Hausa-Fulani	42	Male	4	3	5	5	5
599	Enugu	Minority	26	Male	3	1	5	2	2
600	Enugu	Hausa-Fulani	21	Male	2	5	2	2	4

